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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE TO PERCEPTUAL RISK: 
MANAGING SUBSTANTIAL RESPONSE TO UNSUBSTANTIATED EVENTS 
 
 Analysis and perceived severity of risk influences organizational decisions to 
anticipated threats. As economic development and technology improve our standards of 
living, they also create new challenges to conceptualizing concrete and abstract threats. 
Organizations that face new threats, along with agencies that oversee these organizations, 
produce tightly coupled systems that increase risks for direct, indirect, and future 
stakeholders (Perrow, 1999). Natural disasters, political misbehavior, organizational 
corruption, financial collapse, food and water contaminations, chemical or nuclear 
accidents, international tension, to name a few, all present risks and challenges. 
Unfortunately, many of these situations endanger the lives and well-being of persons. The 
ability of individuals to conceptualize, prioritize, and respond to myriad threats ultimately 
determines their risk perception and intention to act accordingly.  
 
 Individuals often exaggerate some risks, while failing to acknowledge the severity 
of others (Sandman, 1989; Lachlan & Spence, 2007). This study will contribute to the 
understanding of subjectively constructed threats by examining three specific perceptual 
crises: A hoax, near miss, and risk misconstrual event. Each of these cases relies on 
robust newspaper descriptions, content analysis of media, and confirmatory 
organizational interviews. They are documented through a level of legislative action to 
determine real and structural changes incurred from perceptual crises. From these 
investigations this dissertation articulates how perceptual crises challenge organizations 
and governments, ascertains the viability of actional legitimacy theory, and observes 
variance in communication challenges between differing crisis contexts. These 
expectations encompass both applied and theoretical contributions. 
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Misconstrual  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 The analysis and perceived severity of risk influences organizational decisions to 
anticipated threats. As economic development and technology improve our standards of 
living, new challenges are also created with regard to conceptualizing concrete and 
abstract threats. Organizations facing new threats, along with agencies that oversee these 
organizations, produce tightly coupled systems that increase risks for direct, indirect, and 
future stakeholders (Perrow, 1999). Natural disasters, political misbehavior, 
organizational corruption, financial collapse, food and water contaminations, chemical or 
nuclear accidents, international tension, to name a few, all present current risks and 
challenges. Unfortunately, many of these situations endanger the lives and well-being of 
persons. The ability of individuals to conceptualize, prioritize, and respond to myriad 
threats ultimately determines their risk perception and intention to act accordingly. This 
perception process is often volatile. For example, individuals often exaggerate some 
risks, while failing to acknowledge the severity of others (Sandman, 1989; Lachlan & 
Spence, 2007).  
 Thus, perception is central to crisis communication. In fact, some crises are based 
entirely on perception. These crises of perception pose new challenges for risk and crisis 
communicators. From this perspective, risk may best be conceptualized in three forms (a) 
risk as feelings, (b) risk as analysis, and (c) risk as politics (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & 
MacGregor, 2004). Risk as feelings is constituted by risk estimates guided by emotion 
and unempirical intuition. Risk construction as analysis dominates discussion from 
experts who are tasked with consequentialist decision-making. This perspective assumes 
persons approach decision-making by weighing outcomes or consequences associated 
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with various alternatives (Sinaceur, Heath, & Cole, 2005). In recent years, research has 
also identified how subjective understanding influences risk construction (Sandman, 
1989). Risk that includes analysis and risk that includes feeling can yield politically 
construed risk independently of one another, or by a combination of the two. However, if 
risk as analysis or risk as feelings is considerably incongruent, risk management becomes 
more challenging. Slovic (1999) notes that as public perceptions of risk determine 
legislative priorities, funds may be incorrectly appropriated to minimal risks. In contrast, 
risk experts may identify risks that are deserving of attention, but are not taken seriously 
by general publics. The challenge, then, is to appropriately assess and manage multiple 
forms of risk in order to yield the most effective threat management and response.  
 Too often, health risks are arbitrarily determined by individuals who may or may 
not accurately calculate the severity of a threat absent of their own influence of personal 
experience. To make decisions wisely, persons must understand both the risks and 
benefits attached to various actions (Fischhoff, Bostrom, Quadrel, 1993). Risks that are 
incorrectly constructed generate false, or “paracrisis,” events (Coombs, 2012). These 
paracrises, or crises of perception, become real (or substantiated) events in the minds of 
individuals. Consequently, individuals or organizations then must construct substantial 
responses to unsubstantiated claims (Veil, Sellnow, & Petrun, 2011).  
 This study begins by establishing the need for greater understanding of crises of 
perception. Specifically, this chapter begins with a rationale for using three selected cases 
to demonstrate the impact and strategic responses warranted by each case. These cases 
include a hoax or prank, a near miss event, and a risk misconstrual. Next, this chapter 
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overviews selected case studies and details the focus of this study. Finally, a summary of 
dissertation chapters is provided.  
Rationale 
 The challenge and opportunity for future risk research is dependent on the ability 
to establish legitimate, empirically accurate, and empathetic responses to risk. Research 
indicates that “the public has a broad conception of risk, qualitative and complex, that 
incorporates considerations such as uncertainty, dread, catastrophic potential, 
controllability, equity, risk to future generations, and so forth, into the risk equation” 
(Slovic, 1999, p. 691). These subjective and diverse understandings of risk influence 
enacted policy to manage perceived threats. Unfortunately, at times, emotions dictate 
resource allocation. This means that communities, states, or the federal government may 
opt to prepare for threats that rank as a lower priority than other more legitimate threats 
(Tengs et al., 1995). This misappropriation places stakeholder groups in a precarious 
position: Individuals feel safer yet they simultaneously become more vulnerable to 
legitimate threats. A crisis of perception may then place illegitimate demands on precious 
resources. Three cases are presented to describe this process including an: Internet hoax, 
international food contamination, and the misconstrual of threat posed by genetically 
engineered (GE) foods. These cases are each briefly presented with short descriptions.  
Internet Hoaxes: The Case of Domino’s Pizza 
 In 2009, Domino’s Pizza (also referred to as Domino’s) responded to a tip from 
an online community that an unfavorable video was circulating on the video-sharing 
website YouTube. The video was uploaded by Domino’s employees Kristy Hammonds 
and Michael Setzer and featured the duo implying that they contaminated food that would 
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be served to customers. Although the video was recorded and uploaded without malicious 
intent (as would later be discovered), it was viewed more than one million times before 
being removed. Its short-lived circulation captured the interest of online communities and 
generated a public relations and financial crisis for the pizza company (Clifford, 2009). 
Ultimately, the video drastically increased Internet discussions about the quality and 
cleanliness of the restaurant chain (Clifford, 2009). 
 Hammonds and Setzer claim that they never actually delivered the tainted food, 
however the public’s perception of Domino’s food quality changed over the course of 
several days from positive to negative (Cliffords, 2009). The poor judgment of two 
employees, engaging in a prank, resulted in reputational damage to an organization that 
had not engaged in wrongdoing. Regardless of who was responsible for the hoax, 
Domino’s Pizza was forced to respond to the video. This event constituted an 
unsubstantiated crisis because no real threat existed as the video was merely a prank. 
Conversely, Internet viewers perceived the food contamination to be a real threat, 
resulting in a crisis of perception that demanded Domino’s attention. This event 
threatened Domino’s stakeholder legitimacy, future financial success, and created undue 
distress for publics who viewed the video. In the next section, near miss events are 
presented.  
Melamine and Near Misses 
 Near miss events are scenarios that have potential to become crises, but do not 
actually result in loss (Phimister, Oktem, Kleindorfer, & Kunreuther, 2003). In 2008, 
China became the epicenter of one of the largest food contaminations in history. In an 
effort to increase profits, manufacturers diluted powdered infant formula. In order to pass 
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mandated protein threshold levels a synthetic compound, melamine, was intentionally 
added to the product to increase the amount of testable protein. Children who consumed 
the industrial chemical experienced urinary problems, possible renal tube blockages, and 
kidney stones (WHO, 2009). Unfortunately, the incident killed six infants and sickened 
nearly 300,000 children in China, bringing worldwide attention to the issue (WHO, 
2009). In light of several other recent contaminations in the country, this case contributed 
to the growing narrative of corrupt and unsafe business practices in China (Peijuan, Ting, 
& Pang, 2009). Even though the contamination occurred in China and the product was 
not legally imported to the United States (U.S.), the federal government responded to the 
crisis as a legitimate threat. The fear was that because the United States does considerable 
trade with China, contaminated products could be imported in the future.  
 China’s 2008 melamine case illustrates the effects of a near miss event. Several 
months after the contamination erupted, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
instituted Country of Origin Labeling (otherwise known as COOL legislation) to aid 
consumers in identifying more information when purchasing products (NYT, 2008). The 
policy was originally introduced prior to China’s melamine crisis with the 2002 Farm Bill 
(The 2002 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act); however it stalled and was unable 
to pass into law. Even though the products did not directly affect American consumers, 
the 2008 melamine crisis received longitudinal attention from the U.S. television media, 
allowing advocates to emotionally push for enacting the labeling system. When the bill 
passed, identified industries were given six months to comply with the new identification 
system (USDA, 2009). This action cost producers millions of dollars—the USDA 
estimates that the conversion to the new system cost the beef industry $305 million 
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dollars alone (2009). While the melamine contamination could have affected the United 
States, and was a realistic threat, no true harm emerged to U.S. citizens. Nevertheless, the 
U.S. government employed both rhetorical and physical actions to respond to the crisis. 
These actions constituted substantial responses to what was a realistic, but 
unsubstantiated risk. Finally, misconstrued crises may also present unique challenges for 
risk and crisis communicators.  
Misconstrual and Genetically Engineered Food 
 Crises can be misconstrued in the sense that threat is falsely created through 
association. On November 6, 2012 the state of California proposed a new labeling system 
on GE food. This new identification system would require labeling on raw or processed 
food offered for sale to consumers made from plants or animals with “genetic material 
changed in specified ways” (Bowen, 2012, p. 54). Proposition 37 (Prop 37) in California 
would also prohibit sellers from labeling GE products as “natural” (Bowen, 2012). 
California Secretary of State Debra Bowen estimates that the state would incur an 
increased cost ranging from “a few thousand dollars to over $1 million” to regulate such 
a labeling system, which does not include potential litigation resulting from possible 
violations of the new requirements (Bowen, 2012, p. 55). In November 2012, Prop 37 
was defeated only marginally with 52.9% voting against the legislative mandate 
(California Secretary of State, 2012). Momentum has yet to subside for supporters of the 
initiative: They remain focused on altering content in the Farm Bill and pushing 
legislation on GE food labeling in other states.  
 Recently, genetic engineering has been a source of controversy. To date federal 
law does not regulate GE food differently from naturally bred varieties of food. The 
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USDA, Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) regulate GE crops to ensure consumer safety, but classify GE products no 
differently than natural counterparts (GAO, 2008). GE crops show promise in that they 
provide opportunities for food security and increased economic production, environment 
benefits, and improved international relations and trade (GAO, 2008). Genetically 
engineered crops are identified by the USDA as being a positive development for food in 
the United States, yet organizations like the European Union (EU) and the Organic 
Consumers Association (OCA) have increased efforts to eliminate GE food (Fernandez-
Cornejo & McBridge, 2000; OCA, n.d.). The EU has worked to identify and control GE 
food, asserting in a press release that “there is no flexibility for unauthorized” GE food in 
the EU (Gooch & Zeuthen, 2006, para. 2). In this sense, GE products are misconstrued as 
exclusively negative, fueling a growing anti-chemical or anti-science movement within 
the food industry. The misconstrual of risk in this situation creates the potential to lead 
U.S. policy in a direction that may yield significant lost opportunities for domestic food 
production – impacting both industry and public consumers.  
 Acknowledging the subjective and varying levels of risks associated in the 
aforementioned cases offers perceptive for establishing appropriate rhetorical responses 
to complex scenarios. Domino’s Internet hoax, the United States’ near miss melamine 
crisis, and California’s misconstrued GE food scare all provide tangible examples of how 
unsubstantiated claims can cause substantial damage to an organization’s reputation, 
government or private industry’s resources, and be emotionally or psychologically 
damaging to stakeholder groups. These cases are presented and discussed as prototypes 
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for differing crisis settings. Each scenario demands a tailored rhetorical response from 
responding organizations. 
Focus of the Study 
 This study extends our understanding of organizational legitimacy by applying the 
conceptual framework of actional legitimacy to three distinct crises of perception. In 
doing so, the study seeks to answer four research questions. First, what communication 
constraints and opportunities do organizations face when responding to crises of 
perception? Second, are identified constraints and opportunities different based on crisis 
type? Third, to what extent do hoaxes, near misses, and misconstrual of risk obligate 
organizations to engage in legitimation strategies? And finally, does the obligation for 
actional legitimacy during crises of perception differ by crisis type? Answering these 
questions will contribute to literature in several unique ways.  
 This study builds three main areas of inquiry. These topical areas include: (1) 
Establishing the communication challenges that crises of perception pose for 
organizations and government agencies, (2) ascertaining the viability of actional 
legitimacy strategies for responding to crises of perception, and (3) observing variance in 
the communication challenges between differing contexts. More specifically, this study 
examines these paradoxical rhetorical situations with the framework of organizational 
and actional legitimacy. Organizations are perceived as legitimate when their pursued 
goals fall in line with largely held social values (Parsons, 1960). In essence, organizations 
must practice legitimacy in order to remain in business and utilize resources from the 
community. Actional legitimacy is a microform of legitimacy that offers proactive 
strategies for achieving legitimacy when an organization’s reputation is threatened 
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(Boyd, 2000). This framework suggests observable functions that can be documented by 
researchers to improve relations with stakeholder groups. 
 This dissertation will clearly articulate how these three intersecting positions may 
facilitate or impede organizational responses to risk and crisis events. Further, this study 
establishes the necessity of legitimacy maintenance and/or building, theoretically 
constructing a unified account of both organizational and actional legitimacy measures 
and crisis response during three distinct crises of perception. Understanding crises of 
perception better equips responders to diminish human, social, and financial loss; manage 
resources more effectively; and better prepare or tailor communicative responses prior to 
the onset of an unsubstantiated claim. Next, a description of dissertation chapters is 
provided.  
Overview of Chapters 
Chapter Two provides a review of literature that guides this study. This chapter 
incorporates literature on organizational legitimacy, legitimacy and organizational 
responses, actional legitimacy, hoaxes, near misses, and misconstrual. This chapter also 
articulates central research questions that the study addresses. Chapter Three presents 
literature that supports and details the methodology used in this study. This chapter also 
describes data collection, analysis procedures, and artifacts (i.e. interviews, thematic 
coding of videos, press releases and other public organizational documents) used for 
analysis. Chapter Four describes Domino’s Internet Hoax. Chapter Five discusses the 
United States’ melamine near miss. Chapter Six concludes case study explanation by 
illuminating California’s misconstrued biotechnology crisis. Chapter Seven provides 
conclusions, implications, limitations, and opportunities for future research. 
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Summary 
 This chapter introduced crises of perception and how risk and health are often 
incorrectly managed, yielding ineffective mitigation techniques and response strategies. 
When legitimate risks are incongruent with how stakeholders perceive them, gaps in 
response capabilities emerge. Establishing legitimate, empirically accurate, and 
empathetic responses to risk are particularly demanding in perceptual crises. This 
dissertation uses three perceptual crises, including a hoax, near miss, and misconstrued 
crisis, as prototypes to illustrate the consequences of substantial responses to 
unsubstantiated claims.  
 This dissertation will articulate how perceptual crises challenge organizations and 
governments, ascertain the viability of actional legitimacy, and observe variance in 
communication challenges in differing crisis contexts. These expectations encompass 
both applied and theoretical contributions. Finally, an overview of chapters provides the 
reader with directions and organization for the study. The following chapter details 
relevant literature, which illuminates concepts identified for this project. Chapter Two 
begins with the origins of legitimacy, and places the framework in context with other 
similar organizational theories and or frameworks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Elizabeth Lauren Petrun 2013 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 Legitimacy is an integral structural component of sustaining power in both 
antiquity and modern institutions. Monarchs and empires, including benevolent and 
notorious rulers of far reaching ancient civilizations, have engaged in image campaigns to 
encourage their supporters and suppress resistance from competing adversaries. Today, 
businesses, corporations, and governments engage in frequent image campaigns. While 
the terminology used to discuss this concept has shifted over centuries, individuals or 
institutions in power cultivate acceptance, compliance, and devotion from stakeholders to 
affirm their status. This chapter explains the origins of modern legitimacy from an 
organizational perspective, while including work that maintains a communicative focus. 
To begin, modern legitimacy is defined through the original works of Weber. Next, 
organizational legitimacy is discussed as a dominant function of 20th and 21st century 
organizational communication efforts. Boyd (2000) extends the idea of legitimacy to 
include actional legitimacy, which more clearly articulates communicative efforts to 
support specific organizational policies or actions. Finally, contextual factors that 
influence legitimation responses are described.  
Legitimacy 
 The concepts guiding organizational legitimacy, or social action, are initially 
discussed in works by sociologist and philosopher Max Weber. Weber (1922) believes 
that “action, especially social action which involves a social relationship, may be guided 
by the belief in the existence of a legitimate order” (p. 31). Further, actions will only be 
accomplished when legitimacy or “geltung” (literal translation from German to English is 
“validity”) is present (Weber, 1922, p. 31). Aside from the basic definition of legitimacy, 
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Weber explicitly outlines several ways for an order (or command) to obtain legitimacy. 
Legitimacy can be generated by (a) tradition, (b) “virtue of affectual attitudes, especially 
emotional, legitimizing the validity of what is newly revealed or a model to imitate,” (c) 
virtue of a rational belief in its absolute value, or (d) through legal standards (Weber, 
1964, p. 130).  
 Tradition is often viewed as legitimate because it consists of a practice or activity 
to which all are accustomed. Actions that follow tradition are usually not questioned. The 
second form of legitimacy is found in the act of recognizing new situations that have 
always been “valid,” yet not before realized or understood (Weber, 1964). Next, Weber 
recognizes something as an “absolute value” when an occurrence or action follows 
natural law. Lastly, actions that adhere to legal standards are justified as legitimate 
because they follow precedent set by governing individuals or groups. Legitimacy as 
outlined by Weber (1964) is the driving force behind many actions. In fact, Weber’s very 
definition of sociology itself centered upon the notion of actions: Human actions 
construct society. Individual and organizational actions construct societal foundations, 
which ultimately construct our current reality.  
 Weber’s theories on legitimacy and other forms of legitimation elaborated the 
basic principles of modern public relations (PR) long before PR became a commonly 
known professional discipline. The idea of legitimacy eventually gained considerable 
momentum with the industrial revolution and increase of big businesses (Pieczka & 
L’Etang, 2001). When consumers no longer personally knew who was manufacturing 
their goods, perceived organizational legitimacy became a valid concern for the 
consumer. Legitimacy, according to Weber, sought to acquire and preserve support from 
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the general public (Waeraas, 2009). To date, maintaining legitimacy remains the most 
fundamental and universal goal of PR. 
 Organizations cannot claim legitimacy or admiration from stakeholders. Rather, 
stakeholders must bestow the attribute (Massey, 2001). This explains the growth of PR as 
modern organizations have recognized the value of cultivating positive organizational 
perceptions from their publics. As legitimation success and failure is based on the ability 
of organizations to win the hearts and minds of stakeholders, the loss of legitimacy is 
related to violations that are both real or observable and perceived or assumed.  
 The survival of an organization “must be ensured by continuously enabling the 
support and endorsement of the subjects, ensuring that they perceive the system as 
‘worthy’ of voluntary compliance” (Waeraas, 2009, p. 304). Organizations and other 
entities, by merely existing, are seen as possessing a privilege that must be continuously 
justified (Waeraas, 2009). Weber recognized that individuals socially construct 
reputations and perceptions of organizations. Actions perpetuated by organizations are a 
reflection of the organization’s significance. Not only must publics accept the idea that 
the organization has a justifiable right to exist (to fulfill some type of need/want), but 
publics must also believe the information that is released from the organization in the first 
place (Waeraas, 2009). In support, Parsons (1960) argues organizations that pursue goals 
in line with largely held social values have a legitimate claim on resources. In essence, 
organizations must practice legitimacy to remain in business and utilize resources from 
the community. From this perceptive, successfully managing public perception became a 
necessary task for organizational self-preservation and many PR initiatives.  
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Organizational Legitimacy 
 The corporate desire for public legitimation has not always existed (Boyd, 2000). 
Before the 1900s corporations had little responsibility to the consumer public, legally or 
otherwise (Boyd, 2000). Product liability was not given much consideration until 1915, 
and most regulatory agencies that exist today were yet to be created (Boyd, 2000). Boyd 
(2000) argues that corporate legitimacy gained momentum when the “muckraking” 
investigative journalists of the 20th century portrayed corporations as “demons,” 
prompting them to consider public concerns (p. 342). Muckrakers forced corporations to 
address negative publicity that they had previously avoided, which gave rise to the idea 
of legitimate, socially responsible, and ethical businesses (Boyd, 2000). Businesses could 
no longer solely turn a profit; they also were expected to pursue profit in a manner that 
was beneficial to all stakeholders. In the modern era, organizations are only legitimate if 
they provide constituents with necessary products or services in a satisfactory manner. 
However, as organizations seek to act legitimately they may encounter several 
challenges. For example, organizations that seek recognition from a wide variety of 
groups/individuals for endorsement and support may encounter a “vexing predicament” 
(Elsbach & Sutton, 1992, p. 699). If organizations adhere too closely to societal norms, 
they may repel outsider groups or individuals that could potentially provide endorsement 
and support (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992). Over compensation to societal norms will lead to 
dismissal and neglect from crucial outsiders (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992). 
 Institutional legitimacy initially emerged in the political realm before being 
applied to corporations. Political regimes have often searched for the most effective way 
to maintain organizational power. Stillman (1974) notes a government is legitimate if and 
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only if the results of the government’s output are compatible with the values of the 
society that it governs. Revolutions against and obedience to governments are often 
“justified if not partially caused by men’s ideas about what constitutes legitimate 
government” (Stillman, 1974, p. 34). Legitimacy may be found in governments through a 
variety of vehicles, such as majority opinion, tradition, ancestors, divine descent, kings, 
race, gender, etc. (Stillman, 1974). While legitimacy is not often vested in monarchy or 
divine descent anymore, it may be found in majority opinion. However, this also means 
that individuals will find legitimacy in some organizations and view others as 
illegitimate. Stillman (1974) acknowledges the possibility of a society absent of 
legitimacy “because the society’s value pattern is bifurcated, too chaotic, or too 
contradictory, or especially because different portions of the society strongly hold 
different value patterns with different key values” (p. 43). Habermas (1989) finds 
legitimacy difficult to develop, and states, “multinational corporations of the world 
market are not capable of legitimation” (p. 179). When governments, or organizations, 
grow and become dispersed they experience more barriers to achieving legitimacy than 
local and smaller entities.  
 Legitimacy is cultivated through varying means, such as majority opinion or 
tradition. Yet one characteristic remains static: Those outside the nuclear organization 
always confer legitimacy. Legitimacy is awarded by an organization’s stakeholders, and 
is largely a social process (Mazza, 1999). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) find organizations 
can survive only if they maintain a coalition of supportive stakeholders necessary for 
operation, which in turn means members of the coalition retain legitimacy granting 
privileges. This is one of the most notable differences between legitimacy and what is 
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known as reputation. Deephouse and Carter (2005) note that definitions of reputation 
largely rest on relative comparisons among organizations on various attributes, yet 
legitimacy is found in social acceptance resulting from adherence to regulative, 
normative, or cognitive norms that qualify one to exist. As such, an imperfect reputation 
is less debilitating than suffering from an organizational legitimacy crisis. Being viewed 
less favorably by other organizations does not threaten the organization’s continued 
existence (Deephouse & Carter, 2005). Having a lower business status does not mean a 
company may lose access to markets, although it may mean taking steps (such as 
lowering prices to keep customers) to ensure future business (Deephouse & Carter, 
2005). Legitimacy is not something to be claimed by organizations; stakeholders must 
bestow the attribute (Massey, 2001).  
Goals and Rationale for Organizational Legitimacy 
 Perceptions of corporate responsibility change with the passage of time. 
Organizations subsequently can gain or lose legitimacy as employees, policies and 
business practices evolve. In this sense, organizations utilizing legitimation strategies to 
gain public support for policies or practices must also adjust to shifting public 
perceptions (Boyd, 2000). Organizational legitimacy is rarely (if ever) stagnant and 
warrants constant supervision. Most organizations cannot survive without their 
stakeholders including consumers and investors. Organizations depend on such 
stakeholders and must be exceedingly sensitive to legitimation requirements (Boyd, 
2000). Thus, organizational legitimacy ought to be continuously pursued by organizations 
to maintain or bolster credibility with stakeholder groups.  
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 Organizations can employ a variety of response tactics to achieve legitimacy with 
stakeholders, such as specific organizational rhetoric or strategic actions with the intent to 
preserve an organization’s position in society. Legitimacy reflects “embeddedness in a 
system of institutionalized beliefs and action scripts” and often times “legitimate 
organizations become almost self-replicating, requiring little ongoing investment in 
collective mobilization” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Legitimacy is a worthwhile investment 
for organizations, and may not only affect how individuals act towards organizations but 
also how they understand them (Suchman, 1995). Audiences perceive legitimate 
organizations not only as “more worthy,” (of their attention and patronage) but also as 
more meaningful, more predictable, and more trustworthy (Suchman, 1995, p. 575). 
Subsequently, organizations perceived as legitimate by stakeholders may be more likely 
to invest less time and money in advertising, survive a crisis, avoid negative rumors, and 
retain stakeholders for longer periods of time. 
Legitimacy and Organizational Response 
 With the expansion of big businesses in the 20th century, organizations began to 
rely more heavily on PR and rhetorical actions to reach intended audiences. Until 
recently, rhetorical strategies have traditionally been used and studied in relation to 
individuals (Huxman & Bruce, 1995). However, Crable (1990) notes that organizations 
are the “true rhetors” of the latter half of the twentieth century, albeit they are at times 
unseen or unknown (p. 127). Organizational rhetoric is imperative for corporations to 
reach important stakeholders, especially when legitimacy has lapsed or expired. While 
most corporate “wrongdoings” are not rhetorical, “determination of the significance of 
the act is a decidedly rhetorical activity” (Hearit, 1995, p. 1). Thus, many organizations 
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engage in rhetorical appeals to bolster their legitimacy with stakeholders when faced with 
a crisis.  
 Modern corporations employ apologetic discourse, and have changed how the 
most popular rhetorical strategy is used (Hearit, 1995). Kruse (1977) defines apologia as 
a “public discourse produced whenever a prominent person attempts to repair his [sic] 
character if it has been directly or indirectly damaged by overt charges, or rumors and 
allegations” (p. 13). Apologia studies focus on defining situational parameters of 
apologetic discourse; specifying motive states that undergird apologists’ responses and 
identifying the rhetorical moves speakers use to defend themselves (Huxman & Bruce, 
1995). Corporate apologia, although relatively novel, demands increased attention 
because it has become frequent, sophisticated and broad in scope (Huxman & Bruce, 
1995). Corporate apologia typically arises in response to a social legitimacy crisis, which 
is the result of corporate mistakes (Hearit, 1995). Organizational responses must consider 
situational, substantive, and stylistic variables when formulating responses (Huxman & 
Bruce, 1995). Additionally, corporate apologias contain an element that individual 
apologias do not: The construct of decentralization (Huxman & Bruce, 1995). In other 
words, the organization makes decisions rather than a single individual. This process of 
diffusion makes message dissemination much more difficult by “intentionally or 
[unintentionally], obscure[ing] rhetorical responsibility and authorship” (Huxman & 
Bruce, 1995, p. 60).  
 When organizations commit offensive acts and seek absolution, they execute an 
apology to separate guilt from the midst of the congregation (Hearit, 2006). Punishing the 
offenders may be a course of action for producing purification to cleanse the organization 
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(Hearit, 2006). Such acts have a “salutary effect” in that they confirm institutional 
principles in addition to preserving social order (Gronbeck, 1978, p. 171). Hearit (2006) 
posits that such rituals purge guilt, which occurs through a ritualistic communication 
vehicle like apologia. Goffman (1971) believes there are three manners through which 
one may battle wrongdoing with apologia, including the “I didn’t do it” appeal, “someone 
else did,” or “I did do it” approaches. The apologia then may assert that the guilt does not 
exist through a posture of denial, transfer it to another person based on scapegoating, or 
accept it through a process of mortification (Hearit, 1994). The decision an organization 
makes rests upon the nature of the situation at hand, in addition to what the end goal of 
the response is (e.g., staying in business vs. discontinuing a brand or service). 
 Corporate apologia can be successful if the correct strategy is utilized in the 
correct situation, however it may also be damaging if implemented haphazardly. For 
example, corporate apologia was enacted when methyl isocynate (MIC), a deadly gas, 
was accidently released from the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India on December 3, 
1984 (Ice, 1991). The gas killed more than 2,000 people and injured tens of thousands, 
prompting Union Carbide to respond, in an effort to maintain its legitimacy. Union 
Carbide’s act of justification, while maybe premature or ill formed, had implications for 
the ability of the organization to offer sustained assistance to affected communities and 
victims of the crisis (Ice, 1991). The organization’s response focused on the scientific and 
technical dimensions of the accident, and blamed the Indian government for not 
supplying adequate “scientific” evidence of the human misery experienced by the victims 
(Ice, 1991, p. 357). These responses communicated an interest in the technical aspects of 
the situation, but ignored human dimensions (Ice, 1991). Union Carbide responded to 
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bolster the company’s image and ensure the future success of the company (Ice, 1991). In 
this sense, Union Carbide demonstrated public responsibility toward normative, 
functional, and stakeholder publics by addressing the concerns expressed by those publics 
(Ice, 1991). Following initial statements, Union Carbide implemented a “someone else 
did it” appeal and sought to shift blame to other entities involved with the crisis, such as 
the Indian government. As a result of this strategy, Union Carbide experienced increased 
levels of stakeholder outrage. Eventually, the company enacted corporate apologia as an 
organizational response to mitigate further backlash to the organization.  
 Aside from apologia, organizations can employ strategies such as image 
restoration to bolster legitimacy with publics. Benoit (1995) reports the two most basic 
assumptions of image restoration are that communication is indeed a goal-directed 
activity, and that maintaining a positive reputation is one of the central goals of 
communication. Issues campaigns may be used to alter public perceptions such as the one 
mounted by Northwest Airlines (NWA) in 1998 to provide “opportunities for creating, 
altering, and using zones of meaning” to “bring entities together in harmony” (Heath, 
1997, p. 193). Zones of meaning are the “shared information and opinion that members 
of organizations and publics understand and hold dear” (Heath, 1997, p. 192). Northwest 
Airlines at the time was grappling with a pilot strike, which was the result of a collision 
between the zones of fairness and corporate stability. Northwest’s leadership saw profit 
increases while employees saw no increase in compensation and corporate apathy 
(Cowden & Sellnow, 2002). With this event, internal stakeholders were pitted against the 
group’s organizational leadership creating considerable unrest (Cowden & Sellnow, 
2002). In order to promote the company’s decision, “NWA publicly lobbied through an 
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extensive issues advertising campaign for public support in actuating the crisis resolution 
that it preferred” (Cowden & Sellnow, 2002, p. 194). NWA hoped that through a strategic 
campaign they might improve their image and restore their reputation with important 
publics, thus reinstating legitimacy. 
 Both image restoration and apologia draw from Benoit’s (1995) five image 
restoration strategies of denial, evading responsibility, reducing offensiveness of the 
event, corrective action, and mortification. Benoit (1995) sees the implementation of such 
strategies as necessary because: We live in a world with limited resources (and must 
compete for them), circumstances beyond our control occasionally impede us from 
obtaining goals, human beings are imperfect and make mistakes, and finally, humans are 
individuals with varying sets of priorities which “fosters conflict among those with 
competing goals” (p. 1). When such inevitable circumstances occur, others are likely to 
“accuse, attack, berate, blame, censure, condemn, rail against, rebuke, or reproach us or 
object to our behavior” (Benoit, 1995, p. 1). Responses of this manner warrant rebuttal 
from the accused entity in order to restore legitimacy. Novel responses from 
organizations during crises are necessary for novel situations; however, occasionally 
organizations may be able to apply knowledge from previous experiences to assist in the 
crisis response. 
 In addition to institutional or organizational legitimacy, Boyd (2000) develops the 
concept of actional legitimacy to incorporate legitimation responses specifically for 
nuanced actions or policies. Actional legitimacy, then, extends Weber’s original notion of 
social or institutional legitimacy to accommodate nuanced and micro-organizational 
actions.  
 22 
 
Organizational Legitimacy and Actional Legitimacy  
 Boyd (2000) finds that organizational legitimacy is often used interchangeably 
with the term “institutional legitimacy,” which is a macro level unit of analysis and 
interpretation (p. 342). Suchman (1995) also identified this divide in legitimacy research, 
although he describes the legitimacy distinction as “strategic” or “institutional” (p. 572). 
Boyd (2000) asserts that a micro level of legitimacy simultaneously exists alongside 
Weber’s institutional legitimacy, which he refers to as actional legitimacy. Actional 
legitimacy, when employed by organizations, differs in that actional techniques are used 
when an organization attempts “to demonstrate the legitimacy not of their entire 
enterprises, but of specific policies or actions” (Boyd, 2000, p. 342). While not all 
organizations will face institutional legitimation crises, “almost all will introduce on 
occasion new or controversial policies that require actional legitimacy” (Boyd, 2000, p. 
342). The essential actions an organization must take to create and maintain actional 
legitimacy with publics is further documented in subsequent paragraphs.  
 Boyd (2000) articulates that corporations must justify omission of what is 
expected from stakeholders while also providing support for the commission of 
something unexpected. Brummer (1991) suggests that legitimacy is dependent upon 
intended actions to be within an organization’s domain of authority, the perceived 
appropriateness of actions, and the ability of actions to fit within a larger organizational 
mission or goals. When these requirements are met, organizations can effectively 
demonstrate “corporate responsiveness” to stakeholders, demonstrating logic and 
empathy towards those who may question organizational policy or procedure (Ulrich, 
1995, p. 3). Most actional legitimation efforts are described as tackling two main 
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objectives, including organizational competence and responsible operation[s] (Hearit, 
1995). As organizations defend specific operations they create meaningful links to their 
overall organizational competence.  
 To successfully meet these goals, organizations must engage in calculated 
rhetorical strategies to justify their profit-making existence (Boyd, 2000). While Boyd 
(2000) clearly rationalizes and discusses boundaries surrounding actional legitimacy, he 
does not provide specific tactics, or tangible recommendations, for organizations. 
Previous legitimacy literature, however, does fill this gap. Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) 
describe three specific functions that organizations may pursue to become legitimate. 
These include adapting to societal norms, altering the definition of social legitimacy, and 
identifying with other socially significant legitimate symbols, values, or institutions. 
These techniques illustrate how organizations may portray competence and responsibility 
to stakeholders. 
 First, organizations can adapt their output, goals, or methods of operation to 
conform to prevailing definitions of legitimacy (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). Huxman 
and Bruce (1995) provide an example of Dow Chemical Company, who managed 
stakeholder disapproval after manufacturing napalm during the Vietnam War. At the 
time, the Associated Press named Dow the most protested company of the year in 1967 
(Huxman and Bruce, 1995). Dow continued to manufacture napalm, and consequently 
engaged in PR tactics to manage stakeholder outrage. Eventually, Dow was outbid for the 
government’s napalm contract and lost the manufacturing job to another group. In this 
instance, losing the account could have been framed to capitalize on the situation and 
illustrate conformation to norms. For example, Dow might have framed the news as 
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being linked to the protestor’s demands, but they actually failed to capitalize on this 
situation in a timely manner (Huxman and Bruce, 1995). Dow could have framed the 
contract ending as a nod in agreement with protestors, reinforcing the organization’s 
definition of legitimacy. This type (adaptation) of actional strategy often occurs following 
a failed attempt to shift stakeholder perceptions, as organizations are forced to apologize 
for errors and reaffirm their commitment to existing stakeholder expectations.  
 Next, communication can be employed to frame the definition of social 
legitimacy so that it meets the organization’s present practices, output, and values 
(Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) illuminate this tactic in a case 
involving the American Institute for Foreign Study, a for-profit student study abroad 
program, to describe how communication is used to increase social legitimacy. The 
institute faced backlash after media questioned the utility of student study abroad 
programs. To re-establish legitimacy, the institute engaged in a wide range of activities to 
realign public perceptions about study abroad organizations (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). 
By reframing stakeholder perceptions, the American Institute for Foreign Study worked 
to shift societal norms to meet those of their organization. Reframing ideals of what is 
“acceptable” or “correct” reestablished the American Institute’s goals or mission as being 
important with stakeholder groups. By persuading stakeholders to agree with established 
organizational actions and policies, the organization successfully realigns perceptions and 
its reputation remains intact. 
 Finally, an organization may use communication to identify with symbols, values, 
or institutions that have a strong base of social legitimacy (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; 
Suchman, 1995). Boyd (2004) discusses how the R. J. Reynolds (RJR) Tobacco 
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Company engaged in a PR advertising campaign that opposed restrictions to tobacco 
advertising. In this situation, RJR used identification to maintain the legitimacy status 
quo of tobacco marketing practices in newspaper advertisements (Boyd, 2004). While 
Boyd argues that RJR was unsuccessful in its identification attempts, his essay describes 
how identification can link various organizational ideals to something more meaningful 
and significant to stakeholders (in this instance the campaign sought to identify with 
topics such as individual rights and the freedom to choose). This process can bolster 
support for a more controversial organizational action or policy. A frequently employed 
tactic, attaching organizational policy or actions to preexisting favorable symbols, values, 
or institutions can ease the strain associated with introducing change to stakeholders.  
 While Brummer (1991) first articulates the idea of actional legitimacy, Boyd 
(2000) more substantially develops this concept as a tool for organizations seeking 
legitimacy for specific policies or actions. Using Dowling and Pfeffer’s (1975) prescribed 
functions for legitimacy creation and maintenance further extends this framework in 
providing specific strategies for actional legitimation. Legitimacy is the foundation “of all 
effective communication with publics – without it, any organizational messages or 
actions will be looked upon with skepticism” (Boyd, 2009, p. 157). When organizations 
experience resistance surrounding procedural or policy changes, corporate responsiveness 
is imperative to maintain relationships with stakeholder groups. This section 
distinguished actional legitimacy from institutional legitimacy, and outlined the 
theoretical development of the concept. In the next section, barriers and catalysts to 
enacting legitimacy are discussed.  
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Barriers and Catalysts to Enacting Legitimacy Responses  
 Achieving legitimacy through actions or other response tactics is a formidable 
task for organizations. When audiences grow increasingly heterogeneous, it becomes 
more difficult to maintain or improve legitimacy (Massey, 2001). Admittedly, no 
organization can completely satisfy all audiences in all situations (Suchman, 1995). 
Structural inertia may also be an issue. Organizations are often built on existing social 
structures and processes, making them less able to change in response to environmental 
demands (Massey, 2001). The more problematic an organization’s legitimacy crisis is, 
“the greater the scrutiny by constituents, and the lower the tolerance of deviations from 
constituents’ expectations-hence, the less slack to buffer challenges” (Ashforth & Gibbs, 
1990, p. 191). Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) note that the greater extent to which legitimacy 
is associated with resources, the more difficulty organizations will face in reaching 
legitimacy. This challenge is due to diminished capacity to extend or defend legitimacy.  
 Further, with increased legitimation actions comes increased self-promotion, 
which makes constituents more skeptical of legitimation attempts (Ashforth & Gibbs, 
1990). Finally, the above-mentioned roadblocks for achieving legitimacy may drive 
management into “clumsy, nervous, or overzealous attempts at legitimation, thus 
validating constituents’ skepticism” (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990, p. 191). Legitimacy 
building must be approached with prudence, as actions implemented in addition to non-
action will trigger responses from stakeholders. In order to provoke the most effective 
and successful degree of legitimacy, actions must be carefully and strategically 
implemented by organizations. 
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 Many barriers can be identified that would impede an organization in legitimacy 
building efforts, yet several organizational characteristics make reaching organizational 
legitimacy easier for some organizations. Organizations that already conform to social 
norms, values, and expectations will be more likely to garner legitimacy from 
stakeholders. This means that organizations that address niche interests or are unusual 
will have a difficult time generating legitimacy (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). Organizations 
that generate unusual products, whether they are ideas or physical objects, will face 
barriers establishing legitimacy with society. Organizations with diverse audiences or 
stakeholder groups will face challenges in establishing legitimacy when responding to 
fragmented expectations. Responding to multiple stakeholder groups, simultaneously, 
often results in some success but also negative responses from minority stakeholder or 
isolated groups that require specific messaging (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). Further, social 
values and expectations that are constantly evolving are often times not understood, and 
can be difficult to operationalize (Shocker & Sethi, 1974). While not exhaustive, this 
brief discussion of obstructions and catalysts to legitimacy illustrates the difficulty in 
stabilizing stakeholder perceptions. Next, the future of legitimacy research is discussed.  
The Future of Legitimacy  
 Legitimacy, in both micro and macro formats, proves to be a popular framework 
to investigate a number of issues including: Organizational ethics (Long & Driscoll, 
2007), environmental welfare (Aerts & Cormier, 2009), organizational innovation (Rao, 
Chandy, & Prabu, 2008), financial trends (Deephouse & Carter, 2005), generalist and 
specialized businesses (Massey, 2001), corporate rhetoric (Boyd, 2004; Castello & 
Lozano, 2011; Hearit; 1995; Ice, 1991), organizational corruption (Gordon et al., 2009), 
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intercultural business (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2001; Ahlstrom et al., 2008), and more. To 
date, legitimacy research boasts breadth; however, current and future work needs to 
contribute depth to the aforementioned areas.  
 Elsbach (1994) believes that organizations can “protect or even enhance 
legitimacy following controversies that violate social norms if those controversies are 
followed by acknowledging accounts that refer to normative structures, procedures, or 
goals” (p. 84). Considering Elsbach’s (1994) assertion, crisis communication (and 
legitimacy communication efforts) is no longer merely a PR tool implemented when 
corporate malfunction occurs. Strategic communication is a function or responsibility of 
organizations to maintain relationships with important stakeholder groups. In this sense, 
engaging in communication using legitimation strategies not only benefits the 
organization from which it originates, but also the various publics its messages are 
crafted to impact. Ascertaining the effectiveness, or lack thereof, provides insight to 
positive or detrimental communication measures often enacted in serious or threatening 
contexts. Legitimation has evolved from the initial drudgery of simply forcing 
organizations to comply with some semblance of social responsibility to that of an ethical 
imperative for communicators. Ethical, responsible, and encouraging communication is 
expected from modern organizations. Legitimation strategies are encompassed in the 
broader expectation of modern organizational transparency. Maintaining transparency 
aids in the health of not only organizations and their stakeholders, but also more broadly 
at an interorganizational and nation-state level.  
 This brief literature review illustrates the necessity of organizational legitimacy 
and response. Thus, this study poses the following research question:  
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RQ1: What communication constraints and opportunities do organizations face 
when responding to crises of perception?  
Aside from specific institutional and actional legitimacy communication, contextual 
factors should be considered that will influence an organization’s ability to respond to 
crises. In this sense, we narrow our focus to organizational crises. Even more specifically, 
several crisis types are discussed in subsequent sections that will influence an 
organization’s capacity for required public responses. Discussed crisis types include 
hoaxes, near misses, and misconstrued crises.  
Legitimacy and Crisis Setting 
  Researchers have generated crisis typologies to guide crisis response strategies 
(Meyers & Holusha, 1986; Mitroff, Pauchant, Shrivasava, 1988; Kovoor-Misra, 1995; 
Coombs, 1995; Coombs & Holladay, 2002). This is not the goal of this study. Rather, 
these crisis settings are introduced to provide perspective on appropriate actional 
legitimation strategies. Specifically, these crisis settings constitute instances of crises of 
perception; each demanding similar yet tailored response strategies to alleviate 
misunderstanding.  
 Previous literature illustrates the depth of work that classifies crisis types. 
Existing typologies include both real and perceived crises. This research will specifically 
summarize three crises of perception. This task will clarify the distinctions between real 
and perceived crises and contribute to broader understanding of required organizational 
responses. First, hoaxes and pranks are discussed, followed by near misses and finally the 
phenomenon of misconstrual. 
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Hoaxes 
 Managing hoaxes and pranks is more challenging than ever before for crisis 
responders. Individuals hoping to inspire fear in various audiences have more options 
today than did previous generations. Rather than solely relying on traditional physical 
weapons or explosives, individuals now may turn to “softer” targets or channels to 
generate disruption. Mohtadi and Murshid (2009) note that this trend reflects a proactive 
response to anti-terrorism and hoax strategies. Causing physical harm no longer requires 
physical weapons and manpower. Instead, threatening organizations can do so through 
the mail, telephone, or most recently the Internet. In 1968, three out of four terrorist 
attacks were aimed at airlines, or diplomatic, government, and military targets (Mohtadi 
& Murshid, 2009). This statistic has now changed, as lawful businesses, schools, 
communities, individuals and other organizations may also find themselves victimized by 
a malicious hoax or prank.  
 Hoaxes are included in the diversification trend of threats and crises. Dunn and 
Allen (2005) find that gossip, rumors, and hoaxes are not a new phenomenon. For 
example, telephoned bomb threats have been a common way to cause disruption and 
generate fear for decades. However, computers and the Internet offer a new avenue 
through which hoaxes and pranks may spread, leading to unprecedented consequences for 
those exposed to them (Dunn & Allen, 2005). Consequently, these crises of perception 
present an interesting challenge for crisis response. While hoaxes or pranks are not 
legitimate threats, in that they are comprised of false claims, they demand a legitimate 
response from appropriate response agencies. This is because well designed pranks profit 
from uncertainty and perceptions of vulnerability (Sellnow, Littlefield, Vidoloff, & 
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Webb, 2009). The best pseudo-crises are generated by capitalizing on the perceptions of 
vulnerable groups and acting within the boundaries of legitimate claims. In this sense, 
instigators of hoaxes can produce considerable fear in targets while expending minimal 
resources. For these reasons, hoaxes and pranks are appealing to anyone wishing to cause 
an organizational disruption.  
Hoaxes are formally described as “deceptive alerts designed to undermine the 
public’s confidence in an organization, product, service or person” (Veil, Sellnow, & 
Petrun, 2011, p. 7). Additionally, hoaxes contain false claims of harm, threats of such 
harm, or discomfiture (Veil et al., 2011). Hoaxes are perpetuated in many different 
scenarios and have often manifested as false bomb or gun threats, rumors on the Internet, 
or even as false claims about biological or chemical weapons (most notably with 
Anthrax). Internet hoaxes gained traction alongside overall Internet use. Kibby (2005) 
observed that email was the first method used to perpetuate myths, legends, fables, 
rumors and jokes on the Internet. Those with Internet access could use email to forward 
virus alerts, chain letters, and various fabricated stories (Kibby, 2005). Fabricated stories 
included descriptions of events with false warning, petitions, requests for help, and would 
often ask receivers to continue forwarding the message (Kibby, 2005). Email facilitated 
the expedited dissemination of false information while simultaneously allowing users to 
reach multiple end points.  
Social networking websites provide additional channels on the Internet through 
which users can disseminate, collect, and share information. Daniells (2012) notes that 
Twitter currently has 100 million active users and Facebook boasts 800 million active 
users. The average Facebook user claims 130 friends, and “like” (i.e. follow) on average 
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80 pages on the website (Daniells, 2012). Cheong and Lee (2011) state that while these 
types of social media websites were once confined to discussions of status updates of 
what people were doing at a given time, they have also evolved to become “a medium of 
information sharing and dissemination” (p. 45). Rainie, Brenner, and Purcell (2012) find 
that 46% of adult Internet users post original photos or videos that they created. Another 
41% of adult Internet users repost and recycle photos or videos that already exist on the 
Web (Rainie et al., 2012). In sum, at least 56% of Internet users do either one of the 
aforementioned activities, which Rainie et al. refer to as “creating” and “curating” 
(2012).  
Social networks can be employed to spread false and malicious information. 
Twitter has grown to become known as “one of the channels where civilians break news 
of terrorist activities and use it as a method to notify the public of any latest updates, cries 
for help, and as an information source for the authorities” (Cheong & Lee, 2011, p. 47). 
Facebook has also moved from being solely a place to post information about one’s self 
to being an avenue for multiple activities. Park, Kee, and Valenzuela (2009) find that 
Facebook is used for socializing, entertainment, self-status seeking, and information 
seeking. YouTube, a video-sharing website, provides a user-friendly interface to upload 
pirated or homemade videos, in addition to options that allow users to share content via 
email, Facebook, Twitter, Google+, orkut, tumblr, Blogger, Myspace, hi5, LinkedIn, and 
StumbleUpon. As these channels have evolved from being solely micro blogs into 
mediums that individuals rely on for news, their ability to spread information has become 
even more legitimate.  
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Social networking websites are appealing channels to disseminate hoax 
information because of their propensity to disseminate information at a rapid rate. Izawa 
(2010) finds that individuals often share information on their social networks when they 
feel “strongly” about something (p. 29). Additionally, content that is intense, enjoyable, 
and informative is shared with online networks (Izawa, 2010). Online content is more 
likely to be shared if it contains violence or nudity, which is often linked to strong 
emotions (Poter & Golan, 2006; Phelps, Lewis, Mobilio, Perry, & Raman, 2004; Izawa, 
2010). One post to Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, or any of their counterparts, can quickly 
cause a crisis of perception if it involves realistic terroristic threats. When individuals 
encounter information they believe will be useful to their followers, they can choose to 
either “post” it to their wall on Facebook or YouTube account or “tweet” it to their 
followers on Twitter. While the number of connections on social networks varies 
depending on the individual, some public figures and organizations boast millions of 
followers. Should a deviant want to perpetuate a hoax, posting information where a 
highly connected individual or organization encounters it could allow that false 
information to be instantly shared with millions of followers in a matter of seconds, 
depending on the specific channel.  
In the next section, near miss crises are discussed. Near misses are distressing to 
individuals involved because they may perceive the event, even if it did not directly 
affect them, as a legitimate threat.  
Near Misses 
 Smaller accidents can be attributed to what Muermann and Oktem (2002) call 
near misses, or “weak signals” that “contain a genetic signature of a serious, adverse 
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effect” (p. 30). Near misses may also include accidents that almost happen but narrowly 
dissipate prior to manifestation. Phimister, Oktem, Kleindorfer, and Kunreuther (2003) 
describe these incidents as having the potential to cause loss, but in the end, they actually 
do not. Even with the absence of loss these incidents can provide insight into activities 
that could happen (Phimister et al., 2003). Muermann and Oktem (2002) note that these 
events can be seen as “improvement opportunities,” and can be positive experiences 
when they are used to improve operations resulting in the possible avoidance of a 
damaging outcome. Phimister et al. (2003) provide examples of disasters that followed 
foreshadowing near miss events including the 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger explosion, 
the 1997 Hindustan refinery explosion in India, the 1999 Paddington train crash, and the 
1998 Morton explosion and fire. Tinsley, Dillon, and Madsen (2011) also add the 2010 
launch of the Apple iPhone 4 to this list, in addition to Toyota’s car acceleration recall in 
2009, Jet Blue’s approach to flying in increment weather, and British Petroleum’s 
catastrophic oil spill. These events all had smaller near miss indicators that preceded their 
catastrophic disasters, yet meaningful change was not enacted or noticed when they 
occurred. 
 A near miss is also defined as a “special kind of failure to reach a goal, one that 
comes close to being successful” (Reid, 1986, p. 32). Further, Reid (1986) uses the 
description of trying to shoot a target, and narrowly missing your intended mark. In this 
sense, when we miss our target this “gives useful feedback and encourages the player by 
indicating that success may be within reach” (Reid, 1985, p. 32). Therefore, near misses 
can also be encouraging to those attempting to succeed at something. Scholars have 
studied this phenomenon in relation to gambling, and find that often near miss occasions 
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cognitively place an individual in a position to believe they will soon win (Reid, 1985; 
Smith & Razzell, 1975; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). When crises almost “succeed,” 
(happen) affected audiences become more aware of their potential effects. This 
realization may also demand specific organizational and individual actions to prepare and 
respond to the crisis that almost happened but unexpectedly did not. Therefore, there are 
two types of near misses. The first includes events that have good outcomes, but narrowly 
missed a negative consequence and secondly events where a positive outcome is almost 
reached, but is missed by a small margin (Dillon, Tinsley, & Cronin, 2010).  
 Near misses can be both big and small. As the aforementioned examples indicate, 
they may also span financial, social, or human losses. Risk researchers have long sought 
to understand why some individuals may choose to evacuate during an impending 
hurricane, while other remain apathetic (Dillon et al., 2010). Near misses should provide 
“unique information for an individual, and therefore should influence his or her behavior 
beyond the more general information that is provided to a community” (Dillon et al., 
2010, p. 443). However, the subjective perceptions of individuals impede the processing 
of often-important information.  
  Tinsley et al. (2011) describe seven mechanisms to manage near miss events. 
These include (1) heeding high pressure, (2) learning from deviations, (3) uncovering 
root causes of problems, (4) demanding accountability, (5) considering worst-case 
scenarios, (6) encouraging constant evaluation, and to (7) reward taking responsibility for 
exposing near misses (Tinsley et al., 2011). When organizations find themselves under 
overwhelming amounts of pressure, they will be reticent to pause operations to 
investigate a near miss signal. Secondly, persons or organizations should learn from 
 36 
 
deviations. Individuals, when faced with something out of the ordinary, will often look 
for reasons that will enable them to resume the interrupted behavior or activity and stay 
“in action” (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005, p. 409). This means that individuals 
must work to illuminate the real cause of problems. Tinsley et al. (2011) use the example 
of Apple claiming its iPhone 4 was defective because customers could not hold the phone 
correctly, when in reality, it was due to a problem with the antenna.  
 Individuals who report near miss events need to be held accountable for their 
actions when they decide to either pursue or ignore a near miss signal. Reporting events, 
or signals, also should be governed through a simple and encouraging structure 
(Muermann & Oktem, 2002). Worst-case scenarios should be included in plans along 
with dialogue to assuage fear of reporting negative events. Reporting negative 
information can be difficult, as those who prepare for or report worst case scenarios can 
be construed as being alarmists. While preparing for certain risks can seem unrealistic or 
distant, this belief ignores human history and the “uncertainty of the future” (Noah, 
Huebner, Darling, & Waeckerle, 2002, p. 256). Prioritization can assist with this process 
and help organizations or individuals allocate resources. Constant evaluation should 
frequently reorder priorities, and account for new information. Finally, Tinsley et al. 
(2011) assert that employees or individuals must be rewarded for reporting near miss 
incidents. If no perceived benefit is associated with disclosing negative information, few 
people may place their own well-being behind the well-being of an incident that has yet 
to occur.  
 Near misses, like hoaxes, constitute a crisis of perception. Next, the crisis setting 
of misconstrual is discussed.  
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Misconstrual 
 When assessing crises, individuals enact both consequentialist decisions 
(weighing costs and benefits of alternative choices) and cognitive decisions 
(nonemotionally and rationally assessing consequences) (Sinaceur, Health, & Cole, 
2005). However, individuals may not enact the decision-making process completely 
devoid of irrationality. Research indicates that persons tasked with measuring risks are 
often guided by their emotions (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002). Slovic et 
al. (2002) speculate that research may have not accounted for irrationality, particularly 
because of the limited “cognitive focus that characterized psychology” in previous work 
(p. 56). Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor (2004) later established three categories 
of understanding risk including “risk as feelings,” “risk as analysis,” and “risk as politics” 
(p. 311). Misconstruing a crisis is a consequence associated with Slovic et al.’s (2004) 
assertion that risks can be interpreted first and foremost as “feeling,” producing a 
different outcome than those using a “rational” approach to risk and crisis decision-
making (p. 311).  
 Laypersons piece together constructions of risks from a variety of resources they 
have available to them. Persons then “construe relevance and meaning from a given risk 
issue’s myriad messages and relationships,” to arrive at a decision (Sellnow, Ulmer, 
Seeger, & Littlefield, 2009, p. 8). The term “construe” then means “the public must infer 
meaning by assessing the importance and accuracy of the information and the 
authenticity of the source” (Sellnow et al., 2009, p. 8). Misconstrual occurs when lay 
publics or persons incorrectly construct meaning. The misconstrual of risk affects the 
decision-making process and in turn may impede effective decision-making.  
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 Misconstrual is well documented in recent literature. In 2009 the Peanut Butter 
Corporation of America (PCA) was the perpetrator of a widespread salmonella 
contamination. PCA’s product, peanut oil, is used in a variety of products. However, lay 
publics who needed information to guide their decision-making about whether they 
should or should not consume implicated products needed to do so without adequate 
information (Millner, Veil, & Sellnow, 2011). This lack of information produced a 
misconstrual of perceived risk: Consumers also avoided products (more specifically, 
peanut butter) that were not implicated in the contamination (Millner et al., 2011). This 
instance documents an example of consumers choosing to enact overly safe actions. 
These actions still can have detrimental consequences as businesses that did not violate 
public health standards lost significant profits and credibility (Millner et al., 2011). 
Sinaceur et al. (2005) also studied a similar phenomenon in France, as their research 
indicates that describing animal disease with specific terms can influence the vitality of 
the beef industry. Labeling a risk as “mad cow” disease versus a technical term such as 
“Bovine spongiform encephalopathy” (or BSE) evokes different components of the risk 
decision-making process (Sinaceur et al., 2005, p. 247). In these instances, risk is difficult 
to ascertain due to a lack of information and to the ability of emotion to dictate risk 
construction (Millner et al., 2011; Sinaceur et al., 2005). Managing the subjective 
construction of threat, then, is important for organizations wishing to avoid misconstrual.  
 Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) find that events associated with strong feelings can 
overwhelm our judgment and bring persons to erroneous conclusions. When risk as 
emotion, or misunderstanding due to lack of analysis or resources, overtakes risk as 
analysis our decisions are flawed and misguided. As Slovic et al. (2004) note, persons 
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who are very fearful of crime may choose to buy a handgun for their home. However, 
what a new gun owner might not consider is that a gun fired in the home is twenty two 
times more likely to harm oneself or a friend/family member than to harm an unknown or 
dangerous intruder (Slovic et al., 2004). Future research must consider this subjective 
misconstrual of events and provide perspective on mechanisms to offer audiences to 
employ rational risk judgments in their evaluative processes.  
 Misconstrual creates a false sense of risk. This process can result in misallocated 
government dollars, ineffective personal protective actions against risks, and a variety of 
other inappropriate actions that are employed towards risks or crises. Crises of 
perception, including hoaxes, near misses, and misconstrual, demand various actional 
strategies to correct risk and crisis understanding. Legitimacy maintenance and 
improvement is dependent on communication strategies. Thus, strategies are only 
effective if they accurately label, understand, and respond to the subjective constructions 
of risk by affected stakeholder groups.  
 The three aforementioned crises are distinct, but share the characteristic that no 
physical harm or real risk exists for stakeholders. Conversely, risk in each case is created 
and generated by stakeholder groups. Each case also details how organizational 
legitimacy is threatened by false claims of threat or harm. All three crises of perception 
illustrate how risk, even in subjectively constructed contexts, may pose substantial harm 
to unaware organizations. Thus, literature guides this study’s final three questions:  
RQ2: Do communication constraints and opportunities during crises of 
perception differ by crisis type?  
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RQ3: To what extent do hoaxes, near misses, and misconstrual of risk obligate 
organizations to engage in actional legitimacy?  
RQ4: Does the obligation for actional legitimacy during crises of perception 
differ by crisis type? 
As crises of perception grow more prevalent in modern society, acceptable substantiated 
responses to unsubstantiated claims must be further examined.  
Summary 
 This chapter explored the concept of legitimacy and contextual crisis constraints 
on legitimation strategies. Weber’s (1922) concept of legitimacy first articulated this 
concept as it relates to organizational power. Interest in corporate or business legitimacy 
gained momentum in the 20th century and has since remained a significant area of 
inquiry as organizational rhetoric or discourse has become more common. Boyd (2000) 
adds to the concept of organizational legitimacy by describing actional legitimacy as a 
means to scrutinize specific organizational policies or procedures. Contextual factors, 
including hoaxes and pranks, near misses, and misconstrual are described as perceptual 
challenges for organizations engaging in legitimation strategies. Perceptual crises demand 
substantial responses from organizations in instances where organizational fault may be 
misplaced. This paradox creates a precarious situation for communicators unsure of 
appropriate organizational legitimation strategies. Often, organizational survival and 
success rest on effective rhetorical strategies following significant procedural changes, 
events, or other happenings. Following, chapter three explains proposed methods for data 
analysis.  
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Chapter Three: Methods  
 This chapter details the study design used to evaluate communication in each of 
this dissertation’s case studies. To ensure compatibility, each case was examined in a 
consistent and systematic format. The methodology for this project was developed from 
the qualitative domain and includes the use of descriptive data, organizational documents, 
and interviews. Qualitative analysis allows for the incorporation of relevant 
organizational discourse, and analyzes how these public discussions lead to structural and 
organizational policy changes. Interviews with organizational members served to confirm 
and enhance information that is publicly available.  
 Case studies were also analyzed holistically to answer the research questions 
addressing communication constraints/opportunities and an obligation to engage in 
actional legitimacy. The cases were compared with each other to identify the extent to 
which these constraints/opportunities and obligations to engage in actional legitimacy 
differ by case type. To execute this process, the value of case studies is discussed and 
followed by an overview of data sources, sampling design, data collection, analysis, and 
interpretation.  
Case Studies 
 Analysis for this project emphasized case study research. Babbi (2004) identifies 
case studies as selections that “focus attention on one or a few instances of some social 
phenomenon” (p. 293). Often, cases are selected for further scrutiny because they are 
unique instances or events that are perceived as socially significant. For this project, three 
cases are presented, including a hoax, a near miss, and a misconstrued event. Ragin and 
Becker (1992) find that no encompassing consensus exists for defining the limitation of a 
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case study, as this role changes for each circumstance. A “case” is also defined by 
Gerring (2007) as a unit observed at a single point in time or over some period of time (p. 
19). Thus, in a “study” that attempts to explain behavior of individuals or group events, it 
is important to note that certain features may be bounded or framed between other 
designated events.  
 Case studies provide in-depth descriptions that yield explanatory insights to 
particular phenomena (Babbie, 2004). In this sense, case studies offer perspective on why 
events happen, how involved persons or organizations respond, and subsequent 
consequences. Like other methods, case studies often do not provide evidence of 
causation, or even correlation, yet they do illuminate processes surrounding significant 
events, thereby informing the development of conceptual frameworks. Explanatory 
studies often serve as “the basis for the development of more general, nomothetic 
theories” (Babbie, 2004, p. 293). Nomothetic theories are those that are generalizable and 
unbound from specific cases. Extended case studies, then, have the purpose of 
“discovering flaws in, and then modifying, existing social theories” (Babbie, 2004, p. 
293). This project contributes to current crisis literature by using selected cases to clarify 
and extend the conceptual framework of actional legitimacy. Building this theoretical 
framework based on case study analysis generates a foundation and rationale for future 
theory testing and generalizability.  
Data Sources 
 Data for each case study was collected from three sources to provide broad and 
balanced understanding of the hoax, near miss, and misconstrual cases. These sources 
included newspapers, organizational documents, and interviews. Several prominent 
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newspapers offer context to each case, provide a timeline of events, and illustrate national 
coverage of each crisis. Organizational documents give tangible, public, and calculated 
statements released to represent an organizational opinion or standpoint to various 
stakeholder groups. Finally, interviews with key industry or organizational leaders 
provided confirmation that may otherwise be absent from the description of each case. 
These sources are each discussed in detail in subsequent sections. 
Newspapers 
 Newspapers serve an important role in contextualizing each case study. 
Traditionally, historians and social scientists use newspapers for credible, yet informal 
sources of historical data (Franzosi, 1987; Earl, Martin, McCarthy, & Soule, 2004). Other 
fields of study, including event analysis in social movements, rely heavily on newspapers 
for data collection (Barranco & Wisler, 1999). Newspapers provide “long records of 
historical processes often not available otherwise,” revealing rich facts, accounts from a 
variety of persons, and unique perspectives on a story in a particular place and time 
(Franzosi, 1987, p. 14). Other researchers have explored how newspapers guide our 
prioritization of current events and shape our understanding of issues (Entman, 1993; 
McCombs & Shaw, 1972). This study does not pursue analytic depth warranted by full 
content analyses, but rather asserts a need to use newspapers as descriptive vehicles for 
complex events.  
As such, three newspapers including The Wall Street Journal, The New York 
Times, and The Washington Post offered descriptive data. These papers were selected for 
their high circulation rates and emphasis on policy and government issues. 
 44 
 
 According to the Alliance for Audited Media (formerly known as the Audit 
Bureau of Circulators), these newspapers rank among the top fifteen most highly 
circulating papers. Circulation rates range from 2,293,798 for the weekday edition of the 
Wall Street Journal, to 674,751 for The Washington Post Sunday edition (Alliance for 
Audited Media, n.d.).  
 This avenue of data collection is not without its limitations. Researchers argue 
that newspaper analyses encounter difficulty in establishing validity, avoiding sample 
selection bias, coding effectively, and offering generalizable conclusions (Franzosi, 
1987). These limitations are most often encountered in content analyses that seek to draw 
larger conclusions about a broad subject area. This project, however, does not generalize 
findings to make conclusions about newspaper content. For this reason, information 
collected from newspapers is not time-bound (i.e. limited to only a week or month 
sample) or proactive in nature. Proactive in this instance means that because this research 
examines preexisting cases, new information was not collected past May 1, 2013. 
Occasionally, larger issues are studied and researchers may opt to collect information for 
a certain time period that requires them to collect articles in real time. Next, 
organizational documents are discussed as an important source for highlighting 
organizational communication.  
Organizational Documents 
 This study examined organizational responses tasked with influencing stakeholder 
legitimacy. This task required evidence of organizational actions and statements. As 
Crable (1990) notes, organizational rhetoric manifests in public documents or meanings 
of representation. Toulmin (1972), similar to Kant, isolates several different types of 
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representation, including “darstellung,” which entails creating and displaying something 
“to show in an entirely public manner what it comprises, or how it operates” (p. 195). 
This publicly constructed depiction influences the private representations individuals 
generate of the organization. Burke (1969) also describes how outward projections or 
proclamations to audiences are analyzed for motivations behind the outward projection of 
a topic.  
To comprehend how the actors in each case want to portray themselves to 
stakeholders, official organizational materials were examined to document legitimacy 
building efforts (or lack thereof). The nature of official organizational statements depends 
on external communication channels implemented by the organizations in each scenario. 
Organizational documents include press releases, financial reports, blogs, Tweets, 
Facebook posts, YouTube videos, statements posted to websites, government reports, and 
more. The distinction between organizational documents and other information, however, 
rests in the nonnegotiable tenet that only extant messages created and released by the 
organization that they represent are included in this category. This information provides a 
voice to organizational actors, serving as the chosen external representation provided to 
stakeholders concerning a risk or crisis event. In the next section the final source of data, 
interviews, is discussed.   
Interviews 
 To triangulate data and provide confirmation of events in each case, interviews 
with key organizational figures are included. Individuals selected for interviews were 
situated to detail a unique and personal account of how their particular involvement with 
a case unfolded in addition to other relevant information. Interviews provide perspective 
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and insight on organizational culture, decisions, routines, and traditions. The goal is to 
add viewpoints by talking with at least one individual in a decision-making role within 
the organization at the center of the crisis (or an individual from a relevant government 
agency managing the issue). Individuals tasked with decision-making related to public 
communication were approached for inclusion. This data is important to provide 
clarification and organizational context to employed actions. Interviews were semi-
structured and confirmatory, and allowed the flow of conversation to commence on 
relevant topics to cases as the interviewee made them known.  
 The researcher conducted at least one interview with a relevant organizational 
member involved in the case, or a representative from a government agency involved in 
the case. Interviews centered on (a) clarifying and adding information to case studies and 
(b) confirming case events and actions. In this sense, interviews were outlined to 
highlight major areas of inquiry concerning each case. However, because interviewees 
could offer a new perspective on their corresponding case, discussions permitted some 
flexibility. This flexibility upheld the “continuous nature of qualitative interviewing” and 
allowed fluid questioning and interview structure (Rubin & Rubin, 1995, p. 46-47). 
Employing this type of interviewing uncovers previously unknown data irretrievable 
from other published records, greatly contributing to the overall value of this study. In the 
next section, sampling for each of these data sources is described.  
Sampling 
 Newspaper articles were collected from LexisNexis databases. The collection 
archives news articles from 1980 to the present. As the intent of newspaper sources is to 
provide contextual information to each case study, a representative sample of articles was 
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not collected. Rather, articles that adequately fit search criteria (described in subsequent 
sections) were collected and condensed to material that offered relevant description to 
each case. Samples were bounded by time, in that searches start at the beginning of the 
month in which they start to capture all possible articles. For example, China’s melamine 
crisis (Case 2) began to break in news outlets in July 2008. Consequently, collection of 
newspaper articles began on July 1, 2008 and extended to spring 2013. Search criteria for 
Domino’s case (Case 1) began on April 1, 2009 and California’s GMO case (Case 3) 
began on November 1, 2008 when the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
released its report to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry in the U.S. 
Senate (and debate about biotechnology started to permeate government discussions).  
 In addition to newspaper sources, organizational documents were collected to 
determine the desired projected position of each organization during its perceptual crisis. 
To accomplish this task, information was collected through the medium the 
organizational opted to employ. Documents that embody the organization’s response 
were collected for analysis. This provided a complete and compelling account of 
organizational rhetoric and response following the onset of each event.  
 Finally, interviews were collected from identified industry spokespersons. 
Individuals were solicited based on their connection to each case. More specifically, 
persons who work(ed) for the organization during a perceptual crisis or have/had a role in 
an affected industry were considered for inclusion. Final inclusion in the study was 
bounded by accessibility, availability, and willingness to participate. In the following 
section, data collection for each case is more explicitly described.  
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Data Collection 
 Data was collected in three waves. First, LexisNexis was used to find relevant 
news articles for each case. Second, organizational documents were located. Finally, 
interviews were conducted to confirm findings from the first two phases of data 
collection. These phases are discussed in detail below. This order was selected because 
each stage in the data collection sequentially informs the next. For example, the timeline 
and context provided in the newspaper coverage informed the identification and selection 
of items from the organizations’ external communication. This external communication, 
in turn, aided the identification of key individuals to interview. Figure 3.1 visually 
describes the data collection process.  
[Figure 3.1 inserted here].  
Newspapers 
 Newspaper articles were collected for each case and condensed to include only 
articles that offer unique, relevant, and unduplicated information. Each identified 
newspaper, including The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, and The Washington 
Post, was searched independently to locate articles for the three cases. Case 1 is bounded 
from April 1, 2009 to May 1, 2013. Case 2 is bounded from July 1, 2008 to March 26, 
2013. Finally, Case 3 is bounded from November 1, 2008 to May 9, 2013. All articles 
that appeared in search results were evaluated. Each article that contained new 
information about the case was saved in an electronic folder for analysis; those 
containing duplicate or old information were discarded. Articles were evaluated 
following chronological order. A folder for each case, from each newspaper, remains 
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stored on the researcher’s computer for further or future scrutiny if needed. Review 
Figure 3.2 for additional elucidation on how newspapers were collected and handled.  
[Figure 3.2 inserted here].  
Organizational Documents 
 Organizational documents were collected first from organizational websites. 
Official press releases, reports, blogs, or messages were deemed suitable for recording. 
Documents discovered from website searches were downloaded and saved to the 
researcher’s computer for analysis. In addition to organizational websites, organizational 
social media accounts were searched for relevant, extant material addressing each case. 
Social media data was saved by links (if available) or was analyzed from the Internet if 
data was not downloadable. Next, organizational documents for each case are discussed 
in more detail.  
 Case 1. Case 1 encompassed all of Domino’s Pizza’s official responses to its 
YouTube hoax. Organizational data was collected from Domino’s website 
(www.dominosbiz.com/). Domino’s also relied on social media to communicate risk and 
crisis messages to stakeholders, therefore official Domino’s Pizza Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube messages were also examined.  
 Case 2. Case 2 included information on how U.S. government agencies responded 
to melamine adulteration involving products from China. Organizational data was 
collected primarily from the FDA’s website (www.fda.gov), and the USDA’s website 
(www.usda.gov) when applicable. Relevant social media for each agency was examined, 
including Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.  
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 Case 3. Case 3 involved the misconstrual of GE foods in California. Data was 
collected from the California Secretary of State’s Office (http://www.sos.ca.gov/) and 
from the pro-Prop 37 California Right to Know group (http://www.carighttoknow.org/). 
Information from the FDA also provided perspective to the government’s response to 
California’s activist movement. Similarly to previous cases, social media, including 
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, was searched for both government agencies.  
 All material recovered during organizational document searches remains stored in 
the researcher’s computer. Folders for each case contain sub-folders to organize material 
recovered from each associated organization. Organizational folders contain separate 
homes for data recovered from each specified media channel. All relevant data collected 
through these searches was saved for analysis. In the next section, the process used to 
generate interview data is described.  
Interviews 
 Interviews were obtained in the final phase of data collection. Data was collected 
using semi-structured phone interviews. Emails were used to initially recruit participants. 
Those who agreed to participate completed an emailed consent form. Finally, an 
agreeable time was then established for the interview. The researcher transcribed 
interview discussions and composed real-time notes. Interview data remains stored on the 
researcher’s password protected personal computer. Interview participants are 
overviewed in the following paragraphs.  
 Case 1. Domino’s Pizza’s Tim McIntye served as an important point of contact 
for information surrounding the company’s YouTube hoax. Tim McIntyre is Vice 
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President of Communication at Domino’s. He also held this position during the YouTube 
Crisis.  
 Case 2. An official in the FDA offered perspective on how industry in the United 
States responded to China’s 2008 melamine crisis. The representative gave insight on 
specific policy changes. This individual indicated a desire to remain anonymous.  
 Case 3. Finally, information was gleaned from interviews with both President of 
GMO Free USA Diana Reeves and Martina Newell-McGloughlin, director of University 
of Southern California’s Biotechnology Research and Education Program. Reeves and 
McGloughlin agreed to and completed interviews with the researcher through the 
telephone. 
 Data collection was completed for phases one and two by May 1, 2013. 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was obtained for phase three’s interviews and 
was completed by June 1, 2013. Next, analysis and interpretation mechanisms for data 
are explained.  
Analysis and Interpretation 
 Thematic analysis was used to first compare retrieved newspaper articles and 
organizational response documents. Boyatzis (1998) explains that identifying themes “at 
a minimum describes and organizes possible observations or at the maximum interprets 
aspects of the phenomenon. A theme may be identified at the manifest level (directly 
observable in the information) or at the latent level (underlying the phenomenon)” (p. 
vii). This analysis addressed both manifest and latent level themes in the collected data. 
In addition, Desantis and Ugarriza (2000) define a theme or themes as an “abstract entity 
that brings meaning and identity to a recurrent [patterned] experience and its variant 
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manifestations. As such, a theme captures and unifies the nature or basis of the 
experience into a meaningful whole” (p. 362). Similarly, Auerbach and Silverstein (2003) 
define themes as “an implicit topic that organizes a group of repeating ideas” (p. 38). 
This process categorizes sets of data into clusters of ideas that represent higher-level 
theoretical constructs. Through this process, several themes emerged from newspaper 
articles and organizational documents.  
 Data analysis was approached using a psychometric content analysis style. This 
method seeks to (a) “provide a clinical diagnosis for an individual [or in this instance, 
organizations] through analysis of messages generated by that individual” and (b) “to 
measure a psychological trait or state through message analysis” (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 
54). Analyzing messages in this manner centers on uncovering what Burke (1969) 
describes as the outward projections or proclamations to audiences that organizations 
publicize in responses to certain circumstances. This content analysis distinction is 
significant for two reasons. First, this project is not solely interested in audience analysis 
and message impact, but rather in uncovering organizational intent and decision-making. 
The messages chosen for dissemination in (more minimally) newspapers and 
significantly in organizationally sanctioned materials document Toulmin’s (1972) 
“darstellung” or public representation. Secondly, this technique involves a process of 
validation, where content analysis “is linked with other time-honored diagnostic methods, 
such as observations of the subject’s behavior” (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 54-55). Newspapers 
provided descriptions of events, actions, and decisions to contribute to the validation or 
refutation of organizational responses.  
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 Finally, to ensure that organizational legitimation responses were correctly 
interpreted, interviews with key industry spokespersons served as another confirmatory 
checkpoint. In this sense, the use of different research methods to test for consistent 
themes strengthens this study’s findings. Neuendorf (2002) postulates that triangulation is 
the best approach for testing hypothesized relationships between variables, as different 
approaches to data contain various benefits and weaknesses. For example, content 
analyses of organizational documents may lack contextual details to other societal events, 
and newspapers may incorrectly describe an organizational decision. However, 
newspapers contribute rich descriptions of stakeholder responses and organizational 
actions, whereas organizational documents articulate the first-hand account of the 
communicator’s case-specific response. Interviews confirm and clarify manifested 
thematic findings. When each data source is explored in conjunction with others, 
meaningful themes and rich data are most ripe for interpretation. Analysis followed a 
posteriori development of content units and categories. Categories developed as materials 
were viewed and then compared with multiple sources. Interpretation was guided by data 
findings.  
 Procedures for conducting the thematic analysis were guided by a codebook. The 
primary researcher coded all data. Separate codebooks guided analysis of newspapers, 
organizational documents, and interviews. Next, analytic procedures are discussed in 
depth for each data source.  
Coding 
 Butler-Kisber (2010) describes two stages of analysis, beginning with the coarse-
grained phase. Actions associated with this stage include “close readings and rereadings 
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or listening and viewing, dialoguing about what is being revealed, writing reflective and 
analytic memos and/or keeping a journal or log,” followed by broadly classifying 
emerging themes (Butler-Kisber, 2010). The second phase of analysis, the fine-grained 
phase, is when the researcher examines the pieces of data more closely. These “chunks” 
of data are “reassembled into more refined categories, and are broken down into others, 
and these are assigned, and reassigned names or codes” (Butler-Kisber, 2010). 
Newspaper articles and organizational documents were analyzed first by a coarse-grained 
phase, followed by the fine-grained approach. Thus, each artifact was examined at least 
two times. The goal of this process was to construct a “plausible and persuasive 
explanation of what is transpiring from the emergent themes,” (Butler-Kisber, 2010, p. 
31). Following this procedure, smaller units of data were isolated for scrutiny.  
 The second phase of analysis isolated specific words, phrases, and ideas that 
represent larger themes. These more specific, discreet units of data generate support for 
identified abstract concepts or ideas. This manifest content offered qualitative 
information in the form of quotes or quantitative information in the form of collecting 
numbers on how many times organizational spokespersons or actions appeared in data 
sources. Discrete units were grouped as evidence for larger thematic units. Utilizing an 
inductive approach, data introduced themes, categories, and conclusions.  
 Finally, holistic coding was employed to interview transcripts to grasp basic 
themes and issues in the data by absorbing them as a whole rather than line by line 
(Saldana, 2009). Saldana (2009) notes this approach is particularly useful when studies 
include multiple forms of data. Interviews clarify and validate data findings from the 
content analysis of newspapers and organizational documents. This approach permits the 
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researcher to examine the transcripts as a whole, extracting broad themes and concepts 
from interviews. Interview validation served as the final step in the interpretation process. 
Coding Procedures 
 All collected materials were documented in codebooks managed by the 
researcher. Phase one’s course-grain approach to analysis produced a codebook 
accounting for all relevant information found in searches of newspapers and 
organizational documents. This codebook recorded the date of artifact release, newspaper 
or organization from which it originated, author, word count, and a section for notes 
concerning the piece’s relevance and themes. Duplicate documents were identified in this 
phase.  
 Phase two’s fine-grained approach selected unduplicated artifacts with prominent 
information and themes for final analysis. The purpose of this two-step process was to 
include quality information, context, and content for each case. Although overall numbers 
of articles in each theme were noted, quality, or prominence of information, was more 
important than quantity. The fine-grained phase retained the categories mentioned above, 
but also included a column to document the rationale for inclusion in this phase by 
incorporating more detailed notes about the artifact’s content.  
 This project conceptualizes themes as categories, which is a term that 
encompasses “general phenomena: concepts, constructs, themes, and other types of ‘bins’ 
in which to put items that are similar” (Lindlof &Taylor, 2011, p. 246). While categories 
can be devised in a number of ways, this research is categorized by theory. Existing 
theory and research can be used in a “deductive fashion or etic fashion” (Lindlof 
&Taylor, 2011, p. 246). Coding specifically used Dowling and Pfeffer’s (1975) three 
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tactical areas for organizational legitimation to analyze case artifacts. Instances of 
adaptation, reframing, and identifying were recognized, recorded, and described in the 
study’s codebook. These tactics were marked in the “notes” section described in phase 
one of coding, but formally assigned to one of the three categories during phase two’s 
fine-grained approach.  
 In the final phase of coding, the identified categories were compared to the 
holistic coding from interview transcripts. Final comparisons were documented in memos 
composed by the researcher. Memos remain stored on the researcher’s computer and 
informed the final dissertation chapter including discussion, conclusions, and 
implications.  
Significance of Data Interpretation 
 Data and results offered unique insight to legitimation strategies during crisis 
response. Further, data analysis revealed a novel strategy for assessment of public 
organizational responses during perceptual crises. Legitimation strategies are commonly 
used by organizations facing disruption and dissatisfaction from stakeholder groups. This 
research contributes to the development of more effective risk and crisis communication 
for organizations. The deliberate and systematic approach to data analysis and 
interpretation generated a solid foundation for analysis for each case study, resulting in an 
epistemologically sound research project.  
Summary 
  This chapter explained the methods used for this communication study. The value 
of case studies was discussed, followed by incorporated data sources, sampling design, 
data collection, analysis, and interpretation. The qualitative analysis outlined in this 
 57 
 
chapter selects and analyzes organizational public discourse and examines how these 
public discussions lead to structural and organizational change at the policy level. A 
systematic approach to data collection, sampling, and interpretation results in rich, quality 
data from which the researcher draws conclusions from in subsequent chapters. Next, 
chapter four details the first perceptual crisis involving Domino’s Pizza.  
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Figure 3.1 
 
Overview of Coding Procedures  
 
Figure 3.2 
 
Overview of Newspaper Sampling and Collection (LexisNexis)  
 
Step Process Description  
Enter boundaries into 
LexisNexis search criteria  
Searches for this project are bounded by the newspaper 
outlet (in this instance, The Wall Street Journal, The New 
York Times, or The Washington Post), time range (each 
case is bound by important dates, and key words (Case 1 
example: “Domino’s Pizza” and “YouTube”).  
Save search results in a 
discrete folder 
All results that emerged from the LexisNexis search appear 
in a listed format organized by date in the database’s 
system. The list in its entirety is collected and saved for 
review.  
Determine the fit of each 
article  
The researcher read each article to determine its accuracy 
for covering the case. All articles that discussed the case are 
moved to a new folder. Articles that contained the 
keywords used to search but did not refer to the case are 
omitted from coded articles. Duplicate articles in search 
results are omitted from coded articles.  
Articles used to inform 
case description  
Relevant articles are used to describe each case in detail. 
Articles also illuminate important organizational documents 
and spokespersons discussed in media during cases.  
Articles used to bolster 
findings from 
organizational documents 
When relevant, articles also provided more information on 
organizational response – and served as a point of reference 
for organizational documents and statements.  
Newspapers 
Keyword searches 
yield potential 
articles for 
inclusion 
Articles coded if 
they cover the 
selected case 
Relevant articles 
are coded for 
actional strategies 
Organizational 
Documents 
Articles identify 
documents and 
spokesperosns in 
cases 
Organizational 
documents 
collected  
Organizational 
documents are 
coded for actional 
strategies 
Interviews  
Spokespersons with 
perspective on 
cases are contacted 
Spokespersons 
confirm or clarify 
findings  
Final descriptions, 
strategies, and 
findings are 
recorded 
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Chapter Four: Domino’s YouTube Hoax 
 In 2009, an online source alerted Domino’s Pizza (also referred to as Domino’s) 
that an unfavorable video created by two employees was circulating on the video-sharing 
website YouTube.com (also called YouTube). The grotesque video revealed one of the 
employees contaminating food that he falsely claimed would eventually be served to 
customers. Ultimately, over one million viewers watched the prank video, creating a 
crisis of perception for Domino’s Pizza. This chapter analyzes Domino’s response to its 
YouTube crisis. First, Domino’s hoax is described using incorporated newspapers to 
document and illuminate events as they unfolded beginning in spring 2009. Secondly, 
Domino’s case is discussed from the perspective of the hoax literature. Next, artifacts 
selected for inclusion in this chapter are discussed in detail. Fourthly, actional legitimacy 
is used as a framework to analyze Domino’s response. Finally, implications and 
conclusions extend this case to broader organizational issues to offer insight to others 
tasked with responding to similar perceptual crisis.  
 Hoaxes present a paradox for crisis responders in that they demand a legitimate 
response to illegitimate claims. Cultivating a thorough and empirical understanding of 
this paradox is necessary to understand how hoaxes create a crisis of perception. This 
case is noteworthy in that Domino’s largely responded successfully to a situation that had 
little precedent. However, the case is also ordinary in that any organization might 
encounter employees that eventually wish to sabotage a current or former employer for 
myriad reasons. Thus, this case illustrates two points; the first being that this scenario 
could occur anywhere and to any organization. Secondly, other organizations can learn 
from this case and prepare for a similar scenario.  
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The Case 
 In April 2009, Domino’s employees Kristy Hammonds, 31, and Michael Setzer, 
32, recorded a video of themselves during working hours in a Domino’s franchise in 
Conover, North Carolina. Hammonds and Setzer’s inattention to their duties at Domino’s 
and willingness to joke around on the job demonstrates blatant irresponsible behavior; 
however, what they recorded during one particular shift is even more disturbing. 
Hammonds narrates a two-minute video that captures Setzer putting his “boogers” on 
sandwiches, inserting cheese into his nose before placing it on a sandwich, and “farting” 
on salami (Swifttallon, 2009a). Hammonds also smiles for the camera stating she “likes 
to be lazy” and asks Setzer, “You remember the time when you sneezed?” (Swifttallon, 
2009a). It is unclear where Setzer sneezed (or on what), but viewers might assume he has 
engaged in this type of behavior before at Domino’s. Hammonds captures the television 
screen that displays customer orders above Setzer’s workstation, implying that the food is 
being prepared for actual paying customers.  
 Hammonds carelessly asks in her video, “where are these going?” to get a better 
idea of who might be receiving the tampered food (Swifttallon, 2009a). In what could be 
viewed as Hammonds’ worst comment, she says “and little do they know that the cheese 
was in his nose and that there was some lethal gas that ended up on their salami. Now 
that’s how we roll at Domino’s!” (Swifttallon, 2009a). Eventually, Hammonds remarks 
that her “boss lady” could be checking on them soon prompting her to stop recording 
(Swifttallon, 2009a). Viewers are not shown whether the food was discarded or served to 
customers. Hammonds eventually uploaded the video to YouTube on April 12, 2009. 
Those who viewed the video quickly shared it online and instigated widespread 
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discussion covering the incident at Domino’s. Within hours of Hammonds posting the 
recording, the video accumulated 30,000 views (Liddle, 2009).  
By Monday evening April 13, 2009, Domino’s Vice President of 
Communications, Tim McIntyre received a tip about the video from the website 
Consumerist.com (Clifford, 2009). Consumerist.com bloggers helped Domino’s 
corporate office locate the implicated franchise by deciphering what could be seen 
outside through a restaurant window (Clifford, 2009). Within three hours of notification, 
Domino’s started search efforts to find the rogue employees (Wall Street Journal, 2009). 
Eventually, the location of the store was confirmed and the franchise owner was informed 
of his employees’ actions. The next day, April 14, 2009, Domino’s fired Hammonds and 
Setzer and cooperated with the local public health department to sanitize and restore his 
restaurant (Clifford, 2009). Tuesday morning, Hammonds apologized to the company and 
emailed, “It was fake and I wish that everyone knew that!!!! I AM SOO SORRY!” 
(Clifford, 2009, para. 16).  
 Although the termination of Hammonds and Setzer eliminated any threat to public 
safety and the public health department was brought into the Conover franchise to restore 
safe operations, social media discussion and Hammonds’ YouTube video remained 
active. Between April 14-15, video views jumped from 29,000 views to 700,000 (Liddle, 
2009). At the end of the day on April 15, the video reached one million views (Liddle, 
2009). During this time, discussion of the YouTube video continued to stream on the 
social networking site Twitter.com (also referred to as Twitter). Unfortunately, YouTube 
could not fulfill Domino’s request to remove the video earlier because Hammonds legally 
owned the content (Wall Street Journal, 2009). When Hammonds removed the video 
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from YouTube late April 15, 2009, Domino’s continued its crisis response efforts 
(Clifford, 2009). Hammonds and Setzer soon faced felony charges for distributing 
prohibited foods and were taken into custody by Conover Police on April 15, 2009. To 
view a timeline of events surrounding this case, refer to Figure 4.1.  
[Figure 4.1 inserted here].  
 In three full working days, Domino’s Pizza was alerted to the employee 
misbehavior on YouTube, worked with the bloggers of Consumerist.com to locate the 
implicated store, contacted the owner, fired the rogue employees, and called the local 
public health department to assess the franchise’s condition. However, while the 
substantial components of this case were completed by Wednesday, Internet response to 
the video continued to grow. Domino’s remained silent on the issue (outside of the initial 
actions documented above) until Wednesday. Domino’s response will be further 
discussed in subsequent sections. In the next section, hoax literature is used to frame a 
discussion of Domino’s YouTube crisis.  
Communication Constraints Specific to Hoaxes 
 Hoaxes present a challenging scenario for crisis responders. As detailed by the 
case description, Domino’s eliminated the possibility of human or physical harm in three 
days, (on April 15, 2009) when the restaurant chain fired Hammonds and Setzer and the 
franchise was under the local public health authority’s control. However, at an 
organizational level, Domino’s still faced a legitimacy threat with its consumers. In 
particular, the company’s online audiences remained isolated and uncertain of Domino’s 
response to the crisis. For this reason, the restaurant chain’s legitimacy with a growing 
subset of stakeholders was skeptical. Mazza (1999) finds that legitimacy is awarded or 
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bestowed to an organization by its stakeholders. Stakeholders also form subjective 
constructions of legitimacy, and it is this (or their) reality that an organization must attend 
to (Mazza, 1999). Maintaining and building these relationships is necessary for 
organizational well-being (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Domino’s acted quickly when the 
blogging community of Consumerist.com alerted them to Hammonds and Setzer’s 
YouTube video. However, what deserved equal attention was the legitimacy crisis 
developing on the Internet.  
Asymmetrical Threats 
 Hoaxes are appealing to persons wishing to do harm because they constitute a 
“softer” outlet for perpetrators, allowing them to engage in minimal risk or discomfort 
while still accomplishing their goals (Mohtadi & Murshid, 2009). In this sense, one 
criminal can perpetuate false claims on the Internet that grow with each individual who 
consumes and shares the information. Well-designed pranks often profit from uncertainty 
and perceptions of vulnerability, yet spread because they are believable (Sellnow, 
Littlefield, Vidoloff, & Webb, 2009). These deceptive alerts, otherwise known as hoaxes, 
in turn stand to “undermine the public’s confidence in an organization, product, service 
or person” (Veil, Sellnow, & Petrun, 2011, p. 7).  
 In the case of Domino’s crisis, two rogue employees engaged in grotesque acts 
with claims of serious food contamination. Hammonds’ video, which required two 
minutes of her time to film and possibly another minute to upload to the Internet, 
instigated a considerable challenge for Domino’s as they worked to reassure the safety of 
customers and extinguish false claims. The resources required by Hammonds to generate 
false claims about Domino’s Pizza were minimal; however, response actions required by 
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the franchise owner and Domino’s Pizza, Inc. (Domino’s Pizza, Inc. refers to the entire 
restaurant enterprise) were considerably larger. In this sense, hoaxes are an asymmetrical 
threat: They demand little investment from the perpetrator but an escalating and extensive 
response from the victimized individual or organization. Consequently, eliminating and 
minimizing the threat from Internet hoaxes should remain a high priority endeavor for 
crisis managers.  
 Asymmetrical threats are amplified and linger on the Internet. Social networks 
allow users to instantaneously share information with their followers. Twitter, Facebook 
(Facebook.com), and YouTube all boast millions of users each day. At the time of data 
collection for this chapter, Twitter claims 100 million users and Facebook notes 800 
million active users (Daniells, 2012). Assuredly, both social networks gain more users 
with each passing day. With no traditional gatekeeper to regulate information, any user 
may post and/or share information they find newsworthy, interesting, or damaging. 
Rainie, Brenner, and Purcell (2012) find that 46% of adult Internet users post original 
photos or videos that they have created. Hammonds is a member of a growing subset of 
U.S. adults that share personal content regularly on the Internet. Content shared by 
individuals online is often material about which a person feels “strongly” (Izawa, 2010, p. 
29). Hoaxes then, disseminated alongside legitimate or believable context, can quickly 
fall into this category when a scenario endangers and disturbs viewers. The Internet 
complicates matters for organizations engaged in rumor crossfire – meaning that 
organizations must manage competing and often-contradictory viral claims. Not only 
must they expend considerable resources to combat a claim(s) that costs the perpetrator 
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little or nothing to create, they also must contend with a living and growing claim that 
extends itself far past the individual that generated it.  
Social Media 
 The Internet clearly serves as an effective mechanism for spreading false claims. 
However, another component of this process is that often the Internet serves as an outlet 
for legitimate and reasonable grievances from customers or stakeholders toward 
organizations. Review websites such as Zagat.com, Yelp.com, UrbanSpoon.com, and 
Amazon.com illustrate many instances of patrons reporting on their experience with a 
particular restaurant, product, or service. Social media websites are also avenues to share 
legitimate opinions and experiences about a product or organization (Cheong & Lee, 
2011). For this reason, less than favorable information about a product or service may be 
taken seriously until the claim is refuted and discredited. In the next section, social media 
characteristics and Domino’s ability to respond to a hoax are discussed.  
Impact of YouTube Video. Unfortunately, not all crises are created equal. Some 
events or crises are more damaging or disturbing than others. An example of this is 
clarified by considering the outrage associated with an intentional or terrorist event, 
compared with a natural disaster. Certainly, intentionally harmful acts are more 
frightening and debilitating, even if they are less likely to occur. Crisis literature 
establishes precedent for formulating response strategies acknowledging this distinction 
based on crisis type (see Chapter Two). Domino’s YouTube crisis is defined by several 
unique characteristics that shaped stakeholder outrage when Hammonds’ video went 
viral. These considerations encompass the offensiveness of Hammonds and Setzer’s 
actions, responsibility of the act, and uncertainty associated with crisis resolution.  
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 Domino’s Pizza, as a purveyor of food products, works in an industry where 
contamination is highly damaging. Contamination of its products when used (i.e., 
consumed) can result in human sickness or death. Therefore, adulteration of Domino’s 
product is much more serious than a product that is merely admired, collected, worn, etc. 
Food contaminations are alarming to most persons because unlike other products or 
materials, food is essential to our survival. The psychological relationship that exists 
between food and persons is an area of study in and of itself, and is extensively more 
detailed than can be described here. Rozin (1999) writes that the common western truism 
“you are what you eat” (p. 14) illustrates that persons view food as an extension of their 
being. An attack or adulteration of these products is very frightening to most. In this 
sense, Domino’s customers who viewed the YouTube video would be fearful of physical 
illness – a fear exasperated by the notion that the contamination was not only intentional 
but orchestrated internally by Domino’s employees.  
 The outrage of Domino’s YouTube video is further amplified by the fact that 
Hammonds and Setzer are contaminating food during their shift, in uniform, in a 
Domino’s restaurant (Swifttallon, 2009a). Coombs and Holladay (2002) find that publics 
expect more from an organization when it bears responsibility for the crisis. In this 
instance, Domino’s appeared to be fully responsible for product contamination, thus 
warranting extensive response. Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger (2011) argue that 
organizations have an ethical responsibility when making decisions and/or operational 
judgments to ensure no harm comes to stakeholders. Aside from Hammonds and Setzer’s 
misbehavior, stakeholders may also assume that something else is wrong at Domino’s 
Pizza, Inc. simply because this event happened. Inferences about Domino’s hiring 
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practices, lack of supervision or training, and unprofessionalism become secondary issues 
for a public relations team to address when crises emerge internally. For this reason, the 
impact of this video is intensified from Hammonds and Setzer’s status as active 
employees (at the time of the video) and the location of its recording (inside a Domino’s 
restaurant).  
  In addition to the circumstances of psychological distress associated with food 
adulteration and the crisis’ internal origination, the YouTube video generated uncertainty 
with stakeholders. Initially, Domino’s remained quiet with its external communication, 
while choosing to focus organizational efforts on restoring human and physical safety. 
However, millions of viewers created subjective constructions of Domino’s during the 
organization’s lag time between when the video surfaced on YouTube and when social 
media response began. When gaps emerge, stakeholder’s decision-making and 
understanding of the situation are constrained (Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2011). This 
lack of information is detrimental to promoting self-efficacious actions and poor or 
absent communication can make organizations look unresponsive or dismissive in 
addition to violating other best practices in crisis communication (Seeger, 2006). 
Communicative efforts surrounding a crisis are considerably more difficult when 
uncertainty is present.  
 Responding to hoaxes is challenging for organizations, particularly when they 
emerge on the Internet. In subsequent sections, Domino’s response to Hammonds and 
Setzer’s YouTube video is discussed. To begin, case artifacts included in analysis are 
described. Secondly, each actional strategy is examined to illuminate the size and impact 
 68 
 
of Domino’s ability to manage and diminish the hoax YouTube Video. Finally, the 
discussion section describes this case’s broader impact and meaning.  
Case Artifacts 
 Three newspapers were consulted to substantiate this case. A search on 
LexisNexis Academic, specifically for articles from The Washington Post and The New 
York Times, revealed fourteen possible articles discussing Domino’s crisis. The search 
terms “Domino’s Pizza” and “YouTube” were used to locate articles containing both 
terms. Out of these fourteen articles, only one from The New York Times directly covered 
this case. No articles from The Washington Post followed Domino’s YouTube crisis. 
Next, a search of The Wall Street Journal, conducted on the newspaper’s website, yielded 
seven articles and two web blogs (or blogs) that matched search criteria. Both blogs 
discussed the Domino’s hoax directly, yet no full articles devoted attention to the prank. 
Five Wall Street Journal articles did, however, discuss the crisis in relation to other 
organizations or social media issues. In total, only 21 articles were identified from the 
newspaper search. From these artifacts, only three directly covered the YouTube hoax. 
To contribute to the timeline for this case, four additional articles are included in this 
chapter. These articles were located through Google’s News search. The additional 
articles originated from Nation’s Restaurant News, The Strategist, Advertising Age, and 
SlashFood.  
 Next, the YouTube video uploaded by Hammonds was included with the response 
video from Domino’s. While Hammonds’ original video file was removed in 2009, the 
clip is still posted on the humor website Break.com. Domino’s response video remains 
accessible on YouTube. Both videos were transcribed. Facebook and Twitter were 
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included in analyses, as some discussion transferred from YouTube to these social 
networking websites. Domino’s accounts on Twitter (including @DPZinfo and 
@dominos) and Facebook (facebook.com/Dominos) were consulted for this case. Both 
Twitter and Facebook accounts used in this study are the U.S. accounts.  
 Information was also gleaned from an interview with Domino’s Vice President of 
Communication Tim McIntyre, who agreed to and completed a telephone interview with 
the researcher. The interview was confirmatory and explicated Domino’s rationale for 
response actions.  
 Lastly, organizational documents were collected to triangulate other sources. The 
researcher searched Domino’s corporate website dominosbiz.com for press releases or 
other documents that discussed the YouTube hoax. No press releases were written to 
communicate about this incident. However, four financial reports were incorporated to 
track Domino’s Pizza Inc.’s financial status prior to the YouTube hoax, immediately 
following the hoax, and two years after the hoax. All four reports fell within Domino’s 
fourth financial quarter. 
 Using multiple sources of data provides a robust understanding of Domino’s 
response. Consulting newspapers, social media, a Domino’s spokesperson, and 
organizational documents offers perspective on mitigation efforts. In the next section, this 
case is discussed within the parameters of legitimacy literature. 
Domino’s Actional Response 
 Using Boyd’s (2000) actional legitimacy framework and Dowling and Pfeffer’s 
(1975) tactical legitimacy bolstering strategies, this section describes Domino’s response 
as it manifested in publicly available artifacts. Additionally, an interview with Domino’s 
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Tim McIntyre provides perspective on decision-making not accessible in open source 
documents. Incorporating findings from newspapers, social media, a Domino’s 
spokesperson, and organizational documents, this section analyzes crisis responses 
topically using Dowling and Pfeffer’s (1975) prescribed actional strategies. First, 
adaption of output, goals or methods of operation is discussed. Next, efforts that reframe 
the definition of social legitimacy to meet the organization’s present practices, output, 
and values are included. Finally, communicative actions that identify with symbols, 
values, or institutions that have an existing base of social legitimacy concludes 
legitimation strategy analysis.  
Adaption of Output, Goals, or Methods 
 Domino’s Pizza adapted two clear organizational policies to restore legitimacy 
with stakeholders. These areas included social media use and organizational hiring 
practices.  
Social Media 
 Prior to the release of the YouTube video, Domino’s maintained a nonexistent 
social media presence. Domino’s has maintained an online presence since 1996 when it 
launched www.dominos.com. However, the company did not accommodate online 
ordering until 2007 and did not launch social media accounts until 2009. In fact, just as 
the hoax erupted the company was preparing to launch its Facebook and Twitter pages. 
Beginning with a YouTube video response to the hoax, followed by additional social 
media engagement, Domino’s demonstrated evolution of its communicative methods of 
operation.  
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 YouTube. On April 15, 2009, Domino’s President Patrick Doyle filmed a two-
minute YouTube clip addressing the hoax. The video begins with Doyle acknowledging 
the situation, apologizing for the incident, and thanking members of the online 
community for alerting the company to the video (Swifttallon, 2009b). Doyle calmly 
relays that the matter is being taken “incredibly seriously,” and tells viewers that the 
situation is isolated to the North Carolina franchise (Swifttallon, 2009b). Further, Doyle 
discloses that the employees behind the video have been dismissed, felony warrants were 
issued for their arrest, the store in question has been temporarily shut down, and 
Domino’s is “reexamining all of [their] hiring practices” (Swifttallon, 2009b). The video 
explains the damage caused to the local franchise owner, how many other employees are 
impacted by this video, and reiterates a commitment to customer satisfaction (Swifttallon, 
2009b). Rather than issuing a formal press release to mainstream press, hiring an external 
crisis team, or bringing in a creative agency, Doyle responded to viewers by delivering 
his statement directly to the Internet (Flandez, 2009). McIntyre notes that speaking to the 
affected audience directly influenced Domino’s decision to upload the video, as they did 
not want to “tell fifty million people” if they could speak to a smaller, more targeted 
audience (personal communication, 2010).  
 Domino’s YouTube channel, dominosvids, is listed as being active from 
November 5, 2007 to the present; however, prior to April 1, 2009, the channel only 
hosted ten videos (Dominosvids, 2013). Currently, the channel hosts just fewer than fifty 
videos (Dominosvids, 2013). Dominosvids (2013) has 2,411 subscribers and 5,124,085 
video views. The website is not considerably impressive when considering the number of 
videos available for consumption or the average number of video views. Perhaps most 
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remarkable about Domino’s integration of YouTube into its organizational practices, is 
its use as a direct channel to respond to customers on the Internet – customers who were 
using YouTube to share and comment on the hoax video. Additionally, Domino’s Pizza 
used this change to eventually incorporate YouTube videos into a marketing campaign. 
This campaign will be discussed more extensively in the next actional section (framing 
the definition of social legitimacy).  
 Aside from increased engagement in YouTube as a medium, Domino’s also 
incorporated new employee standards for YouTube. Following the incident, the company 
instituted strict photography and videography guidelines for employees to follow that 
were designed to protect Domino’s stores and products (McIntyre, personal 
communication, 2010). The penalty for failure to adhere to organizational guidelines is 
employment termination (McIntyre, personal communication, 2010). McIntyre relays 
other challenges faced by the organization involving YouTube, including the need to 
remain vigilant against similar YouTube pranksters in addition to those who would 
upload videos for more nefarious reasons (e.g., employees demanding compensation to 
withhold a potentially damaging video) (personal communication, 2010). While 
Domino’s response to mechanism to this crisis is novel, so too were the organization’s 
enduring video sharing practices following April 2009.  
 Twitter. In addition to changes on YouTube, Domino’s Pizza increased its 
presence on the social networking websites, Twitter and Facebook. To accompany the 
released YouTube video, Doyle also initiated Twitter conversations on April 15, 2009. 
Doyle maintained primary control of @DPZinfo’s account, which addressed issues and 
questions specifically surrounding the crisis, delivered messages that were informal, and 
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thanked customers for their support (Shankleman, 2009). While Twitter data has since 
been deleted for the Domino’s crisis Twitter account some of these messages are 
captured in other documents. One tweet stated, “To all that have messaged, RT’d or 
given a vote of confidence: THANK YOU! It’s been a heck of a day, but we’re glad to be 
out here with you” (Shankleman, 2009). While some users expressed a continued loyalty 
to the brand, others tweeted “I will never eat a Dominos pizza again! Or even never eat 
anything again!” (Shankleman, 2009).  
Shortly after the crisis, @DPZinfo followers climbed to 1,200 followers (Garner, 
2009). As of February 11, 2013, this number has dropped to 409 followers (@DPZinfo, 
2013). Additionally, @DPZinfo has since deleted all but six tweets, which remind 
followers to follow its active organizational Twitter account, @dominos. One remaining 
tweet reads, “our official account is @dominos. Jump over and say hi” (@DPZinfo, 
2013). Domino’s @dominos account remains active and has 160,354 followers (as of 
February 11, 2013). The account follows 10,940 Twitterers and boasts over 18,000 tweets 
(@dominos, 2013). Additionally, this account is maintained by a media team (referred to 
on Twitter as “the crew”) at the company’s headquarters in Ann Arbor, MI and links to 
the company’s main website (www.dominos.com).  
 Facebook. Twitter served as another discussion forum for individuals who 
viewed the YouTube video online and wanted to know what Domino’s was doing to 
reprimand the rogue employees and reaffirm customer safety. While Facebook did not 
become a third channel for discussion about the hoax video, it did become another tool 
used by Domino’s to engage stakeholders on social media. Domino’s joined Facebook on 
January 10, 2008, however, the company posted minimal material until 2009 (Domino’s 
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Pizza Facebook, 2013). Currently, the website has 7, 924, 667 likes and actively posts 
content, including wall postings (text messages on the page’s wall), pictures, and videos 
(Domino’s Pizza Facebook, 2013). The website houses other organizational information, 
including links to the main Domino’s website, a mobile ordering page, Domino’s Twitter 
account, and other links to coupons and customer service (Domino’s Pizza Facebook, 
2013).  
 Because conversations surrounding the hoax video were not widespread on 
Facebook, the social networks that demanded organization attention were primarily 
YouTube and Twitter. However, since April 2009 Domino’s has maintained active 
accounts on all websites. The adoption of these social networking websites illustrates a 
shift in Domino’s presence on online social networking websites. In addition to adopting 
social networking, Domino’s addressed a need to change organizational policy 
surrounding employee hiring. This organizational change is described in the following 
section.  
Hiring Practices 
 When Doyle uploaded his video to YouTube quickly describing what the 
company was doing in response Hammonds and Setzer’s video, he relayed important 
information about crisis progress. In his response, Doyle iterates that Domino’s is 
“reexamining all of [its] hiring practices to make sure that people like this don’t make it 
into [its] stores” (Swifttallon, 2009b). Even though only two employees were linked to 
the video, Doyle recognized the need for a shift addressing all company employees. 
McIntyre succinctly acknowledges that “people do stupid things,” and many of these 
“stupid things” have occurred at Domino’s locations (personal communication, 2010). It 
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became clear that Domino’s desperately needed to reshape its hiring policy in order to 
limit the employment of individuals prone to deviant behavior.  
 As media uncovered more on the rogue employee’s backgrounds, reports surfaced 
that Hammonds was a registered sex offender when she worked at the North Carolina 
franchise (Flandez, 2009). In fact, this topic became a central focus of some media stories 
even when Domino’s moved towards settling the crisis (McIntyre, personal 
communication, 2010). This realization spurred questions of franchisee’s freedom to hire 
employees, which was not regulated by overarching corporate guidelines. To this effect, 
the corporate offices quickly acknowledged that they needed to reconsider prescribed 
guidelines and basic requirements for all 125,000 Domino’s employees (Swifttallon, 
2009b).  
 Domino’s adaptions in media policy and hiring procedures both demonstrate a 
significant shift in how the company engaged in two essential functions for business. The 
hoax prompted the company to seriously reconsider established organizational tasks and 
expectations surrounding preexisting behavior, resulting in considerable changes for the 
corporation after April 2009. Adapting new practices, goals, or methods of operation 
encompasses one facet to accomplish actional legitimacy strategies. Additionally, 
organizations may attempt to shift the definitions of social legitimacy to meet the 
standards of their current practices, goals, or methods of operation.  
Reframing the Definition of Social Legitimacy 
 When Hammonds and Setzer posted the video to the Internet, viewers quickly 
wanted to know the identity of the featured troubled employees. Doyle’s YouTube 
response highlighted actions being taken against the employees (their dismissal and 
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arrests) and emphasized an organizational change to reexamine how current hiring 
practices led to the acquisition of such irresponsible persons. This discussion produced a 
natural branch from the actual crisis to the root of the problem, which according to 
McIntyre was “two idiots with a video camera and an awful idea” (Clifford, 2009, para. 
9). In its incident response Domino’s reframed the problem to be about two outliers, who 
did not represent the organization as a whole. In this sense, the organization shifted blame 
to the implicated employees instead of the company in its entirety. In prompting crisis 
discussion to place Hammonds and Setzer as the cause of the incident, Domino’s was 
able to shift social legitimacy to meet its present practices and procedures.  
  Doyle’s YouTube response explains that “two team members have been 
dismissed,” and reminds viewers of the “125,000 thousand men and women…around the 
U.S. and more than 60 countries around the world,” who have not committed wrongdoing 
(Swifttallon, 2009b). This point was repeating in media, as McIntyre notes, “the majority 
of people do recognize what this was…that this was a rogue act of two individuals who 
thought they were being funny” (Flandez, 2009, para. 6). Echoing Doyle’s response from 
his video, McIntyre continued to say “[the employees] do not represent the 100,000 
people who work every day at Domino’s Pizza all over the world” (Flandez, 2009, para. 
6). He continued by explaining that managing more than 100,000 people across the 
United States, and in other countries, will likely result in hiring some individuals that will 
“do stupid things” (McIntyre, personal communication, 2010). In other words, an 
organization that is successful most of the time should not be chastised for one instance 
of failure. In addition, what Domino’s leadership should ask themselves is, “how do you 
address when people do something stupid” (McIntyre, personal communication, 2010).  
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 Doyle and McIntyre both emphasize that Hammonds and Setzer are only two of 
over 125,000 employees. Additionally, they discuss that Hammonds and Setzer’s 
“stupid” actions are what caused the crisis, rather than highlighting an organizational 
deficiency. This actional strategy problematizes the implicated individuals instead of 
Domino’s current hiring (or other) practices. Shifting this distinction encourages 
stakeholders to reconsider beliefs that Domino’s present staffing practices are 
insufficient.  
 Dowling and Pfeffer’s (1975) final prescribed actional strategy, including 
communicative actions that identify through symbols, value, or institutions with existing 
legitimacy, is discussed next. This actional strategy is exemplified by Domino’s use of a 
new advertising campaign.  
Identifying with Existing Symbols, Values, or Institutions 
 Identifying with new symbols, values, or institutions that associate positive 
characteristics can improve organizational legitimacy. Although circumstantial, 
Domino’s planned to launch a new pizza campaign shortly after the hoax video went 
viral. It appeared that Domino’s also faced another crisis with stakeholders in 2009: 
Customers needed an improved pizza recipe. In fact, many customers became very vocal 
about their dislike for Domino’s recipe and pizza ingredients. In response to claims that 
their pizza tasted “like cardboard,” they debuted a new recipe accompanied by a creative 
advertising campaign (About Domino’s Pizza, 2013; McIntyre, personal communication, 
2010). This campaign launched with a four and a half minute documentary posted to 
YouTube (pizzaturnaround.com) that not only announced the change, but also included 
commentary from customers who adamantly shared their distaste for Domino’s product. 
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When Hammonds and Setzer’s video emerged on the Internet, Domino’s used this 
disruption to introduce an additional change in organizational practices.  
 Altering the company’s recipe after forty-nine years illustrates significant 
organizational change. Coupling this transition with a national media campaign further 
demonstrates the audacity of this institutional shift. At the heart of the campaign, 
Domino’s attempted to portray honesty and transparency as organizational values 
(McIntyre, personal communication, 2010). To accomplish this task, the company asked 
customers to show Domino’s their pizza, resulting in the “show us your pizza” campaign 
(McIntyre, personal communication, 2010). The campaign debuted on YouTube, but was 
also shared on the company’s other social networks (Facebook and Twitter). Domino’s 
Pizza’s Facebook (2013) continues to promote the campaign: “We think our pizza looks 
delicious just the way it comes out of the oven. It doesn’t need those fancy food 
photography tricks,” and “that’s why we asked our customers, the most authentic source 
for pictures of our pizza, to photograph and upload their own photos.” They even 
encouraged pictures of the “good and the bad,” and would use bad experiences to reach 
out to customers (and distribute a free pizza or two) and/or retrain store staff if needed 
(McIntyre, personal communication, 2010).  
 Domino’s “show us your pizza” campaign was not a product of crisis response, 
rather, the plan to launch the campaign had been in development since 2008 (McIntyre, 
personal communication, 2010). Regardless of intent, the campaign reminded 
stakeholders that Domino’s cares about its customers, maintains ethical standards, and is 
responsive to stakeholder needs. Reminding stakeholders of its core values is an 
important distinction to make when longstanding customers are questioning an 
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organization’s legitimacy. In this case, Domino’s reiterated its longstanding values of 
honesty and transparency by investing resources in changing a failing recipe and 
involving customers in the promotional process. Domino’s wanted customers to know 
they “heard” them and voluntarily “changed” to meet these needs (McIntyre, personal 
communication, 2010).  
 Although the campaign was under development at the time the hoax video went 
viral, Domino’s did not anticipate or develop the campaign’s use and integration of social 
media. McIntyre notes that Domino’s learned the “real power of social media” from the 
hoax and wanted to launch elements of the campaign in its newly established networks 
(personal communication, 2010). By identifying with symbols, values, or institutions that 
have an existing base of social legitimacy, Domino’s achieved Dowling and Pfeffer’s 
(1975) third prescribed actional strategy. The company communicated an interest in 
honesty and transparency, reaffirmed attention to customer responsiveness, and 
demonstrated a quick mastery of social networks.  
 This section detailed actional strategies reached by Domino’s Pizza following the 
company’s YouTube hoax. Organizationally, the company adapted its social media 
practices and acknowledged a need to develop new hiring standards. Secondly, Domino’s 
reframed the definition of legitimacy to bolster existing hiring practices and highlight 
longstanding success in maintaining a large network of valued employees. Finally, an 
advertising campaign reminding stakeholders of Domino’s organizational values and 
customer responsiveness served to identify the company with pre-established feelings of 
positive attributes. The next section explores the implications of these strategies and 
provides recommendations for generalizable lessons.  
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Discussion 
 Domino’s YouTube crisis placed the organization in a difficult situation. The 
organization’s leadership needed to decide quickly to either ignore the video (after 
finding and reprimanding the employees) or to acknowledge it and risk drawing more 
Internet traffic to the prank. This section begins by discussing Domino’s successes and 
missteps in responding to the hoax. Following, Domino’s ability to reach actional 
legitimation is discussed. Finally, generalizable lessons from the case are presented.  
Success and Failures Responding to Consumer Perceptions 
 The Internet, as discussed in previous sections, can be both advantageous and 
threatening to an organization. Domino’s maintained both a website and online ordering 
capabilities prior to the hoax YouTube video’s release. In this sense, the organization 
held a positive presence on the Internet: Potential customers could search online for pizza 
restaurants and place an order through two different options (telephone and 
www.dominos.com). However, the social networking website YouTube facilitated a 
reputational crisis for the company when two rogue employees uploaded a grotesque 
prank video, prompting Domino’s Pizza, Inc. to mitigate a crisis not directly attributable 
to them. Without basis for refutation, the Internet is a forum that can amplify discontent 
of customers, rogue employees, and other stakeholders. This resource is also available to 
those who have no relationship with the company, but merely wish to create disruption or 
harm.  
 Consumerist.com bloggers noticed Hammonds and Setzer’s video soon after it 
was uploaded. However, the company’s lack of social media presence and environmental 
scanning delayed its organizational response. Environmental scanning and preexisting 
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online networks could have expedited the company’s response. In this sense, false claims 
and damaging misinformation are much easier to extinguish when exposed networks 
remain small. Because content is easily spread from person to person on the Internet, like 
a virus, information is easier to contain when the original hosts are quarantined. Once 
content replicates by hundreds of thousands of viewers and is uploaded to multiple 
webpages, removing the content is difficult, if not impossible. Online presence can be 
difficult for small organizations to maintain. However, Domino’s Pizza’s 2011 $6.9 
billion in global sales indicates that the company is hardly small and could allocate 
adequate resources to Internet monitoring (About Domino’s Pizza, 2013).  
 Domino’s inability to assess online threats may have also hurt the company in that 
no preexisting communication strategies were in place to direct the organization in the 
event of an online reputational threat. On a whim Doyle and a lone cameraman decided to 
make a video when most of Domino’s leadership was on vacation (McIntyre, personal 
communication, 2010). Their response video was recorded and uploaded to YouTube 
within 45 minutes of filming (McIntyre, personal communication, 2010). McIntyre notes 
Doyle’s candid, simple, and direct response made YouTube history when traditional 
organizational responses were replaced with a direct (to the source) message from a 
company’s president (personal communication, 2010). Arguably, Doyle happened to 
make a good decision that eventually decelerated the hoax video’s impact. Although this 
worked in the company’s favor, the success can largely be attributed to luck, rather than 
successful organizational strategy.  
 Considering Domino’s underdeveloped Internet presence and absence of an 
online reputational management strategy, the fact that the company’s response did not 
 82 
 
initially reach Internet audiences is unsurprising. Within three hours of being notified, the 
company started its search to find Hammonds and Setzer and eventually located the 
implicated North Carolina franchise (Wall Street Journal, 2009). The next day on April 
14, 2009, Domino’s fired Hammonds and Setzer and the local public health department 
investigated the franchise (Clifford, 2009). While these actions are necessary and 
imperative to mitigating any serious health threat, Internet audiences exposed to the hoax 
video were unaware that steps were being taken to ensure customer safety. More 
specifically, although Domino’s substantial responses followed protocol, the company’s 
initial lack of communication failed to alleviate stakeholder concern. On Wednesday, 
April 15, 2009, Doyle’s video finally intercepted Internet chatter about the hoax video.  
 Doyle’s organizational interjection successfully alleviated concern, as shown by 
the drastic reduction in Twitter traffic and video views. Furthermore, the number of 
views for the president’s response video surpassed Hammonds and Setzer’s video 
(McIntyre, personal communication, 2010). Internet discussion surrounding the potential 
contamination died down when Internet audiences knew that Domino’s was responding 
to the claims. This interjection would have been best delivered on Monday, when the 
company located the implicated franchise. Earlier communication could have halted 
video views at tens of thousands instead of the million plus views that eventually 
accumulated.  
 Despite Domino’s missteps, the pizza company still managed to contain damage 
by acknowledging the need to reach online stakeholders. The epicenter of this crisis 
existed online, and Domino’s appropriately targeted Internet audiences in its 
organizational crisis response. In fact, the company only responded to the YouTube video 
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online. No press releases, press conferences, printed statements, or other traditional 
correspondence mentioned the hoax video. McIntyre refers to this strategy as mopping up 
a “spill in one aisle instead of cleaning the whole store” (personal communication, 2010). 
Domino’s responded to audiences directly via the same channel through which the crisis 
originated.  
By Tuesday, April 15, 2009, the event was no longer a physical crisis in that the 
franchise was temporarily shut down, the implicated employees were fired, and the 
company confirmed that contaminated food was never delivered to customers. 
Unfortunately, the delay in response caused a perceptual threat for the online audiences 
until Doyle’s message reached them on Wednesday afternoon, April 15, 2009. Domino’s 
appropriately prioritized the response by initially confirming that customers were never 
served contaminated food. Even so, stakeholders remained uncertain of this fact until 
Doyle relayed organizational actions to them in his YouTube response.  
Success and Failure in Expressing Actional Legitimacy 
 Organizational response to the YouTube video eventually reached online 
stakeholders to mitigate Domino’s Internet-based perceptual crisis. Yet, the company’s 
targeted online messaging efforts resonated with stakeholders because of its 
comprehensive actional response. Analysis of actional strategies illustrates Domino’s 
ability to achieve success in all three of Dowling and Pfeffer’s (1975) prescribed actional 
strategies. The company quickly adopted new media strategies and promised to revise 
hiring procedures. Domino’s also reframed the crisis to emphasis the wrongdoing of two 
employees, in contrast with the rest of its employees who perform their jobs correctly and 
take pride in serving customers. Finally, the company reminded stakeholders of 
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Domino’s values and concern for customer satisfaction with the launch of the “show us 
your pizza” campaign.  
  Domino’s Pizza achieved all prescribed levels of actional legitimacy in the wake 
of its YouTube crisis. They entered the crisis with a positive reputation, made few 
missteps during the crisis, but engaged in ongoing efforts in post-crisis stages with a new 
campaign. While it remains impossible to link these actions directly with organizational 
success, it is noteworthy to acknowledge Domino’s financial state. Recently, Domino’s 
Pizza (2009; 2010) climbed from a net income of $37.9 million in 2007 to $54 million in 
2008. In 2009, this grew to $79.7 million and eventually to $87.9 million in 2010 
(Domino’s Pizza 2010; Domino’s Pizza, 2011). The company’s success is clear in recent 
years, growing both before and after the Internet hoax.  
 Global store expansion is one component of Domino’s rapid net income growth. 
However, at the end of 2009 Domino’s reported that domestic store sales also grew 1.4% 
as related to increased store traffic (2010). In 2010, domestic store sales grew 6.3% in 
just the fourth financial quarter alone, but jumped to 9.9% when considering the full year 
(Domino’s Pizza, 2011). In fact, 2010 annual domestic store growth was positive for the 
first time since 2007 (Domino’s Pizza, 2011). Domino’s expansion reflects the 
company’s success both domestically and internationally. This accomplishment suggests 
that organizational legitimacy remains strong with stakeholders. President Doyle believes 
2010 brought stakeholders a “new Domino’s,” and was a year that “improve[d] [their] 
pizza” in the United States, by building “a new base of customers and a stronger base of 
business from which to grow” (Domino’s Pizza, 2011). It seems that Domino’s 
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momentum has yet to subside, and has since continued to grow to a net income of $105.4 
million in 2011 (Domino’s Pizza, 2012).  
 Domino’s quick thinking and actional strategies were a recipe for success for the 
company. In an effort to further distill this information, the next section offers three 
generalizable lessons followed by conclusions on the case.  
Generalizable Lessons 
 Domino’s experience lends three lessons that other practitioners may benefit 
from. These include knowing social media networks, preparing for change, and finally 
“going where your stakeholders are.” 
 Know social media. Domino’s case illustrates the necessity of performing 
environmental scanning. Environmental scanning entails continual monitoring of 
pertinent communication networks to proactively gauge stakeholder needs and sentiment. 
In this instance, Domino’s was fortunate that bloggers contacted the organization to alert 
them to growing Internet rumors. However, organizations should not rely on outside 
actors to let them know when something is amiss online. Organizations must be 
preemptive and perform environmental scanning to find, acknowledge, and participate in 
online conversations when appropriate. Monitoring Internet discussions demonstrates 
responsive and proactive behavior, attending to the needs of audiences who may exist 
primarily or solely online. Additionally, knowing social media also means that 
organizations will get to know online stakeholders.  
 Environmental scanning is important for understanding stakeholder issues and 
building relationships with online and offline audiences. Cultivating relationships builds 
trust, rapport, and history with stakeholders. Pre-existing relationships and networks are 
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useful for legitimacy maintenance and building. Pre-existing connections are even more 
useful for disseminating risk and or crisis messages, especially when those implicated in 
the crisis need to communicate directly with stakeholders. Domino’s would have 
benefited if existing Twitter and YouTube accounts maintained consistent followers. 
Instead, the organization scrambled to respond to damaging rumors about its food while 
simultaneously learning to navigate social media and create connections. Building 
relationships with stakeholders during the pre-crisis stage is much easier than cultivating 
relationships after a crisis begins.  
 Prepare for change. Change can be difficult—particularly for organizations that 
are large, established, and stationary. It may be tempting for many organizations to resist 
change as long as they are successful. This process is natural in that past success will 
embolden future behavior. The best organizations, however, are those that engage in 
actions, policies, and behaviors congruent with stakeholder expectations while exploring 
and testing new procedures that could add to current organizational practices. In doing so, 
organizations learn to both highlight previous success and look to the future for novel and 
unprecedented opportunity.  
 Organizations, particularly those selling products that are not subject to constant 
updates (such as pizza), will sometimes wait until they are forced to change to meet new 
stakeholder or societal expectations. In most instances, reactionary behavior rarely 
invokes praise and positive attention. Organizational leadership should be forward 
looking to guide a company in a direction that would allow it to operate successfully in 
six months, a year, five years, and ten years in the future. Domino’s Pizza was moving in 
the direction of updating many of its communication systems. Still, Domino’s was behind 
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other organizations that had already mastered prevalent social media such as Facebook, 
Twitter, and YouTube. Fortunately, the company’s ubiquitous physical presence in many 
ways may have minimized this impact. For example, why would you need a cell phone 
app to find a store that maintains three locations within eyesight of you? However, 
smaller and/or newer restaurateurs must be more proactive in looking for future trends if 
they are to remain at the forefront of general stakeholder expectations.  
 Go where your stakeholders are. What is most compelling about Domino’s 
YouTube hoax is the need for organizations to meet stakeholders where they exist. With 
an abundance of platforms that facilitate online discussions, organizations must directly 
engage in channels that host stakeholders. This is a consequence of our fragmented and 
isolated modern media. Social media outlets sometimes, but not always, overlap with one 
another. Traditional and social media may also occasionally overlap (e.g., local, state, and 
national television news outlets will supplement their shows with a website, Twitter 
account, etc.) but many times they do not. Domino’s successfully dulled its Internet hoax 
by responding to its crisis where it started: On YouTube. Holding a press conference, 
issuing a press release, or even updating their website would not have necessarily reached 
the same persons who learned of the video hoax on YouTube. This case demonstrates 
how even on the Internet, crises can be relegated to a single corridor of online media. 
Organizations should consider this factor when disseminating messages, and attend to 
stakeholders using the most direct and concise mechanism available.  
Conclusion 
 In 2009 “two idiots with a video camera and an awful idea” caught Domino’s 
Pizza off guard (Clifford, 2009, para. 9). In less than one full day, the international 
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corporation was forced to substantially respond to an Internet hoax instigated by two 
employees based in North Carolina. Although Internet discussion surrounding the video 
was damaging, Domino’s engaged in actional legitimation strategies that eventually 
quelled the perceptual crisis. The company’s response, while not perfect, successfully 
engaged stakeholders to reassure the current and future well-being of the organization. As 
Domino’s continues to grow physically and financially, remaining connected to a diverse 
clientele will likely become even more challenging. 
 This chapter described an Internet hoax and the subsequent effects on Domino’s 
Pizza, Inc. More specifically, the case discussed actional strategies, success and failures 
in responding to consumer perceptions, actional legitimacy success and failure, and 
offered generalizable lessons for other organizational leaders. Next, chapter five extends 
discussion of perceptual crises moving from an Internet hoax to a near miss event 
involving adulterated imported food.  
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Figure 4.1 
 
Timeline of Domino’s Hoax Events  
 
Date Event Source 
Sunday April 12, 2009 
(5:00PM-6:00PM) 
Video is filmed.  Jacques, 2009 
Sunday April 12, 2009 
(Evening) 
Video posted to YouTube. Jacques, 2009 
Sunday April 12, 2009 Video reaches 29,000 views 
within hours of posting.  
Liddle, 2009 
Monday April 13, 2009 Domino’s is alerted to the 
video by Consumerist.com. 
Jacques, 2009 
Monday April 13, 2009 
(Evening)  
Domino’s identifies the 
location of the store where 
the video was filmed.  
Jacques, 2009 
Tuesday April 14, 2009 Hammonds and Setzer are 
fired from Domino’s.  
Clifford, 2009 
Tuesday April 14, 2009 Health department inspected 
the Conover franchise.  
Clifford, 2009 
Tuesday April 14, 2009 Hammonds apologizes to 
Domino’s in an email.  
Clifford, 2009 
Tuesday April 14, 2009 Twitter discussion of video 
picks up.  
Jacques, 2009 
Tuesday April 14, 2009 
(5:00PM) 
Video reaches 250,000 
views.  
Jacques, 2009 
Wednesday April 15, 2009 Hammonds and Setzer face 
felony charges and are taken 
into custody of Conover 
Police.  
Clifford, 2009 
Wednesday April 15, 2009 
(12:00PM) 
Video surpasses 1 million 
views.  
Clifford, 2009 
Wednesday April 15, 2009  Domino’s CEO (Doyle) 
responds in a YouTube 
video.  
York, 2009 
Wednesday April 15, 2009  Hammonds removes her 
video from YouTube.  
Clifford, 2009 
Wednesday April 15, 2009 Domino’s creates 
@DPZinfo to respond to 
customers on Twitter.  
Clifford, 2009 
Wednesday April 15, 2009 Video included in five of the 
twelve results on the first 
page of a Google search for 
“Domino’s.” 
Clifford, 2009 
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Figure 4.1 (Continued)  
 
Timeline of Domino’s Hoax Events  
 
Wednesday April 15, 2009 Domino’s video response 
has 330,000 views when the 
first press conference is 
held.  
York, 2009 
Monday April 20, 2009 A copy of Hammonds’ 
video remains on the 
Internet and reaches 
345,000 views.  
York, 2009 
Tuesday September 29, 
2009 
Conover Domino’s closes.  Lawinski, 2009 
Wednesday March 10, 2010 Setzer sentenced to 24 
months of supervised 
probation, Hammonds 
awaits trial.  
Northrup, 2010 
Friday January 25, 2012 Video remains accessible on 
the Internet.  
Swifttallon, 2009a 
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Chapter Five: Made in China – The Melamine Crisis 
 The United States has identified an increasing number of imported food products 
from China that contain unhealthy levels of melamine, an industrial chemical commonly 
used in plastics, adhesives, dishware, and whiteboards. More specifically, in 2007 pet 
food from China containing melamine sickened thousands and killed hundreds of pets. In 
2008, baby formula in China tested positive for the same chemical. While the case of 
2008 infant formula adulteration did not include legally imported food to the United 
States, the contamination received widespread television and print media coverage 
(Petrun, 2010). Unsurprisingly, these cases contributed to feelings of uncertainty and lost 
legitimacy for the country’s food safety enforcement mechanisms. This chapter analyzes 
the U.S. government’s response to the 2008 melamine crisis. First, this case is described 
using relevant newspaper coverage to document events as they occurred beginning in 
summer 2008. Second, the contamination is discussed from the perspective of near miss 
literature. Next, artifacts selected for inclusion in this chapter are discussed in detail. 
Fourth, actional legitimacy is applied as a framework to analyze the U.S. government’s 
response. Finally, implications and conclusions extend this case to offer insight to others 
tasked with responding to similar perceptual crises.  
 A near miss event, which can and should prompt learning and adaptation by 
organizations, is the second type of perceptual crisis discussed in this dissertation. This 
perceptual crisis can influence decision-makers to consider and respond to a problem 
without having to actually experience the trauma of a crisis. Near misses may serve as 
warnings that existing policy and procedures are at risk of serious failure. Conversely, 
organizations can respond to a near miss with excessive confidence in the existing 
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system, seeing the near miss as evidence that the system currently in place is effective. 
Distinguishing between these opposing responses is important as our governments and 
organizations endure an age of austerity where difficult decisions must be made about 
how to best ensure safety and security of our food systems with limited resources. 
Therefore, near miss events offer insight into how this perceptual crisis type may 
influence future food safety policy and government spending.  
The Case 
 Beginning in September 2008, media reports described burgeoning China-led 
investigations of all domestic infant formula. Several hundred Chinese infants were 
mysteriously sickened, and one infant reportedly was killed (Barboza, 2008a). 
Unfortunately, these numbers would eventually grow to a conservative estimate of three 
hundred thousand sickened children and six deaths in China (Wong, 2009). These deaths 
are most likely linked to kidney complications associated with melamine consumption, 
including kidney stones and renal failure (Barboza, 2008b; Kaufman, 2008; Wong, 
2008). Although long-term effects for humans who have ingested large amounts of the 
chemical remain unknown, some studies indicate that the substance could have long-term 
effects on humans in addition to the recently documented short-term effects. Though not 
fully supported, many researchers estimate that melamine consumption can lead to higher 
rates of cancer (particularly bladder or kidney cancer) (CDC, 2008; WHO, 2009b).  
 Melamine is a synthetic chemical, commonly used in the production of resins and 
foams, cleaning products, fertilizers, and pesticides (CDC, 2008). Melamine is not a new 
threat, nor one solely attributable to use in China. In the 1830s a German scientist 
invented the substance, composed of nitrogen, carbon, and hydrogen (Pickert, 2008). Its 
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usefulness was further refined in the 1930s when it was combined with formaldehyde to 
create a moldable, dishwasher safe material often used in kitchen utensils, containers, or 
appliances (Pickert, 2008). This compound can and does occasionally enter food products 
in trace amounts during the manufacturing process; however it is not naturally occurring 
in food. While low levels of melamine do not have observable toxic effects, larger 
amounts have an impact on the urinary tract and kidneys of animals (CDC, 2008). 
Exposure to high doses over time is linked to cases of bladder cancer in animals (CDC, 
2008). Similar exposure in humans could conceivably have the same effects.  
 China’s melamine cases in 2007 and 2008 contained significant, rather than trace, 
amounts of the industrial chemical. The FDA has established that products other than 
infant formulas with levels of melamine below 2.5 parts per million do not pose a risk to 
public health (Shin, 2008). Melamine tolerance levels are calculated on an individual 
basis by assuming 0.63 mg per kg of body weight per day is allowable (WHO, 2009b). 
Therefore, when regulatory agencies set food standards they must consider the product 
type under regulatory consideration, how often the product is consumed, and the size of 
consumers. China’s 2007 pet food and 2008 infant formula contaminations are 
particularly damaging accounts of chemical adulteration because they were found in 
products sold for consumption by vulnerable populations. Pets and infants both have 
limited food options available to them, meaning they often consume high amounts of few 
products. Normal adults typically eat a more diverse diet, which diminishes the 
probability of them consuming harmful amounts of this chemical. Unfortunately, with 
these two contamination cases, pets and infants often consume the exact same product 
each day with very little dietary variation.  
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 In both the 2007 and 2008 melamine contaminations the chemical was 
intentionally added to products. Melamine, which is often the byproduct of other 
manufacturing processes, can mimic real proteins, masking low nutrient levels (Barboza, 
2008a). Diluting products with this cheap and synthetic substitute allows them to pass 
and exceed mandated levels of protein for products (particularly important for pet food 
and infant formulas) while cutting costs. Although this process significantly inflates the 
net profit for manufacturers, it diminishes both the safety and nutritional quality of 
implicated products. 
 U.S. publications reported candid admissions of purposeful adulteration by 
Chinese manufacturers. For example, The New York Times quoted a chemical manager 
from Hebei Jinglong Fengli Company (on the 2008 scandal), “before the Sanlu scandal, 
we were not banned from selling melamine to anyone” (Barboza, 2008b, para. 28). 
Further, the chemical spokesperson mentions he “had heard melamine dealers sell 
melamine to animal feed companies and food companies. It was common before the 
Sanlu scandal” (Barboza, 2008b, para. 28). In addition to intentionally adding the 
chemical to products, private and government officials in China are believed to have been 
aware of the case as early as August 2008, yet failed to publicize information about 
implicated products until late September 2008 (Petrun, 2010). This response may have 
been even further delayed if not for a push from Sanlu’s New Zealand counterpart dairy 
company, Fonterra, who maintained part ownership of Sanlu (Spegele, 2010).  
 Sanlu, a Chinese formula distributor equivalent to that of the Gerber Company in 
the United States, was the first Chinese milk distributor implicated in product 
contamination. Sanlu has since declared bankruptcy, but the company was formerly the 
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country’s largest dairy product distributor (Wines, 2010). Sanlu was based in the city of 
Shijiazhuang in Hebei Province (Wong, 2009). The company’s product tested positive for 
levels of melamine over 2500 mg/kg, corresponding to 350 parts per million (ppm) – 
significantly exceeding the recommended levels for consumable products (WHO, 2009b). 
An acceptable level of the substance for adult (excluding infants) consumption is most 
likely estimated to be around one ppm (Bhalla, Grimm, Chertow, & Pao, 2008).  
 Eventually, several other dairy producing organizations were linked to the 
contamination. However, they were hardly comparable to Sanlu’s high levels of the 
chemical along with the company’s wide-reaching distribution channels (Wong, 2009). 
China’s melamine crisis is troubling because its true impact on the global food supply 
remains unknown. Since the pet food and infant formula contaminations, melamine has 
also been found in frozen yogurt, instant coffee, chocolates, Chinese eggs, and fish feed 
in China (Shin, 2008). In immediate response to the infant formula contamination, 68 
countries enacted protective actions against importing contaminated Chinese products 
illustrating the far-reaching distribution networks of Chinese exports (Bhalla et al., 2008). 
However, because of the expanse of contaminated products (milk, eggs, animal feed, 
coffee, other chocolate products) the true extent of penetration into the global food supply 
cannot be accurately recorded. To better understand the extent of melamine’s continued 
presence in China’s food supply, researchers in Hong Kong have tested vegetables, flour, 
and other meat products to determine other food categories that could have also been 
adulterated by knowing parties (Barboza, 2008b).  
 Chinese officials have largely failed to trace these contaminations to any one 
person or organization. For example, the 2007 pet food contamination was ultimately 
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blamed on a small export group (Barboza, 2008b). Other reports indicate that recent 
adulterations occurred by “marginal players,” insinuating the introduction of the 
chemicals occurred at the farming or distribution levels, suggesting that higher ranking 
and more powerful officials did not know about the malpractice (Areddy, 2010a, para. 9). 
In sentencing implicated dairy industry professionals, Chinese courts eventually handed 
down death sentences to several farmers and incarcerated the head of Sanlu for life 
(Areddy, 2010a). Sanlu declared bankruptcy after the debacle, and several other smaller 
dairy producers were shut down (Wines, 2010; Areddy, 2010a). Beijing says that food 
safety problems are often exaggerated to slow the boom in Chinese imports, and since 
2008, the Chinese government has worked to restore its industries back to an 
economically viable condition (Barboza, 2008a). Unfortunately, international trade 
partners may be more difficult to convince that the country is able to safely regulate its 
food supply. For an overview of event occurrences, refer to Figure 5.1.  
[Figure 5.1 inserted here].  
 The United States’ mitigating responsive actions aimed to quell the impact of 
adulterated products is the subsequent focus of this chapter. More specifically, the U.S. 
FDA-led response to the contamination is examined to document actions imposed 
domestically for mitigating China’s propensity for economically adulterating food 
products. Next, near miss literature is used to frame a discussion on the impacts of near 
miss events.  
Communication Constraints Specific to Near Misses 
 Near miss events create challenging circumstances for crisis responders. As the 
case study describes, this crisis originated in China and was the Chinese government’s 
 97 
 
responsibility to resolve. However, this crisis also gained traction in the United States 
from stakeholders who feared the contamination could impact American products. For 
this reason, the United States, and particularly the FDA, was expected to respond to 
China’s melamine crisis. As predicted, stakeholders perceived the melamine adulteration 
cases as an alarming near miss, demanding protective actions to minimize future 
reoccurrences. Stakeholders determine organizational legitimacy; therefore responsive 
organizations should attend to issues that are important to stakeholders (Mazza, 1999). 
Responsiveness should also attend to the subjective constructions of legitimacy, 
illustrating the potential to take action in the future if needed (Mazza, 1999). While the 
Chinese government promised food safety reform for domestically consumed and 
exported products, the FDA also reacted to the internationally-based contaminations, 
illustrating action to what constituted a perceptual crisis in the United States. 
Near Misses  
 Near misses encompass events that could have happened, but did not. Muermann 
and Oktem (2002) label these occurrences as “weak signals” that might signify a greater 
problem at hand. Other scholars define near misses as incidents that maintain the 
potential to cause loss, but fail to actually do so in the end (Phimister, Oktem, 
Kleindorfer, & Kunreuther, 2003). In this respect, near misses are perceived as damaging 
events that would cause harm if they reached their full potential. Near misses can be 
known or unknown. When known, near miss events can and should be used as a catalyst 
to reevaluate current circumstances to avoid future crises. If a near miss is unknown, its 
occurrence may not be realized until after a crisis has manifested. Phimister et al. (2003) 
list events like the 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger explosion, the 1997 Hindustan refinery 
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explosion in India, the 1999 Paddington train crash, and the 1998 Morton explosion and 
fire as all containing smaller crises or incidents (near misses) that preceded their major 
disasters. Noticing near miss incidents (and failure) can be difficult, particularly when 
employees or stakeholders want business to continue as usual. Near misses can also be 
discussed in relation to almost reaching a desirable goal or outcome.  
 When working towards a goal, narrowly missing a target can be an impetus to 
continue with current activity because success is “almost there.” In this sense, near 
misses might be a “failure to reach a goal” by a narrow margin (Reid, 1986, p. 32). For 
example, politicians attempting to pass legislation may narrowly fail to obtain a number 
of necessary votes. Most would assume this means the legislation was favorable, and 
merely needs slight alterations to win the remaining votes (as opposed to abandoning the 
bill and starting over). This distinction is relevant then because two types of near misses 
may encourage or impede policy. These include situations where the outcomes of an 
event are good but a negative event almost happened, and when a positive event almost 
happens but does not (Dillon, Tinsley, & Cronin, 2010). Subjectivity can excessively 
influence our ability to trust that good events are more likely to happen and bad events 
are less likely to happen. These suggestions tend to ignore actual or technical risk while 
simultaneously embracing “risk as feelings” (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 
2004, p. 311).  
 The subjective interpretations of stakeholders introduce unique communication 
challenges for crisis responders. For example, near miss events can create divergent 
audiences who need divergent risk or crisis communication messages. Dillon et al. (2010) 
find that impending hurricanes will both cause individuals to quickly evacuate while 
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others will remain apathetic about a potential natural disaster. Thus, communicators are 
tasked with understanding how an impending event elicits myriad responses from 
audiences. In this instance, China’s systemic melamine contaminations become a new 
issue that required forecasting and planning. Even in the absence of a fully manifested 
crisis, near misses can demand significant organizational resources. Considering, 
communicators should understand both the impact of near misses and their consequential 
organizational communication and implemented actions.  
China’s Past Adulteration Offenses and Response  
 Part of the U.S. federal government’s response to the melamine crisis was bound 
by past actions and events. Areddy (2010b) notes “problems in Chinese milk in recent 
years have underscored quality concerns about the nation’s food supply, as well as 
highlight[ed] how company and government officials are sometimes reluctant to publicly 
recall hazardous products” (para. 7). Furthermore, China has failed to contain melamine 
contaminations for several consecutive years. In fact, in 2010 the same melamine 
adulterated infant formula products pulled from shelves in previous years were 
discovered back in retailer’s stores in China (Wall Street Journal World News, 2010). 
The recalled (and melamine laden) formula was repackaged and recycled into China’s 
market a second time. Midler (2010) finds that the Chinese government’s response to past 
scandals “has been to protect the industry with a government shield, so no one should be 
surprised when fraud recurs in such an environment” (para. 6). Chinese manufacturers’ 
“pathological focus” on “short-term profitability” makes reporting, responding, and 
communicating about these issues nearly impossible (Midler, 2010, para. 7).  
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 These egregious actions invariably taint the minds of American stakeholders each 
time China suffers another serious food contamination. Furthermore, in the west, “safety 
scandals tend to be sins of omission – an improperly cleaned piece of equipment at a 
meat processing plant, a poorly designed toy” (Sternberg, 2013, para. 6). In China, 
conversely, food recalls involve instances of persons deliberately adding poisonous 
substances to products, injecting chickens with banned hormones and antibiotics, 
recycling cooking oil, mislabeling products, all while showing no indication of hesitation 
or remorse (Sternberg, 2013). Chinese consumers are notoriously untrusting of their 
government, opting to buy foreign infant formula at prices that fetch foreign suppliers a 
400 percent profit to avoid domestically manufactured products (Sternberg, 2013). More 
recent food inspections continue to find instances of food producers using chemical 
additives to alter food for economic gain (Burkitt, 2011).  
 The Chinese government’s responses to these occurrences have been unsuccessful 
in quelling concern in the United States. For example, Connecticut Congresswoman Rosa 
DeLauro, the previous chairwoman of the House Appropriations Committee’s 
Agricultural Subcommittee, has “inserted language in appropriations bills prohibiting the 
USDA from spending money on any activity that would facilitate poultry imports from 
China” (Wall Street Journal Asia, 2009, para. 2). When asked why, Congresswoman 
DeLauro says she maintains concerns about Chinese food safety following the spread of 
avian flu and a “spate of melamine contamination cases in dairy products and pet food” 
(Wall Street Journal Asia, 2009, para. 2). Eventually President Obama signed an 
appropriations bill allowing the United States to import poultry products, but only after 
the USDA received the approval to conduct food safety inspections in China of exports to 
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the United States (Wall Street Journal Opinion Asia, 2009). Since 2008, U.S. food safety 
inspectors have maintained a presence in China to prevent future food safety issues. In 
2011, the FDA called for increased data sharing and communication with China (in 
addition to other major trading partners) to identify and prevent high-risk problems in 
food trade (Burkitt, 2011). Currently, China is slated to tackle structural issues associated 
with food safety, proposing the formation of a new food and drug administration to 
handle all issues in a centralized organization (Tejada, 2013).  
 Adulterated Products in the United States. Clearly, China endures ongoing 
obstacles with purposeful food adulteration. Fortunately many of these challenges do not 
directly impact U.S. consumers. In 2009, the USDA submitted melamine and cyanuric 
acid results on 44 domestically manufactured infant formulas, including powdered, liquid 
concentrate, and liquid ready-to-use formulas. All tests revealed that samples contained 
values below the 0.25 mg/kg threshold level (Hilts & Pelletier, 2009). While American 
products tested within safe threshold limits, the FDA identified implicated Chinese 
products in several ethnic grocery stores (Bradsher, 2008). However, these products 
never received FDA approval for import to the United States and were contained to a 
very specific type of retailer (Bradsher, 2008). Identified products were removed from 
stores upon discovery. After thoroughly testing U.S. products and ensuring no Chinese 
products were being sold in the United States, the alarm surrounding infant formula 
should have lessened. However, response to this issue remains ongoing despite the 
evidence that China’s tainted formula was not present in U.S. infant formula supplies.  
 The problems facing China’s current food safety systems are serious. However, 
amid China’s safety concerns, implicated infant formula was not present in U.S. food 
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systems. Several other events, including the 2007 pet food recall and other recent food or 
product contaminations, may have served as near miss warning signals for future recalls. 
In this sense China’s melamine crisis may embody both types of near miss cases. The 
outcome of the infant formula in the United States was a positive one, in that the 
contamination was absent from domestic products. The outcome could have been worse 
if more illegal products were imported to the United States or already present in 
domestically manufactured products. Conversely, the United States almost entirely 
escaped implication in the 2008 contamination, but still found some Chinese product 
within U.S. borders. Both cases warranted U.S. government response to concerned 
American stakeholders. The complicated task for U.S. government communicators then 
was to convey a message that was twofold; firstly, they had to acknowledge the severity 
of the issue while secondly stating that no viable threat existed for American consumers.  
 Responding to near misses is difficult for organizations tasked with meeting 
multiple message objectives. In subsequent sections, the FDA’s response to China’s 
melamine crisis is discussed. To begin, case artifacts included for analysis are described. 
Second, each actional strategy is examined from FDA’s rhetorical artifacts to illuminate 
the size and impact of its ability to communicate effectively with U.S. stakeholders. 
Finally, the discussion section describes this case’s broader impact and meaning.  
Case Artifacts 
 Three newspapers were consulted to substantiate this case. A search on 
LexisNexis Academic, specifically for articles from The Washington Post and The New 
York Times, revealed fourteen possible articles discussing China’s melamine crisis. The 
search terms “China” and “Melamine” located articles containing both terms for both 
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newspapers. The Washington Post search resulted in three articles from July 1, 2008 to 
March 16, 2013. For this reason, the researcher also searched the Washingtonpost.com 
for additional articles. No additional articles from The Washington Post were found. 
Searching The New York Times revealed eleven relevant articles. These articles also fell 
within July 1, 2008 to March 16, 2013. Search criteria for The New York Times included 
articles and newspaper blogs. Finally, searching The Wall Street Journal’s archives 
yielded 70 articles. The search range for Wall Street Journal articles was bound from 
March 16, 2009 to March 16, 2013 due to a four-year restriction on the newspaper’s 
online content. Archives older than four years were not available. The Wall Street 
Journal’s fruitful search was constrained to traditional articles because of the breadth and 
depth of content collected from the initial search. In total, 84 newspaper articles were 
included in newspaper data for case description.  
 Next, a search of the FDA’s press releases and announcements revealed 22 
possible statements about “China” and “Melamine” from 2007 to present (2013). Five 
links to press statements in the search results included duplicate information. When 
removed, 17 final statements were found relevant to the analysis. Seven statements from 
2007 were included to provide context from the 2007 pet food recalls due to melamine 
contamination. This recall occurred prior to the infant formula contamination. Remaining 
statements were from 2008 and 2009. No statements past 2009 were found during 
document searches. An FDA representative confirmed that press releases are an 
important form of communication for the agency as he notes that most media is driven 
“on the press releases we (the FDA) [give]” (personal communication, 2013). Further, 
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FDA typically relies on national press releases (the documents collected for this study), 
unless an issue is especially contained to localized areas (personal communication, 2013).  
 Finally, information was gleaned from an interview with an FDA representative. 
The representative directly intervened melamine shipments (food and drug imports) from 
China on the U.S.’s west coast. The representative agreed to and completed a telephone 
interview with the researcher. The interview was confirmatory and explicated the FDA’s 
rationale for response strategies.  
 Using multiple sources of data provided a robust understanding of the FDA’s 
response. Consulting newspapers, FDA’s press releases, and an FDA representative 
offered perspective on mitigation efforts. In the next section, this case is discussed within 
the parameters of legitimacy literature. 
FDA’s Actional Response 
 Using Boyd’s (2000) actional legitimacy framework and Dowling and Pfeffer’s 
(1975) tactical legitimacy bolstering strategies, this section describes FDA’s response as 
it manifested in publicly available artifacts. Additionally, an interview with an FDA 
representative provides perspective on decision-making not accessible in open source 
documents. Incorporating findings from newspapers, press releases, and an FDA 
employee in this section analyzes crisis responses topically using Dowling and Pfeffer’s 
(1975) prescribed actional strategies. First, adaption of output, goals or methods of 
operation is discussed. Next, efforts that reframe the definition of social legitimacy to 
meet the organization’s present practices, output, and values are included. Finally, 
communicative actions that identify through symbols, values, or institutions that have an 
existing base of social legitimacy concludes legitimation strategy analysis.  
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Adaption of Output, Goals, or Methods 
 More complex food systems demanded new solutions from the FDA. In response, 
the FDA launched a comprehensive reexamination of food safety protection tactics, 
which spanned prevention, intervention, and response actions. The adaption of output, 
goals, or methods of operation across all of these stages is discussed in order.  
Prevention 
 Prior to the described instances of melamine contamination, U.S. food regulators 
did not recognize melamine as a potential food safety threat. The substance existed from 
manufacturing processes, but assuming the byproduct could infiltrate food systems was 
not anticipated. The FDA acknowledges that preventing intentional and unintentional 
contamination of the food system is the best option for safeguarding the U.S. food supply 
(FDA, 2009). To accomplish this task, a new Food Protection Plan launched in 2007 
called for new vulnerability assessments, new tools, and novel science to prevent 
foodborne illness (FDA, 2009). This report is larger than addressing the melamine 
contamination, but specifically references this event and China’s food safety practices 
thirteen times in the publicly available plan overview. Preventative actions are discussed 
next.  
 Establishing FDA offices abroad. The FDA and the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services (DHHS) traveled to China to address “food safety issues in both 
countries and to share ideas to address global food safety” (Kwisnek, 2008d). The 
dialogue touched on both fresh produce outbreaks in the United States and contaminated 
Chinese products, specifically mentioning the melamine adulteration of dairy products 
(Kwisnek, 2008d). At the time of the dialogue, the FDA was establishing offices around 
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the world, including: China, Latin America, India, Europe, and the Middle East (FDA, 
2009). Employees staffed in the China office are bilingual, and spend time monitoring the 
press, visiting local sites, and working with Chinese regulators as representatives of the 
United States (personal communication, 2013). Additionally, international staff collects 
data abroad that can be analyzed at home (personal communication, 2013). The FDA 
began hiring staff for China and India in 2009, and has continued to expand in the past 
four years.  
 New testing and assessment tools. A major barrier to preventing melamine 
contamination of food products has been the inability of the United States to successfully 
detect the synthetic protein in products. More specifically, melamine was able to pass 
protein tests because the compound mimicked the properties of real protein. The FDA has 
since spent time to develop methods capable of detecting melamine and other potentially 
harmful ingredients in feed and feed ingredients.  
 In addition to specialized testing mechanisms, FDA released the CARVER self-
assessment tool for industry, to “minimize the risk of intentional contamination of food, 
and conducted training seminars for industry on how to use the tool” (Kwisnek, 2008d). 
The name is an acronym standing for six attributes used to evaluate targets for attack: 
Criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability (FDA, 
2010). The CARVER + Shock (tool) “helps food processors protect their products from 
deliberate contamination” (FDA, 2010). The tool evaluates potential vulnerabilities in 
supply chains of different foods and is adaptable to many scenarios. Proactively assessing 
and identifying food vulnerabilities illustrates the necessity of not only protecting against 
unintentional food outbreaks but also addressing points in the food chain that are open to 
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intentional human tampering. Since CARVER’s initial introduction, the FDA has 
computerized the process to take companies “through more than 100 question about their 
facilities and processes to help them identify vulnerable areas” (FDA, 2010).  
 New FDA positions. In addition to creating new positions abroad to manage this 
issue, the FDA created an International Notification Coordinator position internally “to 
manage enhanced information exchanges between the agency and foreign counterpart 
regulatory authorities” (Kwisnek, 2008d). This position designates an American 
counterpart to coordinate newly created partnerships with foreign regulatory agencies.  
 In addition to specific positions, the FDA formed a new standing committee 
designed to meet regularly and discuss economically motivated adulteration (personal 
communication, 2013). The group consists of members from all product sectors. The 
purpose of the group is to discuss “issues of mutual concern” for economic adulteration, 
with the intent of finding indicators for concern early on (personal communication, 
2013). Early indicators in one sector can then trigger further investigations in related 
sectors, so that with “any luck,” the agency can “get a handle on it before it (an 
economically adulterated event) gets out of control” (personal communication, 2013).  
Intervention 
 Even with preventive measures, an amount of contaminated product can still enter 
the United States. However, new inspection points can catch contaminated products 
before they enter retail markets. Two new policies stand to specifically address melamine 
products. These include new third-party inspections and advanced screening technology 
at U.S. borders (a collaborative effort with Customs and Border Protection) (Kwisnek, 
2008a).  
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 Third-party inspectors. To intercept illegally imported food, bad business deals, 
and other unsavory trading practices, a solution could be “third-party inspectors” (FDA, 
2009). This process is suggested for both food and feed (Kwisnek, 2008d). The FDA first 
proposed the idea of how a third-party review process for products might work. Next, 
when the Food Protection Plan was published the FDA sought public comment on the 
existence and use of third-party certification programs to understand how they could be 
used with existing inspection processes (FDA, 2009). Additionally, the Food Protection 
Plan describes pilot testing of this process with Aquacultured Shrimp (FDA, 2009). 
While this plan was not yet implemented at the time of the 2008 China melamine crisis, 
the FDA engaged in serious discussion of how to implement objective inspection 
processes to counteract intentional shipments of contaminated products.  
 Advanced border technology. In addition to adding another layer of review for 
imported products, the FDA worked to develop better tools to identify food safety threats 
at the border (FDA, 2009; Kwisnek, 2008a). New tools include improved electronic 
screening and using open-source intelligence for imported products entering the United 
States (FDA, 2009). This system, known as PREDICT, was complete and under review 
for the final pilot evaluation phase at the time of the 2008 China melamine crisis. 
PREDICT stands for Predictive Risk-based Evaluation for Dynamic Import Compliance 
Targeting. FDA teams are also tasked with expanding PREDICT to an FDA-wide tool, 
ultimately leading to “improving the efficiency of field examinations and sample 
collections” (FDA, 2009). PREDICT helps import employees work more strategically as 
they sample incoming shipments, allowing them to “prioritize the workload” (personal 
communication, 2013). This function also works in conjunction with “prior notice” 
 109 
 
indications delivered to staff concerning incoming high-risk shipments (personal 
communication, 2013). Both of these policy changes provide border staff opportunity to 
analyze which shipments need the most scrutiny. Improving border-screening systems 
will sharpen the precision of product sampling – and consequently identifying 
contaminated products before they are distributed to retailers.  
Response 
 The last layer of new processes developed by the FDA includes response 
functions. The agency notes “whether contamination is unintentional or deliberate, there 
is a need to respond to it faster and communicate more effectively with consumers and 
other partners” (FDA, 2009). Thus, the FDA’s response priorities become identifying and 
tracking where contaminated products have traveled and communicating the risk to 
consumers, industry, and other partners. The ability to quickly and successfully 
accomplish these priorities will protect public health, reduce the economic hardship 
experienced by affected industries, and maintain consumer confidence (FDA, 2009). To 
accomplish these tasks, the FDA quickly worked with local and state counterparts to 
canvas identified vendors to remove contaminated products and hired new staff to 
improve emergency responses (Kwisnek, 2008d). 
 Rapid vendor response. Even with several confirmations from Chinese exporters 
that no contaminated infant formula was exported to the United States, the FDA 
conducted a significant investigation of vendors carrying Asian products (2,100 total) 
(Kwisnek, 2008d). This search targeted areas with large Chinese communities, including 
Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, and New York (Kwisnek, 2008c). Additionally, the 
FDA awarded Rapid Response Team cooperative agreements to develop, implement, 
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exercise, and integrate an all-hazards food and food-borne illness response capability to 
improve reaction times to crises (FDA, 2009). Training development also included 10 
incident command system trainings. These actions demonstrate an immediate response to 
melamine, but also new professional development and techniques for future responses.  
 Emergency response coordinators. The FDA hired two emergency/complaint 
response coordinators “to improve its response to emergencies that involve animal feed, 
including pet food” (Kwisnek, 2008d). Following the drastic contamination of animal 
feed, which in some instances was fed to animals bred for consumption, the FDA 
acknowledged the need to increase scanning for animal illness. Expanding personnel to 
follow this issue suggests that future challenges would benefit from enhancing the 
agency’s ability to coordinate agency response to animal illness.  
 The FDA heavily adopted new policies, practices, and techniques in the 
prevention, intervention, and response stages of responding to a food contamination. 
These actions demonstrate a systemic overhaul of agency methods. By December 2008, 
the FDA initiated a multifaceted approach to fortifying U.S. defenses from foodborne 
illnesses and contaminations that included creating new oversight, establishing offices 
located directly in China, and strengthening collaborations with local and state partners in 
the United States. In subsequent sections, reframing legitimacy and identifying with 
symbols, values, or institutions for social legitimation are discussed.  
Reframing the Definition of Social Legitimacy 
 The FDA’s comprehensive overhaul of policies, practices, and techniques is 
indicative of a diminished focus on reframing definitions of social legitimacy. To 
accomplish this response strategy, the FDA would most likely have discussed the 
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threshold levels of melamine in dairy products. For example, to reposition this issue as 
less important, the organization could discuss how trace amounts of melamine are not 
harmful to adult humans or animals that have consumed them. In 2008, the FDA set 
regulatory standards of 2.5 ppm for melamine and melamine-related compounds for food 
products other than infant formula (Kwisnek, 2008b). This estimate assumed a “worst 
case scenario” which projected exposure in 50% of the diet and applies a 10-fold safety 
factor to the Tolerable Daily Intake (TDI) to account for uncertainties (Kwisnek, 2008b). 
However, infant formula was not included in this recommendation.  
 Infant formula was concurrently bound to a zero-tolerance threshold. A press 
release cites this decision on the agency’s inability “to establish any level of melamine 
and melamine-related compounds in infant formula that does not raise public health 
concern” (Kwisnek, 2008b). Considering the uncertainty of the compound and public 
alarm, the FDA agreed to the zero threshold policy for infant formula products only. This 
decision was not debated and received no explanation in press releases.  
 The FDA’s minimal reframing of the issue relays important information of how 
the agency viewed the adulteration. The agency not only enacted many new responses as 
detailed in the previous section, but they also did not engage in communication about the 
event’s severity or relevance. In other words, the FDA quickly responded to public 
concerns and, if anything, engaged in over-action to certify public safety. In the final 
actional section, identifying with symbols, values, or institutions is discussed.  
Identifying with Existing Symbols, Values, or Institutions 
 In grappling with the emergence of an uncertain and complex issue, the FDA 
sought to relay confidence to stakeholders by forging an alliance with domestic partners, 
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international partners, and internally with organizational leaders. These affiliations 
suggest the agency’s need for support from institutions outside of itself, and further the 
necessity for diversified resources for crisis mitigation.  
 Domestic partners. In September 2008, quickly following the onset of the 
contamination, the FDA discussed inter-organizational collaborations with other U.S. 
agencies. For example, Kwisnek (2008a, 2008c) notes that the agency worked closely 
with state and local governments, Customs and Border Protection within the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, the USDA, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention and other federal agencies. The FDA highlighted its cooperating partners for 
melamine, and reported that they held a meeting with more than 200 federal, state, local, 
tribal, and territorial partners to address and issue a final rule on Prior Notice of Imported 
Food shipments. Press releases also note a signed agreement with six U.S. states to form 
a Rapid Response Team capable of responding to potential threats to our food supply 
(Kwisnek, 2008d). The FDA also extended to private operations to coordinate with 
nongovernment entities when appropriate. For example, the agency started to alert private 
partners to specific problems so they can employ more diligence with organizational 
practices. A theme of working with domestic partners is woven through the agency’s 
discourse concerning melamine, beginning with the dairy contamination in September 
2008 up through the press releases in December 2008.  
 International partners. In addition to domestic partners, the FDA emphasized a 
willingness to “collaborate with foreign governments and their regulatory agencies” and 
an agreement to continuously monitor international reports to help ensure “that 
potentially contaminated products from foreign sources are examined if imported” to the 
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United States (Kwisnek, 2008b). Specifically, the New Zealand Food Safety Authority is 
identified as being an important partner in managing China’s melamine crisis (Kwisnek, 
2008c). Currently, Congress is pushing the FDA to expand these relationships even 
further (personal communication, 2013). Declaring a willingness to coordinate response 
efforts, the FDA employed a multi-lateral approach to managing adulterated products. 
Arguably, this signifies a more robust and diverse movement for finding a solution to 
melamine-laden food.  
 Organizational leaders. Finally, press releases included quotations from two 
Commissioners of Food and Drugs, including Margaret A. Hamburg, M.D. and Andrew 
C. von Eschenbach, M.D. (Kelly, 2009; 2008d). Statements from high-ranking FDA 
representatives indicated issue importance and response from organizational leadership. 
Leadership recognition was congruent with the agency’s willingness to adopt many new 
outputs, goals and methods. 
 The FDA affiliated with several domestic and international institutions in 
responding to imported melamine. Conversely, new values and/or symbols were not 
particularly emphasized. While bolstering partnerships, the FDA diversified the resources 
at its disposal to diminish potential melamine contaminations. Further, these partnerships 
are also a consequence of adopting new policies after the 2008 crisis. For example, in 
expanding to international locations to establish overseas offices, the FDA 
simultaneously constructed new partnerships with international food safety regulatory 
organizations. New domestic policy also spurred novel collaborations between U.S. 
agencies (particularly between the FDA and Customs and Border Protection). The FDA’s 
multi-lateral response to this issue ultimately demonstrates the need for cooperation and 
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novel policy solutions. Lastly, including the names of the FDA’s Commissioners of Food 
and Drugs lends credibility to the response by including organizational leadership 
discussing agency actions.  
 The FDA’s actional response to China’s melamine crisis demonstrates a strong 
shift to new policy in the absence of an actual contamination in the United States. The 
FDA’s adoption of new outputs, goals, and methods illustrates a fast moving and 
unencumbered acknowledgement of concern for future contaminations. Further, the fact 
that the agency disregarded attempts to reframe issues surrounding this event strengthens 
its feelings for proposed and enacted new policies. Finally, expanding agency networks 
signifies new institutional partners to bring legitimacy to the FDA’s mitigation efforts, 
particularly when it comes to preventative actions. In the following section, a discussion 
of these actions describes the impact of FDA’s actional response. 
Discussion 
 The FDA significantly adapted its strategies by 2009 after news of China’s dairy 
contaminations erupted throughout 2008. However, aside from several illegal products 
found in ethnic grocery stores, no melamine-laden products entered the U.S. food supply. 
The FDA’s actional strategies to China’s regulatory problems suggest that the agency 
adopted policy based on a near miss scenario – constituted by three unique case 
attributes. The melamine contamination is unique from other food risks or crises in that 
the case is: (a) Deliberate, (b) systemic, and (c) unresolved. Next, these facets, and how 
they constitute a near miss, are described. Following, the communicative functions 
employed by FDA elucidate how the U.S. government managed the perceived threat of 
melamine.  
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Deliberate Intent  
 Near misses provide warning that existing policy and procedures are at risk of 
serious failure. Unfortunately, accepting and acknowledging the need for change can be 
met with resistance. Organizational change can be difficult to justify after a near miss and 
can invite criticism when such change is not associated with concrete or easily observable 
evidence. In this case, the FDA proposed robust changes to policies and procedures. 
China’s melamine crisis disrupted existing FDA policy because the contamination posed 
new concerns for the agency that it was not prepared to manage. The agency was 
particularly unprepared to handle an intentional instance of food contamination. An FDA 
import specialist notes China’s tactical strategies for blatantly evading U.S. regulations:  
Everyone is trying to beat this and we are playing games. That’s an example of, 
you know, one of the things that makes it more difficult. You know you have a 
country identified that will just ship the product though one of two other countries 
before it comes into the U.S. It makes it that much more difficult to identify 
where the problem is. (personal communication, 2013) 
Prior to the melamine cases, the primary cause of food or drug contamination was 
assumed to be unintentional or accidental human failure at worst. For example, foodborne 
pathogens may damage one shipment of products if the refrigeration on a truck fails, or 
an employee accidently contaminates a batch of product by including ingredients that 
were scheduled to be discarded. These types of errors result in a much smaller volume of 
product contamination, whereas intentional additives can be added to products at a steady 
and widespread rate.  
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 China’s melamine case differs in that products were adulterated for economic 
gain over years, spanning products from rice and wheat proteins to powdered and liquid 
milk, eggs, animal feed, and finished products such as cakes, candy, biscuits, and coffee. 
The intentional use of melamine turned an issue of contamination into a systemic failure. 
Moreover, China’s regulatory agencies could not contain the systemic spread of product 
within or outside the country because the chemical was purposefully added and disguised 
in order to evade detection. Additionally, Chinese manufacturers “play games” with U.S. 
regulatory officials: They knowingly dodge U.S. quality control policies to cheat the 
system in the hopes of earning a higher profit (personal communication, 2013). The 
function of intentionality changes the manner that U.S. agencies must conceptualize and 
communicate the threat to consumers.  
Systems Inundation  
 Melamine’s deliberate introduction into food systems also means that the 
chemical enters new products and markets before regulators can anticipate its arrival. In 
fact, this function is mentioned by an FDA representative who says, “well you know 
melamine was one thing that started our thinking about these kinds of [widespread] 
problems” (personal communication, 2013). This issue transcended the ability of the 
FDA to ban a type of import, implement larger sampling of consistently poor-performing 
repeat offenders, or change the handling practices of a specific company or shipment. 
Typical actions that could be used to curb the growth of contaminations lost their vitality 
as economic adulteration transcended the contained and manageable portions of the food 
supply to encompass many products, in many countries, consistently over time.  
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 The United States’ initial systems (particularly border systems/sampling staff that 
monitor imports) effectively caught adulterated products at the border in 2008 (personal 
communication, 2013). Still, at the time, the FDA did not have the appropriate 
capabilities to stop or minimize the threat of products contaminated with melamine from 
harming U.S. consumers. China’s growing amount of economically motivated 
contaminations prompted U.S. regulations to largely overhaul strategic thinking about 
protecting the U.S. food supply. Fortunately, this process happened prior to any 
detrimental event on the homeland. The FDA’s actional and communicative response to 
these changing systems was extensive – and these changes were relayed to consumers in 
organizational press releases. By proactively preparing for an emerging threat, the 
government demonstrates its ability to learn from current events, and constructively 
respond to melamine as a near miss event. Newly emerging systems demanded new 
operational and regulatory capabilities from the U.S. government. The FDA’s 
introduction of new actions illustrates the agency’s acceptance of these demands, in 
absence of a fully manifested crisis in the United States.  
Unfulfilled Resolution  
 When this dissertation was drafted, China continued to grapple with regulating 
melamine domestically. Regardless, China’s issues provide no indication that melamine 
poses any health concerns to U.S. citizens. When asked to discuss how this issue will 
reach resolution in the United States, an FDA representative notes: “You know who is to 
say it [melamine] might not come in in some other way?” (personal communication, 
2013). In other words, adulteration might be reduced in one product or industry, but 
contaminants are likely to reemerge in another. This ambiguity and uncertainty leaves 
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little room for any feeling of resolution and security. Rather, it should instill a sense of 
urgency in regulators to prepare for the unexpected, and to make few assumptions about 
which products are harmful and which products are safe.  
 Uncertainty surrounding resolution suggests that even though melamine did not 
pose harm to U.S. consumers in 2008, it remains a realistic threat as the trade between the 
United States and China remains vigorous. The Chinese government prosecuted farmers, 
manufacturers, and Sanlu’s leadership in response to the 2008 contamination. However, 
melamine has yet to be eradicated from the food system and families still remain fearful 
the contaminant remains in infant formula. This reality imposes challenging 
consequences for those who trade with China, as even close trade partners will not know 
with certainty if the country’s exports are genuine.  
 China’s melamine crisis prompted the United States to engage in actional 
strategies to mitigate potential harm. Melamine’s functions of intentionality, systemic 
contamination, and unfulfilled resolution failures positioned this event as a near miss 
crisis – resulting in significant policy and procedural changes in the United States. These 
changes were largely communicated by the adaption of output, goals, and methods. 
Similarly, the myriad actions described in this section are FDA’s most clear 
communication that the agency is preparing for and protecting against a future melamine 
contamination in the United States.  
Communicating Change  
 The FDA relied heavily on press releases to provide updates about the melamine 
investigation, its organizational response, and to general reassurance that no threat to U.S. 
consumers existed. However, these changes were not widely communicated to domestic 
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stakeholders. Organizational press releases can be difficult to find and do not always 
attract attention from mass media. Petrun (2010) finds that television media reported 
basic information about the case as it unfolded in fall 2008, but most coverage heavily 
emphasized health affects incurred by sickened children and the drastic penalties (death 
or life in prison) given to individuals tried for economic adulteration. Rarely did media 
outlets discuss policy changes.  
 For example, The Washington Post and The New York Times seldom discussed 
(only two articles of the newspapers above) the FDA in stories covering melamine. In 
failing to link regulatory solutions to discussed problems, solutions are omitted from 
public discourse. Even though the FDA engaged in comprehensive policy reform (see the 
first actional category – adaption of outputs, goals, and methods), U.S. stakeholders were 
not introduced to “FDA success.” FDA success means that instances of successful 
organizational action should be communicated and evaluated. Typically, organizational 
failure to create, maintain, or improve existing policy is heavily emphasized in media 
discussion surrounding government agencies. Of equal importance is knowing what 
works and why in combating issues, particularly because this describes a more complete 
picture of actional strategies.  
 The FDA should generate more press releases to thoroughly document 
organizational action and response. Ideally, communication surrounding the success of 
each proposed policy change could solidify the necessity of these changes and assure 
stakeholders that not only are actions being taken by the FDA to minimize a threat of 
melamine in our food systems, but also that these actions are working. Unfortunately, it 
remains difficult to access information confirming or denying the success of these 
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programs (unless internal access for organizational members is available). More 
specifically, if the FDA begins a more accurate strategic sampling procedure at the border 
they may find more contaminated shipments using less manpower. This would both 
increase the effectiveness of the agency by decreasing the amount of contaminated food 
entering the U.S. supply while concurrently decreasing the expense to U.S. taxpayers. 
However, an achievement like this would rarely make headlines.  
 In addition to infrequently linking policy action to the case, the FDA provides a 
broad overview of adopted changes in its press releases. This breadth provides a brief 
summary of overall sweeping changes in the agency’s prevention, intervention, and 
response capabilities. What remain missing are summaries of each of these changes, and 
what the adoption of these changes will accomplish. This missing link potentially 
impedes the translational element that consumers need to learn more about the U.S. 
government’s response to melamine.  
  U.S. consumers, in addition to Chinese consumers, have little faith in the Chinese 
government to maintain the integrity of the country’s food systems (Bate, 2013). Many 
Chinese now risk arrest for illegally transporting foreign brands of infant formula into 
China from Hong Kong. Currently, Beijing regulates that buyers only purchase two cans 
of formula per day – and failure to adhere to these limits can result in up to two years in 
prison and a $64,500 fine (Bate, 2013). Conversely, melamine remains a non-issue in the 
United States, where most infant formula safety issues encompass preparation and 
foodborne illness (e.g., the need to refrigerate formula to reduce bacteria growth). 
Adulterated formula remains unlikely in the United States, unless parents shop in ethnic 
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stores or locations where counterfeit products might be sold illegally. Properly 
prioritizing risk in the United States is important to place product risk in perspective.  
  Near miss events demand substantial responses from organizations even in the 
absence of a legitimate threat. In this case, the FDA was tasked with managing an 
emerging security issue before it actually impacted the United States. As the melamine 
case worsened in China, the FDA relied on press releases to communicate an 
organizational response to the crisis. These responses demonstrate a willingness to learn 
from this non-crisis as the FDA proactively adapted its output, goals, and methods to 
meet an evolving food safety landscape. From this process, several generalizable lessons 
are revealed.  
Generalizable Lessons 
 The FDA’s response to China’s melamine crisis suggests three lessons other 
practitioners may benefit from. These include accepting uncertainty, responding to public 
concern, and documenting success.  
 Accept Uncertainty. Emerging and novel risks do not have easily discernible 
answers. In this case, the FDA accepted the uncertainty of the scenario and released 
information as it became available. This included updates when investigations were still 
in progress to the finalized results of comprehensive organizational reform. The agency 
was correct to provide updates early and often, even when in some instances little new 
information was available.  
 This process lets consumers know that the issue, or in this instance the discovery 
of any of China’s tainted milk in the United States, is an ongoing priority for the 
responding agency. Near misses may or may not draw attention to an issue. In fact, many 
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times they may go completely unnoticed. Depending on the visibility of a near miss, 
organizations may need to adjust communication about the issue accordingly. As near 
misses often signal the failure of existing policy or procedure, a near miss event may be 
an early indication of impending policy change. Being prepared to communicate early 
and often with stakeholders who may not be directly affected by the event is essential.  
 Respond to Public Concern. Near misses are perceived as damaging events that 
would cause harm if and when they reach their full potential. Melamine was covered in 
U.S. media even though it was not a physical threat to U.S. consumers. This coverage 
prompted an unprecedented explanation from FDA offices. In fact, the FDA received 
“complaints at a rate it had never seen before or since…over thousands and thousands [of 
calls] over a three to four month period” (personal communication, 2013). To meet these 
needs, staffs were redirected from other duties to respond to worried and frustrated callers 
seeking information, fact checking, and requesting advice. FDA officials knew melamine 
was not present in any infant formulas sold within the United States, but they still 
responded to consumer concern.  
 Near miss events can yield strong emotions, especially if consumers feel they 
have narrowly missed being harmed. Acknowledging consumer concern and engaging in 
candid conversations can dispel misinformation. Updating stakeholders on current events 
and on what is being done to ensure a full crisis does not manifest is also a wise response 
strategy. Perceptual crises are inherently subjective, and, to many, a near miss can seem 
like the beginning of a crisis. If a crisis is not realistic, or if precautions have been taken 
to safeguard against an emerging threat, organizations should share this with stakeholders 
so they can reconsider the severity of the situation.  
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 Document Success. One of the most challenging tasks of communication 
surrounding near misses is discussing what went right. Fortunately for U.S. consumers, 
adulterated Chinese products were not imported to domestic markets. Contaminated 
shipments were intercepted at U.S. borders, and illegally imported products were 
recovered from ethnic grocery stores. Many of the FDA’s existing safety mechanisms 
have worked in monitoring the food supply and protecting against adulterated products. 
The problem remains in conveying the amount of harm that the FDA has worked to avoid 
in tangible and relatable terms.  
 Clearly, failure is not only more interesting for media to report, but also often 
easier to understand. Communicating cases of near miss should highlight processes and 
operations that ended successfully, providing as much evidence for the success as 
possible. This process can be both proactive (discussing anticipated benefits) and 
retroactive (documents positive changes over time). The FDA could emphasize current 
policies and procedures and how they have shaped positive outcomes, providing 
commentary on agency success for keeping adulterated products out of the United States. 
Other organizations should similarly remember to discuss success along with failed 
components of policy or operations that produced a near miss scenario.  
Conclusion 
 Beginning in 2008, China’s dairy industry experienced an economically 
motivated contamination of powdered and liquid infant formula. The country’s premier 
manufacturer, Sanlu, was linked to the contamination when 300,000 infants were 
sickened and six others died from kidney complications. The FDA confirmed no legal 
products entered the United States, yet U.S. regulators still engaged in robust planning 
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and communication surrounding this emerging security threat. The agency’s 
responsiveness largely manifested in a highly publicized food safety plan, enacted in 
2009. Communicating these changes to U.S. consumers demonstrates the FDA’s ability 
to effectively plan for, and respond to, a near miss warning signal.  
 This chapter described a near miss crisis and the subsequent effects on FDA’s 
policy. More specifically, the case discussed the challenges associated with near misses, 
FDA’s actional strategies, and offered generalizable lessons for other organizational 
leaders. Next, chapter six extends discussion of perceptual crises moving from a near 
miss to a case of misconstrual involving GE food or biotechnology.  
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Figure 5.1 
 
Timeline of China’s Melamine Crisis  
 
Date Event Source 
2004 13 Chinese infants are killed 
from drinking counterfeit 
Sanlu formula.  
Bradsher, 2008 
2007  16 pets are killed and 
thousands sickened by 
tainted pet foods from 
China.  
Bradsher, 2008 
November, 2007 FDA releases the Food 
Protection Plan.  
FDA, 2009 
March, 2008 FDA engages in a bilateral 
meeting with China to 
discuss Administration of 
Quality, Supervision, 
Inspection, and Quarantine 
(AQSIQ).  
FDA, 2009 
March, 2008  Sanlu receives complaints 
about dairy products from 
customers.  
Barboza, 2008a 
September 12, 2008 China announces 
nationwide inquiry into the 
safety of infant formulas.  
Bradsher, 2008 
September 14, 2008 - One infant death and 432 
others with kidney problems 
reported.  
- Sanlu ordered to shut 
down all powdered milk 
production. 
Barboza, 2008a 
September 26, 2008 Melamine discovered in Mr. 
Brown instant coffee and 
milk tea products (stemming 
from Chinese ingredients).  
Kwisnek, 2008c 
October 4, 2008 FDA sets threshold limit for 
melamine in food.  
Kaufman, 2008 
October 8, 2008 Three infant deaths and 
53,000 others sickened 
reported in China.  
Wong, 2008 
October 6, 2008 Melamine discovered in 
Blue Cat Flavor drinks.  
Kwisnek, 2008c 
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Figure 5.1 (Continued)  
 
Timeline of China’s Melamine Crisis  
 
October 31, 2008  Chinese regulators widen 
search for contaminated 
products to animal feed 
supplies.  
Barboza, 2008b  
November 14, 2008 U.S. blocks all shipments of 
Chinese products that 
contain milk or milk based 
cargo. 
Shin, 2008 
December 23, 2008 Sanlu filed for bankruptcy.  BBC News, 2010 
January 11, 2009 China says a total of 6 died 
and 296,000 children fell ill 
from tainted products.  
BBC News, 2010; Spencer, 
2008 
January 20, 2009 Lawyers file a lawsuit 
against 22 dairy companies 
linked to melamine 
contamination.  
Wong, 2009 
January 21-22, 2009 Sentences delivered to 21 
individuals for melamine 
involvement, including two 
death sentences.  
BBC News, 2010 
January 2, 2010 Shanghai Panda Dairy shuts 
down, after tested products 
still contain melamine.  
Areddy, 2010a 
February 10, 2010 Chinese officials search for 
170 tons of contaminated 
milk powder that remain on 
retailer shelves in China.  
Midler, 2010 
March 5, 2010 Three Chinese dairy 
officials (Panda Dairy Co.) 
sentenced to up to five years 
in prison.  
Areddy, 2010b 
August 12, 2010 Chinese milk supplier and 
dairy giant Fonterra is 
questioned about its 
products when Chinese 
infants are found to have 
abnormal hormone levels.  
Spegele, 2010 
April 16, 2013 Chinese mothers travel to 
Hong Kong to buy 
international brands of 
formula in bulk.  
Bate, 2013 
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Chapter Six: California’s Proposition 37 – A Case of Misconstrued Risk 
 The November 2012 election cycle brought a new food labeling measure to the 
table in the state of California, known as Prop 37. Prop 37, legally entitled The California 
Right to Know Genetically Engineered Food Act, received enough signatures from 
California residents to appear on the state’s ballot. The legislation would become the first 
of its kind to require GE products to be labeled. Prop 37 specifically reads that, 
“manipulating genes and inserting them into organisms is an imprecise process,” and 
further “the results are not always predictable or controllable, and they can lead to 
adverse health or environmental consequences” (Bowen, 2012, p. 110). Policy supporters 
feel that consumers have a right to know whether food is genetically engineered or not. 
As such, these products should be distinctly labeled so consumers know which foods 
have been genetically engineered. While some California residents support the proposed 
policy, other citizens, government agencies, and industry leaders took issue with the 
proposition’s claims that little science exists to back assertions of harm associated with 
GE products. Further, labeling GE products to comply with Prop 37 could cause a ripple 
effect of costs throughout private and public industry.  
 This chapter analyzes misconstrued risk messages surrounding Prop 37 from the 
“California Right to Know” activist group, and describes the FDA’s position. First, the 
case of Prop 37 in California is explained using incorporated newspapers to document 
and illuminate events as they unfolded beginning in fall of 2012. Second, GE labeling is 
discussed from the perspective of misconstrual literature. Next, artifacts selected for 
inclusion in this chapter are discussed in detail. Fourth, the FDA’s position is described 
and actional legitimacy is used as a framework to analyze California Right to Know’s 
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press releases surrounding GE foods. Finally, implications and conclusions extend this 
case to broader organizational issues to offer insight to others tasked with responding to 
similar perceptual crises.  
 Misconstrual is the final perceptual crisis discussed in this dissertation. 
Misconstrual, like hoaxes and near misses, demands legitimate responses to illegitimate 
claims. Discussing how misconstrued risk impacts and strains resources is an important 
task in increasing understanding of misappropriated claims about a risk. This particular 
case is noteworthy because it details how state policy can first be spurred by activist 
movements, influence and garner national attention, and shift discussion from the 
technical aspects of risk to emotional arguments in an effort to pass policy. While the 
focus of this chapter centers on Prop 37, misconstrued risk could indeed spur other types 
of policy debates in the United States. Therefore, it is necessary to both understand how 
legislation builds support for its cause based on incomplete or inconsistent claims, and 
what responding organizations (and those affected by the policy) can do to respond. Next, 
California’s Prop 37 case is overviewed.  
The Case 
 November 6, 2012 became a milestone for those working towards policy 
supporting the “dinner party” in America. In California, a natural and organic food 
movement yielded a petition with enough signatures to introduce Prop 37 to state voters. 
The policy reads “government scientists have stated that the artificial insertion of DNA 
into plants, a technique unique to genetic engineering, can cause a variety of significant 
problems with plant foods” (Bowen, 2012, p. 110). In response to these “significant 
problems,” the mandatory labeling of foods produced through genetic engineering can 
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“provide a critical method for tracking the potential health effects of eating genetically 
engineered foods” (Bowen, 2012). California residents concerned with the effects of GE 
products brought the issue to a debate at the state level, by adding this proposition to the 
ballot with eleven other propositions. 
 Pamm Larry, a 56-year-old activist, initiated the petition for Prop 37 to appear on 
California’s ballot. A former grower of organic herbs and flowers, Larry personally 
spearheaded the campaign to require product labeling (Jargon & Berry, 2012). The 
pronounced farmer, midwife, businesswoman, and “gutsy grandmother” of three quit her 
day job to educate herself about GMOs and ballot initiatives to tackle the United States’ 
“modern day food system(s),” which she believes are responsible for unhealthy and 
artificial food (Spiegelman, 2012, para. 7). She began the process by driving to local 
festivals and farmers markets to collect enough signatures to propel Prop 37 forward. 
While Larry only recently started her campaign, GE foods have actually been present in 
American food systems for about twenty years.  
 GE food was introduced to U.S. markets in the 1990s, when farmers began using 
crops that were bred to repel pests and/or withstand herbicides. The FDA (2013a) 
currently defines genetic engineering as methodology used by scientists “to introduce 
new traits or characteristics to an organism.” The FDA (2013a) also notes in its primary 
definition of the term a strategic choice to use the term genetically engineered instead of 
“genetically modified” (or Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs)) as the latter is “the 
more precise term.” Since 1986, the U.S. federal government has employed a coordinated 
framework to manage agricultural biotechnology. The USDA (2013) defines the broader 
term of “biotechnology” as the processes of “breeding techniques that alter living 
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organisms, or parts of organisms, to make or modify products; improve plants or animals; 
or develop microorganisms for specific agricultural uses.” These processes are guided, 
tested, and approved by three agencies including the USDA’s Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS), the EPA, and DHHS’ FDA. Currently, according to the 
Non-GMO Project, 93% of soy, 88% of field corn, 94% of cotton, and more than 90% of 
canola seed and sugar beets in the United States are genetically engineered (Beecher, 
2013). Inevitably, these products are incorporated into other American made foods as 
ingredients, which disseminate GE products into thousands of finalized products 
available to consumers.  
 Prop 37 is touted as one of the first pieces of policy that would usher in a new era 
of food reform and governance in the United States. Pushing for labeling of products in 
the state would demand further attention from national regulators and industries. Products 
would require substantive (i.e. costly) changes to comply with the state’s new law. 
However, Prop 37 would not be the first time California has enacted drastic policy 
changes in this manner. The state’s initiative process has been used by voters for decades, 
providing an avenue for a “last- or first-ditch way for issues that politicians aren’t yet 
ready to touch” to go to the public, including the tax rebellion of the 1970s (Prop 13) or 
medical marijuana in the 1990s (Prop 215) (Pollan, 2012, para. 2). These propositions in 
turn prompt direct political discussions – including discussions in Washington, D.C. 
(Pollan, 2012). Passing Prop 37 would mean many changes for not only California voters, 
but also for local, state, and national industries, governments, and regulatory bodies. 
 Should Prop 37 pass, consumers could expect to have the cost passed on to them 
from the food industry. Walsh (2012) writes that opponents to the bill claim it would cost 
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consumers an extra $400 a year in grocery bills. This cost, while not clearly defined by 
opponents in news articles, is attributable to increased cost to grow, manufacture, and sell 
non-GMO ingredients. Consumer costs are attributable to foreseeable challenges passed 
onto industry, including creation costs for new labeling, navigating potential lawsuits for 
non-compliance, and remaking or abandoning old products. A supporter of labeling, 
President A.C. Gallo of Whole Foods, states that products without GMOs “are more 
expensive based on tighter supplies of non-GMO ingredients” (Beecher, 2013, para. 18). 
The “No on 37” group, a coalition of those who do not support the proposition, find that 
changing just the packaging associated with the policy would cost $300 to $800 million – 
should companies want to adapt their products and business to meet new state standards 
(Jargon & Berry, 2012).  
 Aside from the cost incurred by consumers and industry, projected costs extend to 
government agencies to regulate and implement the law. California Secretary of State 
Debra Bowen estimates that California would incur an increased cost ranging from “a 
few hundred thousand dollars to over $1 million annually” to regulate the new labeling 
system. This figure does not include potential litigation resulting from possible violations 
of the new requirements (Bowen, 2012, p. 55). Both supporters and oppositionists to the 
policy, in one way or another, acknowledge the significant financial burden that passing 
the bill would create. Interestingly, while consensus exists on increased costs for many 
stakeholder groups, overall consensus about the benefit or necessity of labeling GE foods 
has not been achieved. This divide is evident in newspapers collected to describe this 
case.  
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Support for Proposition 37 
 Supporters of Prop 37 assert that GE food is simply not as healthy as its naturally 
grown counterpart. This argument is attributed to the fact that engineering allows crops 
“to be super resistant to chemical herbicides, chemicals that will kill pretty much 
everything except the specified crop” (Bittman, 2012c, para. 4). Engineering efforts allow 
weeds surrounding crops to be killed, while the produce remains resistant to herbicide or 
pesticide distributed to fields. Along with overuse of chemicals, the “largely untested 
nature of G.M.O.’s themselves” causes alarm (Bittman, 2012c, para. 8). Prop 37 
supporters assert they simply have a “right to know what’s in their food,” and industry 
non-compliance indicates failure to disclose important dietary information (Specter, 
2012, para. 2). Other support is bolstered by the fact that more than 50 other countries 
require labeling of GE products (Bittman, 2012c). In addition to uncertainty associated 
with chemicals, concern for overall health, and a desire to know what they are eating, 
many supporters see the policy as pushing businesses to be more transparent.  
 Prop 37 was born in farmer’s markets and local farms, whereas the movement’s 
opponent is what supporters call “big food,” or large food manufacturers. These 
corporations include companies like ConAgra, Smuckers, Hormel, Kellogg, Coca-Cola, 
and Pepsi-Co, among others (Bittman, 2012a). One of the most noteworthy opponents to 
the legislation is the agricultural giant Monsanto. Monsanto contributed $4.2 million to 
defeat Prop 37 in August 2012 (Bittman, 2012b). Supporters of Prop 37 vehemently 
despise and distrust large organizations that they believe are overly concerned with 
profits rather than consumer health. Bittman (2012c) writes that “six of the top funders 
are the six largest pesticide companies, and three of them are European companies that 
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can’t grow G.M.O.s in their own countries” (para. 19). The idea of industry padding the 
pockets of decision-makers extends back to 1992, when the FDA deemed GE foods as 
equivalent (or no different than) natural foods. Pollan (2012) writes that this 
determination:  
Represented a breathtaking exercise of both political power (the F.D.A. policy 
was co-written by a lawyer whose former firm worked for Monsanto) and product 
positioning: these new crops were revolutionary enough…to deserve patent 
protection and government support, yet at the same time the food made from them 
was no different than it ever was, so did not need to be labeled. (para. 7) 
As the November election grew closer, the California Secretary of State estimated that 
Kraft Foods Group Inc., Coca Cola Co., Monsanto Co., and other food and agricultural 
heavy hitters contributed more than $40.9 million to a campaign that persuaded 
California voters to reject the measure (Jargon & Berry, 2012). Clearly taking a different 
approach to the policy, industry officials found the proposed legislation troubling. They 
began engaging in campaign efforts to ensure that Prop 37 would not gain enough 
momentum to become law.  
Opposition to Proposition 37  
 Labeling GE food is seen as unnecessary to many in the food industry because 
humans have selectively bred and perpetuated desirable crops and animals for thousands 
of years (Ritter & Borenstein). This process, which has been refined by gene engineering, 
“is a proven way to reduce disease, protect from insects and increase the food supply to 
curb world hunger” (Ritter & Borenstein, 2012, para. 12). Genetic engineering, unlike 
natural selection or breeding techniques, is more accurate and predictable than trying to 
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control natural pollination or breeding livestock. Martina Newell McGloghlin, director of 
the University of California’s Biotechnology Research and Education Program, notes 
“genetic engineering is more precise and predictable, yet it is regulated up the wazoo” 
(Ritter & Borenstein, 2012, para. 20). In any respect, “all the food we eat, whether 
Brussels sprouts or pork bellies, has been modified by mankind” (Specter, 2012, para. 3).  
 Unlike natural processes, GE foods have also been studied “hundreds of times 
over the past two decades, the National Academy of Sciences, the British Royal 
Academy, and scores of other scientific bodies have concluded they are no more 
dangerous than other foods” (Specter, 2012, para. 4). The American Medical Association 
(AMA) has said that GE crops “pose no new or different risks than any other crop, and 
there is no scientific reason to believe they would be any more risky” (Specter, 2012, 
para. 4). The problem, then, rests with the fact that arbitrary labeling would provide 
undue concern from consumers, leading them to avoid foods that contain ingredients that 
do no harm (Jargon & Berry, 2012). A Kraft Foods representative said the measure 
“could disrupt [the company’s] ability to meet consumer demand for [its] products, 
increase costs for California consumers and increase frivolous lawsuits against 
businesses” (Jargon & Berry, 2012, para. 14).  
 The effects of stripping the GE food industry of operational capacity by requiring 
labeling and other bans are serious. For example, Tomson (2010) writes that U.S. sugar 
production could have been cut by 20% if farmers were banned from planting genetically 
modified beets. In 2010, a judge threw out the USDA’s initial approval for the use of 
genetically modified seeds, saying “it hadn’t done enough research into the 
environmental impact” (Tomson, 2010, para. 2). Berezow (2012) notes that GE food 
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research has produced a line of reduced allergen dairy milk, bananas in Africa that are 
resistant to a devastating bacterium that damages the livelihood of millions of people, 
healthier papayas in Hawaii (now saved from a ringspot virus), and an overall decreased 
use of insecticides because of increased crop resistance.  
 Prop 37 became the topic of a very public debate among industry spokespersons, 
activist groups, the USDA, the EPA, and most centrally the FDA. As November 6, 2012 
neared, margins grew closer together as both sides gained momentum to inch towards a 
narrowly split decision.  
The Results  
 Earlier in 2012, polls showed that passing Prop 37 was strongly supported in 
California (Walsh, 2012). Beginning in October, polls fluctuated to show narrower 
margins. While Prop 37 failed to pass with 52.9% voting against the mandate (in 
comparison with 47.1% voting in favor of the legislation), this closely split initiative 
indicates significant support for both sides of the issue (California Secretary of State, 
2012). To date, momentum has yet to subside and supporters of the initiative remain 
focused on altering content in the Farm Bill to encourage labeling systems of GE food. In 
March 2013, an activist group called “JustLabelIt” reported that 14 states were 
considering bills similar to Prop 37, including Washington, Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota, 
Vermont New York, and Maryland (Leschin-Hoar, 2013). In May 2013, Vermont’s 
House of Representatives became the first state to pass a bill similar to Prop 37 that 
requires GE food to be labeled (Wilce, 2013). The State Senate, however, has not yet 
accepted the Vermont bill. In addition to Vermont’s success, certain retailers, including 
Whole Foods grocery store, are considering setting their own standards for GE food. 
 136 
 
Whole Foods is imposing a deadline for its suppliers to label GE foods by 2018 (Leschin-
Hoar, 2013). Other companies, such as Kellogg’s (a traditionally strong opponent of GE 
labeling), are now segmenting certain branches of their products to be GE free (including 
Kellogg’s GoLean cereals and granola bars) (Leschin-Hoar, 2013). 
 Even though Prop 37 failed to pass in California, the policy generated changes in 
both government and private industry. However, the claim that labeling GE food is 
necessary to prevent detrimental health effects has yet to be substantiated with scientific 
or empirical evidence. In this respect, the claims by supporters of Prop 37 that GE 
products are known to cause harm are misconstrued. The next section discusses this case 
as it relates to misconstrual.  
Communication Constraints Specific to Misconstrual 
 Laypersons, or those who do not have a background or expertise in a topic, piece 
together constructions of risk from a variety of familiar resources. Persons “construe 
relevance and meaning from a given risk issue’s myriad messages and relationships,” to 
arrive at a decision (Sellnow, Ulmer, Seeger, & Littlefield, 2009, p. 8). Construe 
specifically means “the public must infer meaning by assessing the importance and 
accuracy of the information and the authenticity of the source” (Sellnow et al., 2009, p. 
8). Conversely, misconstrual occurs when laypersons incorrectly construct meaning. This 
misconstrued meaning affects decision-making processes, and in turn may impede 
persons from arriving at the most ideal choice.  
 Events associated with strong feelings can overwhelm judgment and bring 
persons to erroneous conclusions (Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001). When risk as emotion 
overtakes risk as analysis, choices can become flawed or misguided. Further, research 
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suggests that persons tasked with measuring risks are often in fact guided by their 
emotions (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002). Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and 
MacGregor (2004) elaborate that risk is actually best discussed in three categories, 
including “risk as feelings,” “risk as analysis,” and “risk as politics” (p. 311). 
Misconstruing risk is a consequence associated with Slovic et al.’s (2004) assertion that 
risks can be interpreted first and foremost as “feeling,” producing a different outcome 
than those using a “rational” approach to decision-making (p. 311). 
 Sinaceur, Heath, and Cole (2005) find that persons enact both consequentialist 
decisions (weighing costs and benefits of alternative choices) and cognitive decisions 
(nonemotionally and rationally assessing consequences) during risk deliberations. 
However, individuals may not always act rationally. In fact, Sinaceur et al. (2005) tested 
food-labeling alternatives in France and found that describing an animal disease with 
different terms can influence the vitality of the beef industry. For example, labeling risk 
as “mad cow” disease instead of “Bovine spongiform encephalopathy” (or BSE) evokes 
different components of the risk-decision-making process even though the terms describe 
the same disease (Sinaceur et al., 2005, p. 247). Managing the subjective construction of 
threat becomes important for organizations wishing to avoid misconstrual. As Sinaceur et 
al. (2005) discovered terminology alone is enough to disrupt the vitality of the beef 
industry. Unnecessary disruptions to business can harm organizational legitimacy, 
growth, and increase the cost of product to end-users.  
 Similar to the beef industry’s fear of the term “mad cow disease,” food purveyors 
who rely on GE products worry that activist groups will falsely represent what is 
currently a sanctioned process for cultivating food. As Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) 
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describe, events associated with strong feelings can overwhelm judgment and produce 
erroneous conclusions. This emotional push can overwhelm technical assessments of risk 
and allow irrationality into decision-making. Food is a particularly powerful topic of 
discussion. Not surprisingly, if consumers truly believe they are either (1) eating food 
that is harmful to them, and/or (2) being manipulated by unscrupulous organizations, they 
would choose to organize and petition to seek meaningful change to regulate GE 
products. The problem, however, is that no empirical evidence is available to suggest that 
more risk is associated with GE food than naturally bred products to incorporate desirable 
characteristics. Further, enacting policy to counter unsubstantiated risk creates undue fear 
and cost to stakeholders.  
 A lack of information increases the odds that a decision-maker will not select an 
option that yields the most benefit. Simply stated, persons can make better decisions 
about risks when they have accurate, timely, and complete information. Millner, Veil, 
and Sellnow (2011) explain challenges associated with the 2009 Peanut Butter 
Corporation (PCA) peanut paste recall. In this instance, lay publics needed information to 
guide their decision-making process concerning whether or not they should consume 
peanut products. Unfortunately, little information was released and the public 
misconstrued the risk of contaminated peanut paste to extend to the entire peanut butter 
industry, which was an incorrect risk assessment (Millner et al., 2011). In this case, 
consumers decided to engage in overly cautious actions and avoided a product that was 
not included in the recall. PCA’s case is significant in that it demonstrates the arbitrary 
associations that can be implied by consumers. A similar arbitrary association to GE 
foods would not only devastate the vitality and legitimacy of one product, or one type of 
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product, but rather the composition of the U.S. food supply. If GE foods fall from favor 
with voters and the United States begins to pursue stricter regulations, this would impact 
agricultural methods, yield expectancies, domestic trade, international trade, and total 
food costs. It would also influence the ability of the United States to grow needed food to 
meet an increasing national and international demand.  
 The challenge of misconstrual is to first understand what is missing or 
misinterpreted by decision-makers. Secondly, communicators need to determine the best 
way in which to reconcile this gap in information. In this instance, scientists, experts, 
academics, and regulators should consider what is known about this topic and share this 
knowledge with general audiences. However, transferring or imparting knowledge to 
groups that need it is rarely this easy.  
 Misconstrual poses communication challenges to those tasked with explicating 
technical information to audiences that may maintain high levels of emotion about an 
issue (in this instance, about the healthfulness and environmental impact of GE foods). In 
the following section, case artifacts used to describe and explore this case are 
documented. Next, the FDA’s rationale for decision-making is described. Following, case 
artifacts are presented to illustrate actional strategies of GE opponents.  
Case Artifacts 
 Three newspapers are consulted to support this case. A search on LexisNexis 
Academic, specifically for articles from The Washington Post and The New York Times, 
revealed six possible articles discussing GE food. Articles collected fell between 
November 1, 2008, and May 9, 2013. The search terms “California” and “GMO” were 
used to locate articles containing both terms. While this text refers to food as “genetically 
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engineered,” overwhelmingly media favored the term “genetically modified organism.” 
To locate more articles, GMO was also used in search terms. Four articles from The New 
York Times directly covered this case. No articles from The Washington Post followed 
the food debate in California. However, to capture more articles, search terms were 
expanded to “California” and “Biotechnology” which yielded two Washington Post 
articles. Next, a search of The Wall Street Journal produced twelve results. Of these 
twelve possible articles, four videos, which appeared in results, were eliminated and three 
articles were found to be irrelevant. Unwanted material removed, the Wall Street Journal 
contained five articles including the terms “California” and “GMO.” Eleven articles in 
total were found to be relevant to this case from searches.  
 To ensure all relevant articles for this case were collected for The Wall Street 
Journal, the researcher substituted database search terms to be “California” and 
“Biotechnology” to verify term accuracy. These terms produced broader topical articles 
on a wide variety of biotech issues and were not relevant to this case. When sorting 
through search results, the same relevant articles (from the California and GMO search) 
appeared and did not add additional articles for review. Five additional articles that 
contributed to the timeline of this case were included in this chapter. These articles were 
located through Google’s News search. The additional articles originated from The 
Huffington Post, The New Yorker, Time, Voice of San Diego, and Food Safety News.  
 Next, organizational documents from the FDA and California Right to Know are 
included to document actional strategies. First, organizational documents from the FDA 
illuminate the regulatory agency’s perspective on GE safety and legitimacy. The FDA 
documents include the: Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; Statement of Policy – 
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Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties; Completed Consultations on Bioengineered 
Foods, Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or 
Have Not Been Developed Using Bioengineering; Draft Guidance; and several FDA 
webpages that discuss GE foods. FDA documents were selected for their presence in 
citations from newspapers and prominence in searching for GE information on the 
regulatory agency’s website. Second, press releases from the California “Right to Know” 
campaign provide insight to a pro-GE labeling group. California Right to Know endorses 
Prop 37 and is acknowledged by the state of California’s voting materials for voter’s that 
want to receive more information on the issue. In total, 51 press releases were included 
for analysis (the 51 press releases include all organizational press releases posted online). 
 Information was also gleaned from interviews with Martina Newell-McGloughlin, 
director of University of Southern California’s Biotechnology Research and Education 
Program, and President of GMO Free USA, Diana Reeves. McGloughlin and Reeves 
agreed to and completed interviews with the researcher via telephone. Interviews were 
confirmatory and explicated communication surrounding the labeling of GE food.   
 Using multiple sources of data provides a robust understanding of both the FDA 
and a GMO advocacy group’s response to this issue. Consulting newspapers, 
organizational documents, and two organizational leaders offers perspective on risk 
communication from both sides. In the next section, this case is discussed within the 
parameters of legitimacy literature. 
FDA Actional Responses Surrounding GE Foods 
 2012 was a busy year for groups like California Right to Know, yet not 
necessarily for agencies tasked with regulation – including the FDA. In fact, the FDA 
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engaged in minimal public communication during the California debates and campaigns. 
Until recently, (it is not clear on what date exactly) the agency maintained few resources 
online that directly addressed GE food. On May 29, 1992, the FDA published its 
statement of, “Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties,” constituting the 
founding document on GE food. In 1992, the FDA determined that the “intended 
expression product or products presents in foods derived from new plant varieties will 
typically be proteins or substances produced by the action of protein enzymes, such as 
carbohydrates and fats and oils.” These substances, being already present in consumed 
foods, pose an “unlikely” safety concern and thus would not “warrant formal premarket 
review and approval by the FDA” (FDA, 1992).  
 Compositionally, GE food is no different than non-GE food. Considering, FDA’s 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act mandated (Section 403) that food should not be 
misbranded or misleading; a stipulation that was needed to ensure the credibility and 
safety of products for consumers. Section 403, however, also applies to mislabeling 
products for benefits, increased nutritional quality, or other attributes. As the FDA finds 
GE food to be compositionally similar to traditional varieties, labeling GE food 
differently is at odds with the agencies’ guiding operations. The FDA’s document 
entitled, “Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or 
Have Not Been Developed Using Bioengineering; Draft Guidance,” explains that “if a 
bioengineered food is significantly different from its traditional counterpart such that the 
common or unusual name no longer adequately describes the new food,” the product’s 
name would need to change (FDA, 2001). GE foods are genetically similar to their 
counterparts, and consequently must be treated the same as non-engineered products.  
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 To date, the FDA remains mum about public debate surrounding GE food. The 
agency has updated its website to include a new homepage that centralizes information 
about GE plants. The FDA also compiled a document titled, “FDA’s Role in Regulating 
Safety of GE Foods,” in addition to a “Questions and Answers on Food from Genetically 
Engineered Plants” (FDA, 2013b; FDA, 2013a). The document that discusses regulation 
and safety describes plant-breeding methodology, safety, and briefly mentions the 
organization’s stance towards GE foods and labeling. Specifically relating to 
organizational views, the document states, “the agency neither supports GE plants based 
on their perceived benefits nor opposes them based on their perceived risks” (FDA, 
2013b). The agency is most concerned that U.S. foods are “safe and otherwise in 
compliance with the FD+C Act and applicable regulations” (FDA, 2013b). FDA’s 
frequently asked questions page covers ten common questions, ranging from “what is 
genetic engineering” to “how is the safety of food from a genetically engineered plant 
evaluated?” (FDA, 2013a). Responses to questions are short and contain minimal jargon.  
 The FDA maintains a passive role, engaging in minimal educational outreach or 
communication. In fact, searches for “Proposition 37” or “Prop 37” on the agency’s 
website return no results.  
In summary, this section detailed actional strategies by FDA’s non-response to 
California’s Prop 37. The next section explores contested messages surrounding Prop 37, 
propagated by activist group California Right to Know.  
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Actional Responses Surrounding GE Foods: 
Contested Messages 
 Using Boyd’s (2000) actional legitimacy framework and Dowling and Pfeffer’s 
(1975) tactical legitimacy bolstering strategies, this section describes California Right to 
Know’s response to support labeling GE food as it manifested in publicly available 
artifacts. Additionally, an interview with GMO Free USA’s Diana Reeves provides 
perspective on the movement not accessible in open source documents. The implications 
of communication from Prop 37 policy supporters and the FDA are further analyzed in 
the discussion section.  
Adaption of Output, Goals, or Methods 
 GE labeling supporters worked to gain legitimacy with stakeholders by using 
several strategies. The most emphasized adaption strategies include establishing media 
presence and coalition building.  
Media 
 On May 20, 2012, Prop 37 was officially welcomed by the California Secretary of 
State’s Office to the November 2012 ballot. Prior to this day, the movement focused on 
gaining enough momentum to initiate the ballot introduction process, accomplished by 
obtaining enough California state resident signatures. Officially introducing this measure 
to the ballot signaled a turning point for the movement, which first incorporated the 
creation of supportive media.  
 Online presence. California Right to Know maintains an Internet home at 
www.carighttoknow.org. This homepage is dedicated solely to Prop 37, and includes 
sections for news, a blog, events, and endorsements. The page features videos (discussed 
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more in the following section), and fact sections It also lists endorsements for both sides 
of the debate, and links to several social media accounts. In total, California Right to 
Know maintains Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Pinterest, Google+, and Reddit accounts 
and links on its homepage. Press releases are archived on the website, and direct 
consumers to website materials for additional information. The California Right to Know 
Facebook page (https://www.facebook.com/carighttoknow) was created on March 30, 
2012 and the page’s first post was a call to action for more ballot signatures. California 
Right to Know’s presence on Twitter is accessible from May 24, 2012, when the account 
first tweeted about U.S. Senator Lisa Murkowski’s argument against GE salmon 
(@CARightToKnow, 2012). To date, Facebook, Twitter, and Pinterest accounts remain 
active (showing activity in the past week – as of May 30, 2013), whereas YouTube, 
Google+, and Reddit have been unattended for a month or more. From April 2012 to 
November 2012, GE labeling supporters organized a robust online presence. In addition, 
labeling advocates also produced and aired television and radio advertisements.  
 Traditional media. On August 27, 2012 California Right to Know announced the 
organization’s first television ad that “presents the history of notoriously inaccurate 
corporate health claims, including falsehoods from some of the very same corporations 
now funding the No on 37 campaign” (Malkan, 2012b). On September 13, 2012, the 
organization announced a “six figure ad buy” to “connect California voters to the 
importance of knowing what’s in the foods they eat for breakfast, lunch, and dinner” 
(Fulbright, 2012c). Three radio ads, similar in content but designed to air during different 
times of day (including breakfast, lunch, and dinner time slots) kicked off an initial push 
on the radio (Fulbright, 2012c). On October 26, 2012, Right to Know announced a 
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“seven-figure television ad buy” to air a new “Food is Love” advertisement (Fulbright, 
2012e). While Right to Know did not disclose the total amount spent on advertising, the 
organization asked for donations online to cover television advertising fees. Radio and 
television ads were featured on the organization’s website, with full transcriptions 
included in press releases.  
 California Right to Know invested both considerable time and money to widely 
disseminate their pro-GE food labeling message. The group also heavily engaged in 
coalition building – which the group frequently communicated to stakeholders.  
Coalition Building 
 To illustrate policy acceptance, California Right to Know publicized its new 
partner organizations. In fact, the organization’s first press release on April 30, 2012, 
notes that a “wide ranging coalition of consumer, public health, and environmental 
organizations, food companies, and individuals” submitted the California Right to Know 
Genetically Engineered Food Act to the State Attorney General (Fulbright, 2012a). 
Highlights about organizations that offered support for the measure often received their 
own, stand-alone press release. Fulbright’s (2012b) release entitled “health care providers 
support GMO labeling” solely documents health care oriented groups who are supportive 
of labeling. For example, a June 20, 2012 release specifically mentions that the AMA has 
not reached consensus on GE foods, and also lists medical groups that endorse the policy. 
Groups mentioned include American Public Health Association, Physicians for Social 
Responsibility – Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Sacramento, American Academy of 
Environmental Medicine, among others (Fulbright, 2012b). Other releases discuss 
endorsements from celebrities, consumers, public health industries, farming groups, 
 147 
 
medial organizations, political candidates, women, mothers, authors, chefs, and faith/ 
spiritual groups (California Right to Know, n.d.). In total, the organization lists 3,817 
official endorsements (California Right to Know, n.d.). 
 Diana Reeves, President of GMO Free USA, also acknowledges that coalition 
building is an important component of generating support for GE food labeling. Reeves 
notes that her group will reach out to supporters to tell them to “contact their own 
senators and representatives, and ask them to co-sponsor [the bill]” (personal 
communication, 2013). Fundamentally, support for Prop 37 is “all grassroots,” and relies 
on volunteers to both organize and petition legislators (Reeves, personal communication, 
2013).  
 Advocacy group California Right to Know both quickly adapted and increased its 
media presence and a diverse network of coalitions. In addition to greatly increasing its 
media reach and networks, the organization reframes what is socially legitimate. The next 
section describes how California Right to Know shifted discussion of the necessity of 
labeling policy, and directly engaged in discussion over the science behind current 
policies.  
Reframing the Definition of Social Legitimacy 
 Labeling advocates rely on redefining legitimacy standards for consumer 
expectations. This redefinition of legitimacy is initially enacted by pushing a “right to 
know” belief about GE food, followed by reframing expectations surrounding current 
biotechnology science. 
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Right To Know 
 Expectations surrounding food and drug information evolved as the FDA shaped 
early regulations concerning the safety and authenticity of U.S. food. With the 
development of food regulations, consumers can expect to know the general composition 
of products (ingredients, nutritional value, etc.). Other product details are more recently 
contested. For example, labeling calories in restaurants and providing Country of Origin 
Labeling (COOL) are two novel debates in the labeling industry. In this sense, 
perceptions of the extent of “right to know” issues are not solidified. Prop 37 advocates 
see genetic engineering as a characteristic worthy of sharing – hence adding GE foods to 
preexisting labeling expectations. The “right to know” campaign, then, attempts to extend 
currently accepted consumer expectations.  
 The “right to know” about GE properties was a staple of campaign 
communication from the beginning of pro-Prop 37 messaging. As evidenced in the 
organization’s namesake and first press release, pro-labeling advocates, such as Robyn 
O’Brien, author and founder of the Allergy Kids Foundation, assert that Californians 
have “a right to know what’s in the food [they] eat and feed [their] children” (Fulbright, 
2012a). Also heavily emphasized is the assumption that those opposed to labeling are 
trying to hide information from consumers. California Right to Know’s television 
advertisement states: 
 We’ve heard the false corporate health claims before . . . Cigarettes aren’t 
 harmful. DDT  is safe. Agent Orange is harmless. Now they say genetically 
 engineered food is safe. If Monsanto and Dow think these foods are safe, why are 
 they fighting our right to know what’s in our food? (Malkan, 2012b)  
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Unabashedly, California Right to Know views labeling GE food as another fundamental 
right. The organization’s press releases acknowledge the need to know about GE food, 
something that Reeves also identifies. Reeves notes that, “we want it [bioengineered 
food] out, it shouldn’t be fed to kids, you know” (personal communication, 2013). 
Additionally, Reeves emphasizes the importance of a book written by an author whose 
daughter experienced an anaphylactic allergic response to an Eggo waffle and Yoplait 
yogurt. Both foods “are chalked full of GMOs,” so the problem is that “without any 
testing… there’s really no evidence that they’re safe and without labeling there’s no 
accountability” (Reeves, personal communication, 2013). Thus, California Right to 
Know insists parents need labels to avoid GE products and to protect their families. 
Secondly, the Prop 37 supporters reframe and reinterpret the scientific justification for 
labeling GE food.  
Science Is Unsupported  
 Currently, the FDA allows GE food because there is no known evidence 
documenting any detrimental outcomes. This absence of negative outcomes could signal 
safety; but to Prop 37 advocates, absence is interpreted to mean “more testing is needed.” 
Malkan (2012b) states that the AMA and the World Health Organization/ United Nations 
“have said mandatory safety studies should be required,” and to date the United States 
has failed to meet such standards. Furthermore, the U.S. federal government “requires no 
safety studies for genetically engineered foods,” and no long-term human trials for GE 
food have been implemented (Malkan, 2012b). Reeves echoes this sentiment noting 
“there really has not been any testing” and “no evidence” that GE foods are safe 
(personal communication 2013). Closer to the election, a California Right to Know press 
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release argued that blatant misrepresentations of “the positions of leading science, 
professional, academic organizations and government agencies” have plagued their 
campaign to deliver accurate information to consumers (Malkan, 2012f). Further, the 
only group that concludes biotech foods are safe is the American Council on Science and 
Health, “which happens to be a notorious front group for the pesticide and climate change 
deniers” (Malkan, 2012f).  
 Studies that support alarming findings about GE food are also shared in press 
releases. On September 19, 2012, California Right to Know’s press release entitled 
“BREAKING: Massive Tumors in Rats Fed GMO Corn in First Ever Long-Term Study” 
reports findings published in the journal of Food and Chemical Toxicology that indicate 
GE corn yielded mammary tumors, kidney and liver damage and other serious illnesses in 
rats (Malkan, 2012c). On September 25, 2012, Malkan (2012d) writes that Russia 
suspended the import and use of Monsanto’s GE corn, and the French government called 
for an investigation into GMOs. The same release notes, “the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration has not reacted to the study” (Malkan, 2012d).  
 Prop 37 supporters reframe information about the science behind GE food. Pro-
Prop 37 press releases specify that credible health and professional agencies generally 
acknowledge uncertainty surrounding GE food. Releases also suggest emerging science 
finds GE foods are harmful to animals. Next, identification with grassroots organizations 
and democratic values is discussed.  
Identifying with Existing Symbols, Values, or Institutions 
 One of California Right to Know’s most abundant points is that Prop 37 is a bill 
introduced by California consumers, to benefit California consumers. This homegrown 
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measure is the culmination of democracy at work – which stands in stark contrast to elite 
organizations that wish to suppress the wishes of average California consumers.  
Grassroots Movement and Democracy  
 In the past, “efforts to enact labeling laws in Congress and the California 
legislature have been blocked by big food and chemical company lobbyists” (Fulbright, 
2012a). Conversely, in April 2012, opinion polls indicated, “over 90 percent of California 
voters support the labeling of genetically engineered foods” (Fulbright, 2012a). Prop 37 
then, represents the will of the people working together to overcome the few who wish to 
block the legislation. This dichotomous relationship positions the issue as a debate 
between two groups, consisting of “multi-national food and agrichemical companies” and 
“moms and grandmothers” who gathered enough petition signatures at farmer’s markets 
and local groceries (Malkan, 2012a).  
 Gearing up for a “David versus Goliath fight,” California Right to Know 
discusses the legislation as an uphill battle against “multi-billion dollar businesses” and 
parents who “want to make informed choices” about what their families and children eat 
(Malkan, 2012a; Fulbright, 2012d). Further, because those pushing for Prop 37 do not 
have infinite resources, they must fight anti-Prop 37 organizations by coming at them 
“from every angle,” ultimately leading to victory by defeating Goliath-like entities with 
“death by a thousand cuts” (Reeves, personal communication, 2013). In identifying with 
families, local and small businesses, and the majority of California consumers, California 
Right to Know positions Prop 37 as an organically and widely-supported bill free from 
lobbyist groups and for-profit businesses. The purportedly well-intentioned legislation 
sounds appealing to those who view large food and agricultural companies unfavorably, 
 152 
 
even outside of labeling. This association could be one of the campaign’s most powerful 
arguments – a topic touched on again in the discussion section.  
 California Right to Know and the pro-labeling movement engage in all of 
Dowling and Pfeffer’s (1975) tactical legitimacy bolstering strategies, suggesting a robust 
actional legitimation effect. The next section explores the implications of these strategies 
and provides recommendations for generalizable lessons. 
Discussion 
 In examining the positions of the FDA and pro-labeling groups like California 
Right to Know, it becomes difficult to ascertain whose story is legitimate. Furthermore, 
U.S. consumers are left unsure of whether they should or need to worry about GE food. 
Consumers may also be unsure whether or not the FDA is effectively regulating food and 
if multi-national companies are insensitive to the public’s well-being. This section begins 
with a discussion of successes and missteps in responding to the risk misconstrual of Prop 
37. Following, California Right to Know’s ability to reach actional legitimation is 
discussed. Finally, generalizable lessons from the case are presented. 
Success and Failure in Responding to Consumer Perceptions 
 California residents who signed California Right to Know’s petition committed 
themselves in support of labeling GE food. Further, many of these consumers believe that 
GE food is not only different from naturally produced food, but also that it is potentially 
harmful. These consumers construed or “infer[ed] meaning by assessing the importance 
and accuracy of the information and the authenticity of the source” to reach a conclusion 
that GE products pose significant risks (Sellnow et al., 2009, p. 8). Many in the scientific 
community believe that misconstrual has occurred in the case of GE food. As 
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McGloghlin notes, several California counties (like Marin and Mendocino) have passed 
GE labeling laws locally (personal communication, 2013). Some bills, however, like 
Mendocino’s, are “so poorly written,” they “describe DNA as a complex protein” 
although it is actually a nucleic acid (McGloghlin, personal communication, 2013). Past 
local bills “also refer to mixing of species” however, “all of Mendocino, and in fact, all of 
production vineyards involve grafting one variety of grape onto another” (McGloghlin, 
personal communication, 2013). If local laws successfully passed into state law, and were 
subsequently enforced, those who propelled the bill forward would “already not [be] in 
compliance with their own law” (McGloghlin, personal communication 2013). 
 Twenty years after the FDA released its initial statement of policy on new plant 
varieties; the agency has yet to find any human health consequences connected with GE 
food. Foods from GE plants “must meet the same requirements, including safety 
requirements, as foods from traditionally bred plants” (FDA, 2013a). Nutritional 
assessments for GE foods “that have been evaluated by FDA through the consultation 
process have shown that foods are generally as nutritious as foods from comparable 
traditionally bred plants” (FDA, 2013a). Additionally, GE foods evaluated by the FDA 
“have not been more likely to cause an allergic or toxic reaction than foods from 
traditionally bred plants” (FDA, 2013a). All of the FDA’s testing (performed by scientists 
with backgrounds in “genetic engineering, toxicology, chemistry, nutrition” etc.) 
indicates no significant differences between GE food and traditionally bred varieties 
(FDA, 2013a).  
 The emerging gap between existing science and consumer perceptions is growing. 
As additional states consider following in Vermont’s footsteps, misconstrual should be 
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addressed. Two areas that are in need of improvement include the technical risk 
associated with GE food and current FDA regulation standards.  
 Groups like California Right to Know claim that GE food should be regarded and 
responded to in a manner congruent with that of cigarettes, DDT, and Agent Orange 
(Malkan, 2012b). The above products carry the potential for severe health risks. 
However, claims associating GE food with the risk levels evidenced by these products is 
incorrect. While cigarettes for example show clear association with several types of 
cancer, the FDA has not established associations between GE food consumption and 
negative human health outcomes.  
 In beginning to alleviate misconstrued information, consumers must recognize 
misappropriated risks. This task is not impossible. For example, misconstrued risks were 
once associated with microwaves. James Murray, a professor of animal sciences at the 
University of California at Davis, says that fears surrounding GE foods sound similar to 
“concerns about microwave ovens, which some people initially thought would give off 
dangerous radiation” (Ritter & Borenstein, 2010, para. 35). Learning the technical 
outcomes of consuming GE foods is imperative; yet instead of learning new information 
about technology (as is the case with the introduction of a microwave), learning entails 
diving into the compositional similarity of GE and naturally bred food.  
 Secondly, the FDA suffers from a lack of recognition of current regulations. For 
example, in a California Right to Know press release, a spokesperson is quoted saying “it 
is a scandal that the FDA, EPA, and companies like Monsanto have failed to do long-
term testing over the past decade. Until further research is done we should have a 
moratorium on new approval of GE crops and labeling” (Malkan, 2012e). According to 
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the FDA, “foods, such as fruits, vegetables, grains, and their byproducts, derived from 
plant varieties developed by the new methods of genetic modification are regulated 
within the existing framework of the act…that [applies] to foods developed by traditional 
plant breeding” (FDA, 1992). Arguably, GE food is even safer than traditionally bred 
varieties. McGloghlin states that, “genetic engineering is more precise and predictable” 
than traditionally bred products, yet it is “regulated up the wazoo” (Ritter & Borenstein, 
2010, para. 20). Not only is GE food more carefully constructed compositionally than 
traditionally bred varieties, allowing scientists to remove unwanted traits, it is more 
heavily scrutinized.  
 Both perceptions of technical risk and regulatory oversight of GE food are 
arguably misconstrued by Prop 37 supporters. While misappropriated risk may exist 
absent from media and activist attention, both variables additionally blur the gap between 
perceptional risk and actual risk. These components, evidenced by California Right to 
Know, are described next.  
Success and Failure in Expressing Actional Legitimacy 
 California Right to Know successfully expressed actional legitimation strategies, 
and narrowly missed success in enacting new labeling laws in the state. Prop 37’s 47.1% 
favorability in the November 2012 election indicates significant support for both sides of 
the issue (California Secretary of State, 2012). Analysis of actional strategies illustrates 
the activist group’s ability to achieve success in all three of Dowling and Pfeffer’s (1975) 
prescribed actional strategies. California Right to Know quickly adapted and increased 
both its media presence and a diverse network of coalitions. They also reframed 
information about the science behind GE food, and communicated messages of 
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uncertainty surrounding the validity of testing of products. Thirdly, a strong push to 
create identification with grassroots organizations and democratic values further helped 
bolster legitimacy for the movement.  
 Labeling GE food as a perceptual crisis gaining legitimacy – exemplified by its 
narrow margin of failure in California and other concurrent deliberations in states around 
the United States. As activist groups increase momentum to support future efforts for GE 
food labeling and restriction, communication efforts that combat risk misconstrual is 
necessary for consumers to make an informed choice about the foods they buy and 
consume. California Right to Know’s emotionally charged messages (particularly 
concerning the people’s “right to know” and the multi-national companies involved) are 
effective in garnering support for labeling. Grassroots support for labeling initiatives 
remains engaged throughout the United States and counter-communication remains 
lacking to provide a balanced perspective on the issue.  
 Actional legitimacy surrounding the defense of GE products should be improved. 
To begin, as the major regulator of GE products, the FDA must publicly rationalize the 
agency’s decisions for regulation strategies. Recently, the FDA has not enacted any 
actional legitimation strategies. This inaction is supported by the organization with the 
preface that it is neither its job to “support GE plants based on their perceived benefits,” 
or “oppose them based on their perceived risks” (FDA, 2013b). Understandably, the FDA 
is not an activist group. In fact, the organization’s legitimacy is upheld by remaining 
neutral to inconclusive debates on food, drugs, and cosmetics. At the same time, it is 
important to communicate why a natural stance is acceptable for this topic. Doing so 
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would be based on the agency’s findings that the foods are compositionally equivalent to 
one another.  
 Organizational policy and precedent limit the FDA’s range of communication 
options. The agency is also unable to serve as an advocate on issues like genetic 
engineering because of its need to remain an objective regulatory agency. It is, however, 
completely within the FDA’s capacity to rationalize and clarify decisions surrounding 
new biotechnology and the implications for these products. Understanding these 
decisions increases organizational transparency and show consumers that the agency is 
engaging in ongoing monitoring, cataloguing, regulation, and testing of genetic 
engineering and other innovations. Failure to improve this transparency could lend 
further legitimacy to activist groups who claim the FDA is not regulating GE food.  
 Additionally, groups outside the FDA who advocate for GE food, including 
outside of the labeling issue, should work to increase public discussion surrounding the 
benefits associated with GE food. In prior sections of this chapter, benefits including 
reduced allergens, bacterium, viruses, and insecticides are noted as being associated with 
GE foods (Berezow, 2012). Biotechnology will be even more important in the next ten to 
twenty years as climate change and a growing global population put more strain on 
current agricultural practices and yields. Without biotechnology, current agricultural 
outputs will struggle to feed four billion people, let alone the current seven billion or 
projected nine billion in coming years (McGloghlin, personal communication, 2013). 
More communication by those who see advantages to biotechnology are needed to 
reframe misconstrued evidence. Additionally, identification with positive outcomes of the 
technology could also contribute to countering the existing misinformation campaigns 
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surrounding GE food. In the next section, California’s case of misconstrual is broadened 
to offer insight for future scenarios.  
Generalizable Lessons 
 California Right to Know’s actional strategies and failed counter-communicative 
attempts for GE food labeling has contributed to risk misconstrual surrounding GE food. 
In an effort to further distill this information, the next section offers three generalizable 
lessons followed by conclusions on the case. 
 Not-for-profit organizations must communicate decision-making. Political 
sensitivities and policy limit the FDA from speaking out about GE food. Counter-
arguments have since been offered from for-profit organizations like Monsanto, Dow 
Agrosciences, Pepsico, Nestle, Coca-Cola, ConAgra, Kellogg Company, and more. The 
problem with these and similar organizations spearheading anti-labeling measures, is that 
consumers assume that these organizations have a self-motivated or vested interest in 
their decision. Although this may be true, a lack of credibility disempowers the counter-
communication before information or discussion can even commence. 
 Prop 37 supporters benefit from their seemingly financially unmotivated coalition. 
Future scenarios, which involve an organization countering activist or grassroots 
coalitions, should consider if they are the best spokesperson for actional strategies. 
Ideally, organizations that do not directly benefit financially from decisions should lead 
communication efforts. Objectivity of all parties might be discussed – and biases should 
be disclosed openly.  
 Proactive strategies are essential. Secondly, benefits associated with genetic 
engineering should be actively communicated. Failure to insert support and credibility for 
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GE food allows public sentiment to default to those who dominate the active discussion. 
In addition, those who oppose GE food are often those that will not directly benefit from 
it. For example, in some California “counties, clearly in places like Marin and Mendocino 
where they don’t grow biotech products or GMOs at this point in time” are the places 
where labeling laws were “relatively easy to pass” (McGloghlin, personal 
communication, 2013). Some of the California counties that passed local laws similar to 
Prop 37 are home to organic farmers or industry that is not impacted by GE food. In this 
sense, advocates are not working towards removing health risks from GE food 
consumption (which continues to be a main argument associated with the necessity for 
labeling), but rather working towards stabilizing or diminishing future competitors.  
 New scientific and technological advances will be met by skepticism from 
consumers and organizational leaders. Justification and evidence of the benefits should be 
provided upon introduction of new innovations to consumers. Questions surrounding 
risks should be addressed and responded to – otherwise default arguments may fill-in 
gaps of missing information. Misinformation can be used to effectively quell entirely safe 
products, arbitrarily denying positive outcomes and benefits.  
 Incorrect science should be refuted. A consistent issue surrounding GE food 
involves debate on what science, or empirical testing, supports. In California’s case, both 
Prop 37 supporters and opposition cite science to validate their claims. In fact, Malkan 
(2012e) writes “the US Food and Drug Administration requires no safety testing of 
GMOs, despite the opinions by the World Health Organization and American Medical 
Association” (para. 9). At the same time, the AMA is quoted elsewhere as believing GE 
food “pose[s] no new or different risks than any other crop, and there is no scientific 
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reason to believe they would be any more risky” (Specter, 2012, para. 4). Conflicting 
evidence is difficult to follow, and should be clarified by those agencies whose mission is 
to protect consumers.  
 Unfortunately, some may even use science more deceptively. When asked what 
was most surprising about discussing GE food with the media and the public, 
McGloghlin says she has a hard time listening to colleagues who: 
  Are against the technology not because they have any question from a scientific 
 perspective, but because of their concern with this notion of multinational 
 ownership…and then they come out with justification from a scientific 
 perspective (against genetic engineering), which is, to me, utterly inappropriate 
 for a scientist. (personal communication, 2013) 
The notion of infallible and objective science can be damaging to the food industry, but 
many others as well. False, deceptive, or subjective statements should be questioned and 
those who knowingly disseminate misconstrued information should be identified. 
Unfortunately, complex topics like genetic engineering can be difficult for laypersons to 
criticize, which is why scientific experts, academics, and other relevant spokespersons 
should actively communicate about the validity behind scientific claims.  
Conclusion 
 Twenty years after the FDA developed policy concerning GE foods, a resurgence 
of debate and criticism arose over the issue in California. Supporters of Prop 37 launched 
a campaign in the state to pass legislation by popular vote in the November 2012 election. 
Policy advocates assert that opponents to the bill claim “a) there's no proof that G.M.O.'s 
are harmful to humans, and b) studies demonstrating that they might be are largely 
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flawed. Point B might even be true, although since the chemical companies 
largely control the research, it's hard to tell” (Bittman, 2012c, para. 2). Opponents to 
labeling find that many supporters “don’t actually have a genuine issue…but when you 
drill down you realize what their real issue is, their real issue is Monsanto” (McGloghlin, 
personal communication, 2013). Unfortunately, emotional tensions between local, 
organic, or natural coalitions and multi-national corporations have misconstrued the 
actual risk levels associated with GE food. This arbitrary calculation stands to provoke 
unnecessary and costly changes in the food system, should other states continue pursuing 
similar labeling measures. As groups like California Right to Know continue to campaign 
and control the public dialogue, scientists, regulators, and companies will have a difficult 
time presenting counterarguments unless changes are orchestrated to improve current 
actional legitimation strategies.  
 This chapter described risk misconstrual and the subsequent effects on food 
labeling policy. More specifically, the case discussed actional strategies, success and 
failures in responding to consumer perceptions, actional legitimacy success and failure, 
and offered generalizable lessons for other cases of risk misconstrual. Next, chapter seven 
extends discussion to encompass all three perceptual threats including hoaxes, near 
misses, and risk misconstrual.  
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Chapter Seven: Discussion and Conclusions 
 
 Risk perceptions are volatile. The subjective construction of threats, caused by 
conflation of risk as feelings, analysis, and politics, can produce unwieldy decision-
making and inappropriate crisis response. This dissertation discusses three crises of 
perception, spanning a YouTube hoax, an economic adulteration near miss, and 
misconstrued risk in food biotechnology in California. In exploring these cases, 
information is gleaned from both conceptualizing new crisis types and in identifying 
actional strategies employed by responding organizations. This chapter provides 
discussion across cases, answering proposed research questions, and solidifies 
observations collected from the three cases.  
 Currently, much crisis literature covers post-crisis response to actualized events. 
In other words, practitioners and academics may best understand what to do when risk 
has already manifested into crisis. Perceptual crises are not as easily discernible or 
demanding. Directing attention to this distinction, this study’s research questions asked:  
RQ1: What communication constraints and opportunities do organizations face 
when responding to crises of perception? 
RQ2: Do communication constraints and opportunities during crises of 
perception differ by crisis type? 
Discussion first encompasses constraints and opportunities associated with perceptual 
crises, as relating to the case studies, and then bridges to specific characteristics of 
hoaxes, near misses, and misconstrual.  
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Communication Constraints 
Perceptual crises challenge responders by demanding substantial responses to 
unsubstantiated claims. Unfortunately, this substantial response is not always easy to 
enact. Two constraints cut across cases, including organizational agency to act on behalf 
of emerging issues and associated preemptive resources. These constraints are briefly 
explained followed by examples from each case.  
One of the greatest challenges associated with perceptual crises is bolstering the 
wherewithal to produce decisions surrounding emerging issues. Organizational 
legitimacy is fluid: Dependent upon shifting public perceptions (Boyd, 2000). Public 
sentiment, then, dictates legitimacy when processing many variables outside of an 
organization’s control – a phenomenon well recognized by Perrow (1999). The greatest 
challenge for an organization is to be on the forefront of discussions and to lead public 
discourse about its business. However, as national and international organizational 
structures continue to be a dominant business model, these operations will face difficultly 
in remaining nimble enough to adapt to emerging issues. Moreover, these large national 
or international structures will make maintaining legitimacy with stakeholders 
increasingly difficult. The diffusion of operations, expanding market reach, and need to 
focus on profits for growth and survival are at odds with other goals of relational 
maintenance, promoting social responsibility, and specializing in one market’s needs.  
Second, organizations must equip themselves to respond to emerging and 
unknown issues. This process demands physical resources and the ability to accept 
uncertainty and occasional loss. Occasional loss can also mean accepting that some 
preparation resources will not be used if risk does not actually manifest to crisis. When 
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budgets are tight and organizational survival trumps other objectives, advocating for 
proactive risk preparation becomes secondary to other tangible needs. In this sense it can 
be tempting to diminish risk resources after several cycles of unused mitigation resources 
pile up. However, organizations should not let the absence of crisis deter them from 
engaging in proactive protective behavior.  
In addition to difficulties associated with preparation in absence of crisis, 
Phimister, Oktem, Kleindorfer, and Kunreuther (2003) note the difficulty associated with 
preparing for crises even with existing warning signals. In these situations warnings are 
not guarantees that appropriate preparations will occur (e.g., the 1986 Space Shuttle 
Challenger explosion or the 1998 Morton explosion and fire). In this sense, organizations 
are constrained by organizational cultures that demand evidence of crises prior to taking 
action. Much like insurance offers financial reimbursement for automobile accidents, or 
health insurance covers ailments yet to be incurred, organizations should act within their 
means to resource responders so that they are prepared to act when an event occurs. 
Evidence of these constraints is further exemplified by discussing each case. 
Hoaxes 
 Domino’s response to the grotesque YouTube video filmed in a North Carolina 
franchise illustrates the necessity of adaptation for organizations. Domino’s President 
Patrick Doyle’s response video, however successful, is still somewhat attributable to luck 
and fast thinking. In fact, Vice President of Communication Tim McIntyre notes that this 
video was made when most of the company’s leadership was on vacation and unable to 
comment on the response (personal communication, 2010). Prior to the 2009 video, 
Domino’s maintained traditional means of communication, such as broadcast media and 
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press releases, that would have been ineffective in breaching social communication 
discussions. This deviation from organizational precedent has since become standard for 
other CEOs of large companies engaging in apologia or other explanations.  
Near Misses 
 China’s melamine crisis shows how organizational adaptations to changing 
environmental conditions are constrained by diffused responsibility. Encompassing the 
Chinese and United States’ governments, in addition to private entities (i.e., Sanlu), many 
wondered: Who should have responded to the threat of contaminated powdered and 
liquid milk? In the United States, this responsibility fell to the FDA even though the crisis 
erupted abroad and was contained to China. Highly coupled systems provide ambiguity 
for communication “duties,” and even more ambiguity surrounding preparation costs 
(who is paying for response actions and damages associated with the risk/ crisis)?  
Misconstrual 
  Finally, Prop 37’s emergence in California suggests the need for constant 
monitoring and prediction of changing sentiment. Regulated for over 20 years in the 
United States, the safety of GE foods has not changed since 1992. What has changed is 
public association of GE food and its relationship with multi-national organizations. 
Identifying new sources of contention, which can harm legitimacy, is imperative for 
maintaining science and technology that stand to benefit food production and 
accessibility. Unfortunately, uncovering the root of changing perceptions is labor 
intensive, time consuming, and costly. The ability to constantly monitor and track these 
overarching assumptions certainly constrains the ability of organizations and agencies to 
address these issues in public communication.  
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 Managing communication constraints is a formidable task. Unsubstantiated 
claims are demanding of organizational time and physical resources. Uncertainty can also 
arise concerning true derived benefits (i.e. positive outcomes) from organizational 
initiatives. Still, perceptual crises offer opportunities for responders. These are further 
explained in the following section.  
Communication Opportunities 
 Organizational responses surrounding perceptual threats are as important to 
recognize as the foreseeable challenges. Organizational activities, whether they are 
inherently “good” or “bad,” generate response from stakeholders. In this sense, subjective 
interpretations of organizational practices or policy can produce negative perceptions 
surrounding positive actions, or positive perceptions surrounding negative or detrimental 
actions. What also matters is how these actions are explained and defended. As Crable 
(1990) finds, organizations are the “true rhetors” of the latter half of the twentieth 
century, and consequently organizational communication will “determine the significance 
of the act” in questions (p. 127; Hearit, 1995, p. 1). Communication then is an 
opportunity to illustrate responsiveness and engage in learning.   
 Communication surrounding a perceptual threat indicates responsiveness. 
Response, which Weber (1922) notes can occur through varying actions, is that means 
through which stakeholders learn of an organization’s empathy and concern. 
Acknowledging stakeholder sentiment is of the utmost importance, as stakeholders are 
the means through which legitimacy is bestowed (Massey, 2001). Navigating perceptual 
threats is challenging in that they are difficult to see (e.g., they are more hidden than full 
blown crises) and they may not be widespread (i.e., they are still isolated). The 
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opportunity then rests in an organization’s ability to know its stakeholders well enough to 
recognize when something is wrong, and to respond before they are required to do so. 
This recognition and response would suggest a very observant and concerned effort, 
which speaks to the organization’s relationships with stakeholders and its priorities. 
Ultimately, responsive organizations are enduring organizations.  
 Second, perceptual crises often provide learning opportunities for organizations. 
Learning can occur in pre-crisis, crisis, or post-crisis phases. For example, emerging risks 
can prompt organizations to engage in new activities during pre-crisis stages. As 
organizations consider appropriate responses to emerging risks, they can express a 
commitment to learning and to developing new strategies. During crises, organizations 
have the chance to demonstrate that they have learned from others or past mistakes. In 
post-crisis, more detailed expressions of learning should illustrate changes taken by an 
organization to avoid or better prepare for future crises. Ongoing learning, whether the 
learning is direct and from the organization’s own experiences or vicarious, is an 
opportunity to evolve in absence of a full-blown catastrophe. Learning from perceptual 
threats is smart, but especially so when there is possibility to learn from the mistakes or 
experiences of others. Finally, organizations can also learn vicariously from their own 
perceptual threats. Perceptual threats that do not evolve into crises can serve as an 
important warning signal for organizations to adapt behaviors, reframe expectations, or 
identify with other more positive institutions or symbols.  
Perceptual threats offer opportunities to showcase organizational responsiveness 
and learning. Successfully managing these threats will not only allow an organization to 
maintain current operations, but possibly improve legitimacy with stakeholders and better 
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prepare for emerging risks or likely crises. Next, instances of both responsiveness and 
learning are illustrated in this study’s cases.  
Hoaxes 
 Domino’s case demonstrates the benefits of responding directly to stakeholders. 
By responding directly to users on YouTube and Twitter, Doyle and his communication 
team mopped up a “spill in one aisle instead of the whole store” (McIntyre, personal 
communication, 2010). In using social media channels preferred by a subset of 
stakeholders, Domino’s also communicated with customers on its own turf, rather than 
turning to pre-established company methods. Domino’s did wait three days before 
engaging stakeholders online, which received criticism from some journalists, yet the 
pizza company’s willingness to respond via YouTube and tweets allowed the company to 
bounce back from the social media scandal without lasting harm (Domino’s Pizza, 2011). 
Domino’s also used the social media crisis to launch themselves into a new era with 
social media accounts, an improved pizza recipe, and a corresponding advertising 
campaign – propelling the over 50-year-old company into continued financial success 
domestically and internationally (Domino’s Pizza, 2009; Domino’s Pizza, 2010).  
Near Misses 
 Near misses serve as invaluable learning opportunities. The FDA, in responding 
to melamine contaminations in China, vicariously learned from the international crisis 
and emboldened the United States’ food safety mechanisms. Upon learning of melamine 
contaminations in 2007 and 2008, the agency enacted the Food Protection Plan and 
drastically changed programs, personnel, and communication strategies to ensure China’s 
systemic adulteration problem did not reach U.S. soil. The FDA’s response to the issue 
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occurred without an actual crisis prompting organizational changes, and the agency 
vicariously learned through China’s challenges. This learning demonstrates the 
organization’s ability to use a near miss to accomplish preemptive actions – minimizing 
risks before they manifest to crisis. Changes in sampling techniques at U.S. borders, new 
satellite offices in China, and innovative technology to identify synthetic protein in 
products will limit the spread of future adulterated Chinese products before they can 
harm U.S. consumers.  
Misconstrual 
 California’s Prop 37 demonstrates a communicative failure surrounding 
biotechnology. As identified in the case, growing subsets of U.S. consumers are fearful 
and untrusting of not only GE food, but also private companies and federal regulatory 
agencies. Groups like California Right to Know use compelling communication 
campaigns to disperse emotionally charged and well-argued propaganda. What is missing 
in these campaigns is “science’s side,” or the voice behind the benefits of biotechnology. 
The FDA, one of three organizations that monitor GE food, neither endorses nor opposes 
the use of biotechnology in food. Private companies serve as poor spokespersons as 
consumers question the motives of organizations that profit from products they 
champion. Other potential spokespersons, such as academics, may choose not to speak 
out so they can remain objective or anonymous (McGloghlin, personal communication, 
2013). Unsurprisingly, communication from companies that stand to profit from GE 
foods is met with skepticism. To date GE food poses many benefits (e.g., reduced 
allergens, bacterium, viruses, insecticides, etc.), yet U.S. consumers continue to receive 
misinformation about GE food or ignore messages from sources they find lacking in 
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credibility. Currently, biotechnology is missing the opportunity to engage in public 
dialogue about the positive outcomes of growing and selling GE food.  
 Perceptual threats offer both challenges and opportunities for responders. The 
three cases in this dissertation highlight characteristics that constrain communication and 
discuss actualized opportunities. The next section discusses the similarities and 
differences in communication strategy considering hoaxes, near misses, and cases of 
misconstrual.  
Crisis Type Differences 
Hoaxes, near misses, and cases of misconstrual are similar in that in all three 
cases, the perceptual threats warrant a strategic response. What differentiates each case is 
the origin of communication surrounding the issue and the consequences of 
communicative action. For example, responsibility for communication is associated with 
the original source; and the impact of disseminated messages arguably guides the form of 
response.  
Hoaxes, or other pranks, can be perpetrated inside or outside of an organization. 
In Domino’s case, the organization was bound to a response because it was their 
employees who uploaded an incriminating YouTube video. However, if a similar prank 
video of persons not affiliated with Domino’s were uploaded the company would have 
been a victim instead of part of the problem. In addition, because it was uncertain 
whether contaminated food was distributed to customers, a robust response was needed 
immediately to assuage alarm over the improperly handled food. Therefore, internal 
hoaxes are distinct from those enacted by an outsider to an organization. Domino’s 
situation was particularly worsened by the fact that rogue employees filmed their video 
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during working hours, in their uniforms, inside of a franchise that could have been 
located anywhere in the United States.  
The outcome of Domino’s hoax video was outrage from online stakeholders, yet 
the actual risk was non-existent. Contaminated food was never delivered and both 
employees were fired. Although immature and irresponsible, the Domino’s employees 
also meant no harm. Other hoaxes or pranks are not always as innocuous. Bomb threats, 
social media posts about school shootings, or false anthrax or ricin-laden letters certainly 
differ from Setzer and Hammonds’ prank. The affiliation and motives of the perpetrator 
demand varying levels of response from implicated organizations during crisis, which 
varies in each situation. In contrast, if a prank is purely in jest and clearly will produce no 
harm, it could be in an organization’s best interest to initiate no response (Veil, Petrun, & 
Roberts, 2012).  
Near misses are distinguishable from hoaxes in that they are framed to be either 
positive or negative. China’s melamine crisis illuminates an instance where 
communication surrounding a negative event produced protective behaviors against a 
potentially serious and purposeful threat to the U.S. food supply. The opposite, 
communication surrounding a positive near miss, is not threatening. Rather, organizations 
may wish to promote near success to bolster legitimacy with stakeholders (e.g., a vote 
almost passes the U.S. Congress and this is important to convey to policy supporters). 
The necessity to communicate surrounding a near miss is not as steadfast as an 
intentional hoax, and is also more diffused than threats orchestrated against a single 
organization (as in the case with Domino’s).  
 172 
 
The outcome of near misses will also alter the necessity of risk or crisis response. 
Severe near misses, those that are associated with high physical, social, or financial risk, 
will attract considerably more publicity. The FDA’s response to melamine was 
heightened for several reasons, but is likely due to the deliberate intent of merchants in 
China to contaminate food for economic gain, the inundation of contaminant throughout 
the country’s food supply, and continued failure to reach a resolution. Considering the 
characteristics of the melamine case, other regulatory agencies, including those in the 
United States, needed to communicate reasons for why this crisis will not permeate U.S. 
systems. This near miss was not anonymous, and certainly did not go unnoticed. 
However, other instances of near misses could go undetected, thereby not requiring the 
same level of attention. 
Misconstrual is more ambiguous than a near miss or hoax, and special attention is 
needed to discern how risk is misconstrued and who is responsible (if anyone) for that 
misconstrual. California’s Prop 37 is a manifestation of misconstrued risk of 
biotechnology in California, propagated by advocacy groups and those who oppose “big 
food and chemical company lobbyists” (Fulbright, 2012a). Claims originated from groups 
who advocate on behalf of average citizens and those who “want to make informed 
choices” about what their families and children eat (Fulbright, 2012d). What is less 
understood is the motive of such groups (e.g., industries and companies that sell organic 
products) and the inability to inform from others (e.g., the FDA and academics). Unlike 
hoaxes, misconstrual is not always purposeful, though in some instances misinformation 
very well could be intentional. The opportunity and rationale for responding to 
misconstrual is to achieve true informed consent for stakeholders. Doing so requires 
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providing accurate and balanced information so that decisions are made considering 
whole truths.  
Risk misconstrual outcomes are not as obvious as those associated with hoaxes or 
near misses. In fact, risk misconstrual may be the most difficult perceptual threat to 
manage because there may be no observable action to suggest that a problem exists. 
Misconstrual may only be represented as it was in California – in changing poll numbers 
indicating support or opposition for Prop 37. Misconstrual could mean responders need to 
simply engage in discussion to ensure that accurate information is shared. Arguably, the 
clearest indication that adjusting information is needed for misconstrued risk is the call 
for policy change at a state or national level. Unfortunately, waiting until change is 
evident at this level may be too late to successfully influence public opinion before a 
policy decision is made.  
Perceptual crises involving misconstrued risk will likely have serious implications 
in coming decades as voters make decisions concerning complex topics, including 
healthcare, technology, foreign policy, financial systems and more. Ongoing monitoring 
and frequently revisiting public sentiment about highly technical policy, especially 
controversial policy, is important in discovering opportunities for comment and to 
provide adjusting information to stand next to questionable or emotional arguments.  
Engaging in Actional Legitimacy 
 Crisis characteristics become more apparent from discussion of opportunities and 
constraints associated with each scenario. What is also clear is that each crisis type 
indicates the importance of situational factors for communication and decision-making. 
Considering both crisis distinctions and situational factors associated with each case, 
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Boyd’s (2000) actional legitimacy is used to identify the most useful strategies for 
responding to hoaxes, near misses, and misconstrual. The following description also 
relies on Dowling and Pfeffer’s (1975) tactical legitimacy building strategies to highlight 
key strategies for each crisis type. To further provide perspective on demands associated 
with each crisis type, this study posed the following:  
RQ3: To what extent to hoaxes, near misses, and misconstrual of risk obligate 
organizations to engage in actional legitimacy?  
RQ4: Does the obligation for actional legitimacy during crises of perception 
differ by crisis type?  
The outcome of actional strategies for each case is described next.  
Hoaxes 
 Domino’s Pizza enacted a robust response to its hoax video. The company 
adopted new media strategies on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, and reconsidered 
hiring procedures. The company reframed the definition of social legitimacy in 
differentiating the rogue employees from the other “125,000 thousand men and women” 
employees who have not engaged in wrongdoing (Swifttallon, 2009b). Immediately 
following the crisis, Domino’s also launched a new pizza recipe and advertising 
campaign. This launch relied on Domino’s standards of honesty and transparency to 
highlight the organization’s longstanding history with stakeholders. Reaching all 
prescribed levels of actional legitimacy left little room for failure, and while Domino’s 
may have made slight missteps during the crisis (i.e. not communicating quickly enough 
online), they emerged with a positive reputation post-incident.  
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 Although Domino’s responded successfully, the company may have had little 
choice. In waiting to see if the online crisis would die down, Hammonds and Setzer’s 
video merely attracted more viewers. This growth was the turning point in deciding when 
and how to act. Should the video have reached 30,000 views (as it did within hours of 
being posted) and then subsequently slowed or declined in growth, interjecting a message 
acknowledging the hoax from President Doyle would not have been necessary. The 
company cautiously waited to see how the situation evolved, and then engaged in 
communication via the Internet. The rapid escalation of the crisis leads some to argue that 
Domino’s response was several days too late. Predicting the spread of online content is 
not always possible – yet there are means through which to gauge the “virility” of 
content. Violent, sexual, or unexpected news will travel fast (Poter & Golan, 2006; 
Phelps, Lewis, Mobilio, Perry, & Raman, 2004; Izawa, 2010). Communicators should 
consider the nature of the hoax in question, and situational factors surrounding the hoax 
perpetrator, the organization, and receptivity of stakeholders.  
Near Misses 
 The FDA’s response to melamine is thorough, accounting for responses spanning 
prevention, intervention, and response actions. During the intervention phase, the FDA 
considered hiring third party inspectors and implemented advanced border technology 
(e.g., PREDICT). Should melamine enter the U.S. food supply, the FDA readied with 
rapid vendor response teams and new emergency response coordinators. Following the 
2008 contamination, the agency did not engage in reframing efforts. More specifically, in 
not refuting the significance of the melamine near miss, regulatory agencies 
acknowledged the severity of a possible contamination and did not pursue reframing 
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techniques. Conversely, reframing techniques may have been more useful should they 
have decided not to enact more robust changes. Finally, identifying with domestic 
partners (e.g. U.S. Customs and Border Protection), international partners, and 
organizational leaders assisted the agency in generating true structural changes in food 
safety and security.  
 The characteristics associated with China’s melamine crisis obligated the United 
States to respond. Most importantly the intentionality associated with economic 
adulteration obliged U.S. regulators to seek immediate solutions to food laden with 
melamine. Conversely, unintentional product contaminations may have yielded smaller, 
if any, changes to food safety mechanisms. Unlike ever before, regulators were faced 
with business partners who “play[ed] games” with markets – generating new filler 
substances to boost profitability, shipping illegal items through multiple countries to 
avoid shipping tracking, and concealing important health information to evade 
repercussions (FDA representative, personal communication, 2013). U.S. agencies tasked 
with monitoring the quality of Chinese products could not ignore this issue. Engaging in 
non-action in this case would likely bring more physical and financial harm to U.S. 
consumers, particularly as it became clearer that China was not changing food safety 
standards on its own (or at least changing their standards fast enough).  
Misconstrual 
 Required actional responses to misconstrual are less clear than in the 
aforementioned cases, and responsibility is more diffused. Prop 37 gained momentum in 
California as advocacy groups brought a controversial amendment to the state ballot in 
November 2012. California Right to Know engaged in coalition building, traditional and 
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social media campaigns to gather momentum for policy change. Supporters also reframed 
arguments surrounding GE food, and pushed claims that consumers had a “right to know” 
what was in their food. The group also asserted that the science behind biotechnology 
was fallible and unproven. Finally, California Right to Know worked to identify its cause 
as a “grassroots movement,” which represented the people of California, rather than the 
interests of greedy corporations. As the FDA maintains an objective stance on the 
practice of genetic engineering, the organization cannot be obligated to communicate 
about GE food. This stands even though many consumers maintain expectations that the 
FDA should be an opinion leader on food issues. However, misinformation and missing 
spokespersons for biotechnology are creating knowledge gaps in public dialogue.  
 The challenge in this instance is that obligation for counter-communication lacks 
direction. Recognition that the FDA is bound to objectivity and precedent helps 
rationalize its absence from the debate, but the question remains: Who should advocate 
for biotechnology? To date, private entities like Monsanto, who profit from these 
endeavors, are unconvincing. The best option for counter-communication will rest with 
those who benefit from GE food, but do not receive profits from the technology. For 
example, developing countries are reaping benefits from GE food, including reduced 
food diseases, increased protection from insects and more crop yields (Ritter & 
Borenstein, 2012). Organizations that facilitate international outreach, farmers who 
benefit from biotechnology, or even their families, would all be exceptional examples of 
the benefits of GE food. Still, these individuals do not have a direct obligation to address 
misconstrual of genetic engineering. This obligation is spread among the scientific 
community who are aware of GE food’s positive outcomes, and ethical risk 
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communication should drive professionals to objectively discuss risks and benefits. 
Unfortunately, too often other attributes associated with GE food, such as multi-national 
corporate ownership of biotechnology, push professionals to respond differently to 
scientific evidence.  
 Identifying responsibility, or obligation, to perceptual threats guides actional 
strategies. From this study, it appears that the strongest approaches employ two or more 
of Dowling and Pfeffer’s (1975) legitimacy building techniques. In the following section, 
larger implications discuss broader impact of perceptual threats. Following, suggestions 
for future research and conclusions are provided.  
Implications 
 Actional legitimacy theory offers practitioners guidance for future risk and crisis 
mitigation. This section offers practical recommendations for each crisis type. Within 
each crisis, suggestions concerning pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis phases are offered. 
Following, suggestions are made for future research.  
 Domino’s case suggests that issues monitoring pre-crisis is essential to identify 
emerging risks and manage issues before they erupt to a full crisis. If a third party did not 
alert Domino’s to the hoax video, it could have been much longer before the company 
was able to respond. Media monitoring and actively engaging in ongoing dialogue with 
stakeholders should remain a priority for organizations that have the means to staff a 
communications team. Should a hoax gain traction, responders should employ ample 
caution and question the validity of threat. Hoaxes or pranks are alarming, and it is 
important to consider the context and impact of the act. If stakeholders view the incident 
as a joke, addressing the issue may be a waste time and money. However, if prank 
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allegations are serious, non-response may not be an option. Lastly, practitioners should 
express lessons learned following a hoax incident. Mainly, they should seek to answer the 
questions: “Why did this happen” and “What will we do differently”? A key tenet of 
Domino’s response was ensuring that similar incidents would not occur again in the 
future – something that the company has upheld since 2009. McIntyre notes that after the 
YouTube hoax, new policy for the company mandated termination for any employees 
engaging in similar online behavior (personal communication, 2010). Since 2009, 
consistent monitoring also continues to address online conflict and contributes to 
relationship building (McIntyre, personal communication, 2010).  
 Unlike hoaxes, near misses are more predictable. Known vulnerabilities, warning 
signals, and strategic predictions should prompt pre-crisis planning. While there is no 
guarantee failure will happen, responders should have a crisis plan in place in case it 
does. Crises that almost happen can be highly emotionally charged – and cause high 
outrage even in absence of actual risk or damage. Stakeholders in the United States 
responded strongly to China’s melamine scare, and the FDA reacted appropriately with a 
robust and longitudinal response. Post-crisis, organizations should also express learning 
and emphasize what will be done differently to avoid future eruptions of crisis. Post-crisis 
response is extremely important for near misses. Stakeholders need to know what will 
change to ensure history does not repeat itself.  
 While post-crisis response is most important to near misses, pre-crisis issues 
monitoring is essential to misconstrual management. Misconstrual grows over time, and 
is exasperated by complacency. Organizations should engage in issues monitoring to 
track and respond to public sentiment for important issues. This is especially true when 
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entities stand to profit from winning an idea war – as is the case with biotechnology. In 
many ways, industry benefits from both sides of Prop 37. On one side, agrochemical 
companies like Monsanto benefit from the absence of labeling laws identifying 
engineered products. On the other, organic industries stand to profit from passing Prop 
37. General consumers may be unaware of who profits from decision-making, and 
communication campaigns are not always entirely transparent. Ongoing monitoring 
should identify misinformation and provide alternative information for arguments.  
 Manifested misconstrual demands that communicators discuss the emerging issue 
often and consider all levels of audience comprehension. Misconstrual happens over 
time, and in the case of biotechnology, brought hundreds of thousands of Californians to 
the ballot to vote for and against Prop 37. Counter-communication needs to be equally as 
comprehensive and address all interested parties all while using meaningful and 
functional language. In the end, crisis communication should extend to post-crisis efforts: 
Focusing on constant issue management and the sharing needed or missing information. 
Achieving true impact in combating misconstrual requires an investment and ongoing 
commitment. For example, California Right to Know worked for over a year to 
communicate what the FDA contended was misconstrued evidence against GE food. 
Conversely, a similar for-profit or non-profit entity arguing the opposite was nowhere 
near as visible promoting counter-communication. Pre-crisis monitoring and response 
will ideally tackle misconstrual issues before they are unmanageable, and before they 
reach a point of no return.  
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 This section distilled several key points from each crisis type to address future 
decision-making and actional legitimacy. Finally, limitations, future research, and 
conclusions are provided.  
Limitations 
 This project specifically focused on threats involving food. Hoaxes, near misses, 
and misconstrual cases in non-food related scenarios are also needed to extend 
understanding of these threats. Perceptual threats associated with food could elicit 
different reactions than non-food related incidents. This potential distinction should be 
investigated further, and could begin with case studies.  
 Next, this dissertation used a case study approach to describe perceptual threats. 
While the case study approach is valuable for in-depth, initial explanatory information, 
the method is neither generalizable nor predictive in nature. Additional research that 
explores these issues using surveys and experiments, for example, would be extremely 
valuable in more accurately measuring the impact of perceptual threats on individuals. 
Working towards predictive understanding is also important for mapping future risk and 
crisis communication responses.  
 Finally, the three perceptual threats described here merely begin the description of 
subjective risk and crises. These three cases are not all encompassing of perceptual 
threats and more work is needed to understand additional forms of perceptual risks and 
crises. In the following paragraphs, next steps for research are presented.  
Future Research 
 The theory of actional legitimacy proved insightful for this communication study. 
Future research should first begin by applying these concepts to other situational threats 
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such as workplace safety, diverse public health issues, or political scenarios. Applying 
actional legitimacy to new topical areas will further uncover the theory’s generalizability. 
In addition, this study revealed that the effectiveness of actional legitimacy could vary 
based on the context of the perceptual crisis. If, for example, the hoax or near miss is seen 
as inconsequential, drawing further attention to the event with actional legitimacy 
strategies may be unnecessary or even harmful. Thus, further research is needed to 
distinguish the contexts for when actional legitimacy is and is not appropriate. 
Second, this study revealed the potential for new media channels to both create 
and resolve perceptual crises. Monitoring social media discussions appears relevant to all 
three crisis types examined in this study. For example, social media was used to create 
and attenuate Domino’s crisis, to express concern over Chinese food imports, and to 
challenge existing confidence in biotechnology. Clearly, new media have a direct impact 
on an organization’s ability to develop and maintain social legitimacy. Future research 
should focus on how potential perceptual crises can be monitored and addressed through 
social media.  
Third, this study focused on organizations and organizational spokespersons. This 
focus is fitting with previous work that has applied actional legitimacy to perceptual 
crises. Future research should expand this focus to specifically test the responses of 
public stakeholders to various communication strategies designed to foster actional 
legitimacy. This shift in focus would involve message testing using surveys and 
laboratory experiments. Shifting to a consumer-oriented focus would create an 
opportunity to further advance the theory of actional legitimacy. Ultimately, an expanded 
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focus that allows for such message testing can move the theory toward a more predictive 
level. 
Finally, actional legitimacy is only one theoretical lens that has relevance to 
perceptual crises. Future research could focus on perceptual crises using theories and 
conceptual frameworks such as organizational mindfulness, high reliability organizations, 
and focusing events. Each of these theories addresses different levels or types of 
communication that are relevant for analyzing perceptual crises. Thus, viewing 
perceptual crises from a variety of theoretical perspectives would provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of how these events emerge and how they can best be 
resolved. 
Conclusion 
 This dissertation began by rationalizing the necessity of studying perceptual 
threats. Using three perceptual crises, including a hoax, near miss, and misconstrual 
crises, this dissertation illustrates the consequences of substantial responses to 
unsubstantiated claims. Outcomes associated with Domino’s YouTube hoax, China’s 
melamine crisis in the United States, and Prop 37 in California, exemplify the impact of 
unsubstantiated claims on associated organizations. This study further determined the 
viability of actional legitimacy and observed variance in communication challenges in 
differing crisis contexts. Understanding the impact of illegitimate claims, and appropriate 
communication response strategies is important for correcting false information. 
Communicators have a responsibility to use concise, clear, and ethical communication 
strategies to ensure stakeholders have necessary knowledge to engage in informed 
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decision-making. Actional legitimacy is one such corrective and useful communicative 
framework that responders should continue to consider in future risk and crisis scenarios.  
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